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Abstract 
 
 This thesis seeks to answer the ‘key question’: ‘how is the border worked at an 
international airport?’ To answer this key question the author, who is employed as a 
Customs officer, uses participant observation to provide material for an anthropological 
analysis of this question. The primary anthropological focus that will permeate throughout 
this thesis is interconnectedness of human and non human actors. 
 This focus on interconnectedness will be linked to the ability of the workers of the 
border to communicate about risk to one another. Risk at the border is highly political 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11 (9/11). The attacks are not a focus of this 
thesis but a study of the border network will shed some light on how the workers of the 
border make sense of external factors such as these attacks (9/11) in their work world.  
 The thesis accounts for links between the border workers of different government 
agencies and uses the idea of an occupational community to do so. The thesis will attempt 
to account for technologies within the border network. The account of technologies will 
demonstrate through an actor network approach their hybrid nature, and their ability to 
negotiate and renegotiate the border network. Power is analysed at the border through the 
ideas of Foucault. Though the idea of occupational community, actor network theory and 
the ideas of Foucault on power are not linked outside of this thesis in any way, they 
provide an honest account of the border network as expressed through the case study of 
risk and interagency communication at an international airport.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Aims of this thesis and Key Question 
Traditionally borders were looked upon as walls around city states or lines on a 
map 200 miles off the shoreline of a country. These ideas are no longer applicable and 
perhaps never really were an appropriate way to think of borders. There are so many lines 
of communication at the border that the idea of zone or network is in many ways better 
than any idea of a border being a line. “Border management should be seen in terms of a 
zone and a process” (Ladley and White, 2006: 17). A border, where passengers go through 
a zone or process is an area of risk, both to the country the passenger enters, the staff who 
work the border and the passengers themselves.  
 A key aspect of borders and border management is that borders are porous. Borders 
are where states project their power onto those who are wanting to enter their area of 
governance and those who are wanting to move away from it. Border management 
“represents the empirical manifestation of a state’s adaptation to its external environment” 
(Hills 2004: 5). Borders are where states project power onto the people crossing into and 
out of their area of their control. 
 The border becomes a place where power is contested between the people crossing 
the border and the agents of the government who work at the border. Before it was 
discussed how the border could be seen as a network, Aaltola believes that the airport can 
be seen as a central node of a network and states in relation to power that 
the more or less explicit lesson from the past seems to be that a modern 
world power should rely on a network of nodes and linkages rather than 
on extensive and direct occupation of territory (2005: 268). 
 
Technically speaking as to the theories that will be used later in this thesis networks do not 
have a centre and the border will be presented as a network as opposed to a zone. The 
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focus of these introductory comments on the border and power is to illustrate that 
traditional lineal and bounded concepts of borders are not applicable. Aaltola is arguing 
that modern states such as New Zealand no longer need to rely upon traditional occupation 
of territory to project their power, instead the central hubs of networks are a good point for 
them to project their power. Aaltola argues that state power at the border is projected on 
the travelling public through the use of metal detectors, x-rays and other technologies, 
which drive home to the public that their survival is at stake when crossing the border. 
Throughout this thesis some other examples of state power at the border will be used that 
take more of a middle ground when it comes to the projection of state power on the public, 
such as Salter  who explores the pragmatic difficulties that states face when using new 
technologies to project power at the border (2007). 
 Power contestations and the exertion of power at the border also exist between as 
well as among the workers of the border and the agencies that they work for. Foucault 
explores power and some of his discussions on the projection of state power being ad hoc 
as opposed to all encompassing will be used later in the chapter of this thesis that deals 
directly with power at the border. 
 This thesis asks the question ‘how is the border worked at an international 
airport?’ Which is to say, what do the workers of the border do to effectively police the 
border network? Policing the border network can be described as exerting the government 
of New Zealand’s will on the entry and exit of people and things into and out of  New 
Zealand. Being an anthropological study this thesis looks at the workers of the border 
themselves and what they do as opposed to their operating procedures and manuals to 
determine how the border is actually worked. The key question is one that will highlight 
the interconnected nature of the human and non human actors within the border network. 
 3 
 The answer to the question of how the border is worked can be framed by saying 
that the border workers fall into two different groups, one of which  constructs it’s identity 
in opposition to the other. The two groups are border workers and passengers. Border 
workers can be further broken down into workers who are members of the occupational 
community of border workers and those who are not. The border workers all work in 
alliance with various technologies and can under a particular theoretical approach be seen 
as actors within the border network.  
 The workers of the border who are members of the occupational community go 
about working the border in a different way than those who are not members of the 
occupational community. Communication between members of the occupational 
community is often negotiated through the technologies of the border. The technologies of 
the border also illuminate conflict between members of the occupational community and 
those outside of it.  
 When travelling across the border passengers are given the impression that they are 
under the eye of the panopticon. The panopticon is the concept of an all seeing ‘eye’. It is 
in the interest of the workers of the border and the government of New Zealand for 
passengers to be under this impression. The argument that is determined from the findings 
and analysis of this research is divergent from this concept. In actual fact, passengers when 
crossing the border, are under the many eyes of the border workers who are not ‘above’ 
like a panopticon would be, rather they are in the same network. At ground level the 
workers of the border are policing the border and going about their work in a public space. 
The workers of the border are in many ways under the eye of the travelling public as much 
as the travelling public is under their eye. The difference is that the border workers have 
the power over the passengers even if this power is exercised from ground level as opposed 
to from ‘above’ in a panoptical sense. 
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This thesis breaks the argument that is presented into three chapters. Intentionally 
the three chapters each focus upon a different theory or idea rather than one ‘all 
encompassing theory’. This is because the argument that is presented could not honestly 
and accurately represent the border workers or demonstrate how the border is worked 
using just one theory or idea used herein. The first chapter will look at the idea of an 
occupational community to describe one of the groups of border workers. The second 
chapter will focus upon the actor network theory of Bruno Latour to describe and analyse 
the alliances between the human and non human actors within the border network. Though 
not related to the idea of occupational community, actor network theory allows the links 
between the human actors that are on the inside and outside of the occupational community 
to be explored. Rather than focus on the conflict between the actor network theories of 
Latour and the idea of an occupational community, which are very different in their focus 
and intent, the chapters will use these theories and ideas to complement one another so as 
to analyse the whole concept of working the border. The final chapter explores power. This 
exploration of power is conducted using some ideas from Foucault such as the already 
mentioned panopticon as well as ideas of the power of government. Ideas of occupational 
community address power, in a worker vs. management structure. To supplement and 
readdress ideas of power in a more effective manner, a  Foucauldian focus of power in the 
later part of this thesis will explore power in a more appropriate way to the border context.  
Occupational community, actor network theory, and Foucault’s ideas of power are 
not theoretically linked in any way outside of their use in this thesis. Within the argument 
presented by this thesis the ideas do have a utility and aspects of the different arguments or 
ideas will be demonstrated to complement each other as the argument progresses between 
chapters. 
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Border Sector Governance Group 
 The key focus of this thesis is the communication between border workers that 
allows the border network to effectively mitigate risk. This is not a focus or area that has 
been studied academically but it has been a focus of the government following September 
11 2001. Post September 11 terrorist attacks the various intelligence, Police and border 
agencies of the United States were widely criticised for their failures in detecting and 
preventing the attacks. One of the main criticisms was that all the information required to 
have prevented the attacks was available to the United State’s government as a whole. The 
problem was that the information was held in small chunks by an assortment of agencies, 
including border agencies, who did not communicate information with each other 
effectively.  
The direction taken in recent years by many western nations has been to 
amalgamate border agencies, one such agency being ‘Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement’ or ‘ICE’, which is the lead enforcement agency in the United States 
department of homeland security. ICE works with the Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) agency, which has the main uniformed presence at international airports in the 
United States. Recent arguments have been put forward that further amalgamation of these 
agencies may be required. 
Recognizing that partnerships are essential, ICE worked closely across 
agency boundaries with law enforcement colleagues at the local, state and 
federal levels and across international boundaries to form a united front 
against criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations that threaten public 
safety and national security. (ICE, 2009) 
 
The New Zealand government was not faced with the same immediate risk post September 
11 as the United States government. However, it also introduced projects to review the 
way border agencies work together. A key driver of this was the post September 11 
demand from the United States to secure exports going to the United States from the point 
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of export. The Customs magazine talks of two projects that are linked to the need to have 
the diverse border agencies working together. 
The job of protecting the border against people, pests and products that 
could harm New Zealand has become a whole lot harder in recent years 
due to the resurgence of international terrorism, pandemic threats, the 
globalisation of the world economy and the growth of overseas travel and 
tourism… (Contraband 2007: 5) 
 
The New Zealand ‘Border Sector Governance Group’ (BSGG) is made up of CEO’s from 
the border related agencies and its working group the ‘Border Sector Co-ordination 
Project’ (BSCP) involves staff from all the border agencies. One of the main difficulties 
faced by the BSCP has been the need to “get agreement on a common definition of the 
border and border management across agencies” (Hing, 2007: 4). The project is attempting 
to: 
map then analyse the operational processes used by each of us (border 
agencies) to see where there is scope for better co-ordination and shared 
investment. This work is now a key reference point for identifying 
potential opportunities for alignment in both operations and information 
systems… The first stage is to bring together a picture of the current state 
of information systems, and their integration and overlap across agencies. 
A myriad of systems – including paper based systems – exists across our 
border management processes for people, goods and craft. (Contraband 
2007: 5) 
 
The border network of New Zealand is influenced by requirements set down by the United 
States border network in response to a breach of that network in the form of the September 
11 attacks. The BSGG and the BSCP are both looking at how agencies work together at 
strategic, operational and tactical levels. This thesis is not directly linked to these projects 
but it is a timely opportunity to look at what actually happens amongst the workers of 
these different agencies ‘on the shop floor’ or at a tactical level. 
 
The Fieldwork Site 
 The international airport where the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted was 
based near to one of the three main cities in New Zealand. The airport catered to flights 
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from Australia as well as ‘long haul’ international flights. The airport were it not called an 
airport could be aptly described as a small town, having restaurants, pharmacies, 
hairdressers and 1000s of people working, shopping or sleeping there at all hours of day 
and night.  
 The airport studied had all the essential elements that make it an airport, runways, a 
control tower, passenger terminals, aeroplanes, passengers and most importantly for the 
purposes of this thesis, workers. The workers at an international airport can be roughly 
split into two main categories, those who work for the government and those who work for 
private enterprise including the airport itself. This thesis focuses upon the workers of the 
border who work for the government and are in some way involved in policing the border.  
 The international airport must be policed in a way that a normal domestic or private 
airfield does not have to be. This is because an international airport is the point where 
travellers first enter a country. Travellers and crew first have to enter New Zealand at an 
international port due to an act of legislation, specifically, section 24 of the Customs and 
Excise Act 1996, which states: 
1) Subject to sections 21 and 25 of this Act, the person in charge of a craft 
— 
(a) That arrives within New Zealand on a journey from a point outside 
New Zealand; or 
(b) That is carrying — 
(i) Persons; or 
(ii) Goods subject to the control of the Customs — brought in that craft or 
any other craft from a point outside New Zealand — 
must ensure that the craft lands, anchors, or otherwise arrives only at the 
Customs place, which in the case of a craft to which section 21 of this Act 
applies, shall be the Customs place nominated by that person in 
accordance with that section. 
(2) On arrival at the nominated Customs place or Customs controlled area 
within that place, and until an inward report in accordance with section 26 
of this Act has been made, no person shall leave or board the craft unless 
authorised to do so by a Customs officer. 
 
As such when arriving in New Zealand a passenger does not simply land at an airport 
because it is a long strip of concrete with fewer obstacles for the pilot to avoid than a 
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farmer’s paddock. Passengers land at an airport because it is where the border agencies 
police and administer their arrival into New Zealand. This section will provide an account 
of these different agencies, their approximate numbers at the airport studied and the status 
of their employees (full time or part-time) as well as their prime outputs, which is to say 
what the government of New Zealand expects them to do. Importantly these outlines will 
describe what the workers of these agencies wear, as this for most passengers is the key 
difference between them. This section will account for the five agencies that all have staff 
at the international airport studied, and will mention the agencies that have links to 
policing the border, as well as the unions that represent staff across the spectrum of the 
border workers. 
 
New Zealand Customs Service 
The New Zealand Custom Service at the international airport studied employs 
around one hundred staff, split between approximately two thirds full-time to the 
remainder part-time. Full-time workers work a pattern of six days on three days off, or six 
nights on, three days off then three early shifts and three day shifts followed by three days 
off. The part-time workers are called Variable Hours Officers (VHOs) and work five days 
on three days off, often they work split shifts with start and finish times depending upon 
the incoming and outgoing flights. Customs officers wear dark blue pants, light blue shirts 
with black and gold epaulettes and Customs badges and a dark blue tie; to the average 
traveller they look like a Policeman without the anti stab vests and weapons. 
Customs is tasked by the government with enforcing the Customs and Excise Act 
1996, which involves enforcing duty and GST collection at the border as well as stopping 
prohibited imports entering New Zealand. Duty and GST collection at the airport studied 
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varied over the course of the fieldwork I conducted from $30,000 worth of cameras being 
bonded to frequent collections of $70 duty and GST on an extra carton of cigarettes.  
Customs officers act as Immigration officers, which is to say when a person enters 
or leaves New Zealand it is a Customs officer immigrating or emigrating them on behalf of 
the Immigration Service. If any issues from this process arise the Customs officer transfers 
the responsibility to the immigration service who make decisions around issues such as 
visas and permits as well as deportation and refugee claims. 
Customs also enforces the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 and is actively involved in 
searching people’s possessions and their persons for drug importations. The Misuse of 
Drugs Act is linked to certain prohibition orders that Customs also enforces. These prohibit 
items over a wide spectrum from stun guns and pepper spray to cannabis and 
methamphetamine pipes. At the international airport studied Customs officers worked 
closely with Police and Customs investigators after the drugs had been detected entering 
New Zealand. Customs officer use specially trained drug detector dogs at the airport to 
detect large amounts or trace amounts of illegal drugs. 
Customs also administers a variety of other legislation at the border, such as the 
Medicines Act 1981. This act prohibits and controls un-prescribed medication entering 
New Zealand. This medication is stopped from entering New Zealand to reduce the chance 
of dangerous counterfeit medicines entering the country as well as to ensure people are not 
taking pills that are not suitable for them or not endorsed by New Zealand authorities. Of a 
similar safety vein Customs enforces the Consumer Standards Act and stops items like 
unsafe cigarette lighters entering New Zealand. Customs enforces the Department of 
Internal Affairs (DIA) standards for movies and intercepts objectionable material such as 
child pornography. Customs also plays a role in airport security, non proliferation of 
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weapons of mass destruction, intellectual copyright, financial crime reporting and anti 
fraud activities. 
On a day to day basis at the airport studied officers also frequently enforced 
assorted Department of Conservation (DOC) legislation. The DOC legislation regulates 
endangered species or products from them entering New Zealand as well as species leaving 
New Zealand along with non living heritage things like pounamu (greenstone). Much of 
this enforcement around environmental products is based on the CITES Act (convention on 
international trade in endangered species) which is also administered by MAF. MAF’s 
focus is not on the processed products but animal or plant products in unprocessed form. 
This processed versus unprocessed state is the line between Customs and MAF when it 
comes to environmental issues. For example, Customs will seize a box of ‘po chi pills’ a 
product of the endangered plant ‘Aucklandia lappa’, but MAF would seize the actual plant 
if encountered at the border. 
 
MAF - Biosecurity New Zealand 
 The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is what is traditionally known as the 
quarantine service. Over the course of the fieldwork, MAF became MAF Biosecurity New 
Zealand and changed their uniforms as well as staffing structure. MAF officers are spilt 
into quarantine enforcement officers and quarantine assistants. MAF staff who are full time 
workers work a pattern of five nine hour days and then three days off. This pattern rotates 
between a month of night shift and a month of day shift. MAF officers at the outset of the 
fieldwork wore green shirts and MAF badges with dark grey pants but have since changed 
and have yellow and black Biosecurity New Zealand badges on more business like green, 
white and brown pinstripe shirts.  
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 MAF officers look to stop biosecurity risks entering New Zealand such as food 
items of risk like uncooked vegetables and meat, as well as flora, fauna, replies and insects. 
The MAF officers at the airport are also involved in clearing cargo when they are not 
involved in processing flights. MAF relies upon biosecurity detector dogs, of which most 
are beagles, to detect food at the airport. 
 MAF operates under a variety of legislation including the Biosecurity Act 1993, the 
Hazardous Substances and new Organisms Act 1996, the Agricultural Compounds and 
Vetinary Medicines Act 1997 and has linkages to a variety of conservation acts.  
 
Aviation Security - AVSEC 
 The Aviation Security Service or AVSEC is the agency responsible for screening 
people and their luggage as well as cargo on flights into and out of New Zealand’s 
domestic and international airports. AVSEC is also responsible for the physical security of 
the airports and the planes when they are on the ground. To do this AVSEC uses officers at 
checkpoints that passengers must pass through before they fly as well as officers on roving 
foot and vehicle patrol. AVSEC officers also utilise dogs to sniff out explosives. At the 
international airport studied there were a similar number of AVSEC staff to Customs staff. 
 AVSEC wears a light blue uniform and officers often wear peaked light blue hats 
and high visibility vests when they are on tarmac patrols. Unlike all the other border 
agencies mentioned, AVSEC is essentially self-funding, which is to say that the funds that 
AVSEC uses to carry out their screening of passengers comes from charges levied to 
airlines who then charge passengers as part of their ticketing. 
 During the course of the fieldwork that was conducted at the international airport a 
relatively major incident occurred at the domestic part of the airport where a plane landed 
that had been allegedly ‘hijacked’ on a domestic route. Incidents such as this bring AVSEC 
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very much to the forefront of public consciousness. Border workers from other agencies 
are aware that outside of their workplace, most people will think of AVSEC when they tell 
them that they work for MAF or Customs. At the international airport studied there were 
over one hundred AVSEC officers working who rotated between the international and 
domestic terminals. AVSEC operate under the jurisdiction of the Civil Aviation Act 1990, 
the Aviation Crimes Act 1972 and a variety of civil aviation rules as well as trespass 
legislation. 
 
Police 
The airport Police due to international air travel conventions are present at all times 
during the processing of international flights. Under international air travel regulations the 
airport Police also have to be armed. As such the airport Police with their holstered pistols 
and anti-stab vests are a very visible part of the border network. Aside from the 
requirement to be present and to be armed airport Police operate under the same wide 
variety of laws that Police outside of the airport operate under. Their appearance is the 
same as any other Police officer in New Zealand aside from the fact that they are armed at 
all times which is not the case for Police outside the confines of the airport.  
At the international airport studied the number of airport Police officers varied as 
they were often deployed on other jobs or secondments, but for the most part their number 
remained at about twenty staff who rotated through a shift pattern. Airport Police are the 
main people involved in arresting offenders at the airport. If Customs or AVSEC catches 
an offender in most (but not all) instances a Police officer will actually make the arrest 
under advice of the another border worker and take the suspect into custody. The airport 
Police are the only airport staff with the tools required for long term detention, such as 
handcuffs and holding cells. The airport Police work closely with the Immigration service 
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(INZ), and will often escort them when they leave the airport to go and find a person who 
needs to be deported. INZ also calls on the Police regularly to take into custody arriving 
passengers who have been refused entry and who are to be deported.  
 
Immigration New Zealand 
 Immigration New Zealand (INZ) is part of the Department of Labour. It’s officers 
at the border are involved in the border security aspect of immigration rather than the 
processing of applications for residency and work etc. The international airport studied has 
a team of approximately ten border security group officers who are the resident experts in 
travel documents. INZ staff at the airport have the tools and training to detect false 
passports and the visa labels and stamps within them. INZ staff at the airport conduct 
interviews with persons who may pose a risk to the New Zealand border such as potential 
workers coming in on visitor’s permits or people who have declared (or not declared) 
criminal convictions. Immigration officers wear ‘corporate uniform’, which is essentially 
business type shirt and pants, with a label on each item identifying the person as INZ. The 
Immigration officers at the airport studied operate under the Immigration Act 1987, 
Immigration Act Commencement Order 1987, Immigration (Refugee Processing) 
Regulations 1999 , Immigration Regulations 1999, Immigration (Special Regularisation) 
Regulations 2000 and the Immigration (Transit Visas) Regulations 2002. 
 
Border Linked Agencies 
 Many government agencies are linked to the border without actually having staff 
who work there on a constant basis. This is because government agencies, as apparatuses 
of the state have a need to assert control (such as through the gathering of knowledge) over 
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the population of the state. Without the ability to police the border the state loses a veneer 
of control over its population. 
 Agencies such as Inland Revenue (IRD) and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) have 
links to the border to stop or keep track of persons with debt or fines or warrants for their 
arrest who may attempt to leave or re-enter New Zealand. The Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA) and Maritime New Zealand (MNZ) also have links to the border through the 
regulation of travel and the ‘Secure Export Scheme’ agreement with the United States. 
Various intelligence agencies such as the Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) have an 
interest in who crosses the border. The New Zealand Defence Force, especially the Air 
Force and Navy have a role in protecting the offshore borders of New Zealand and work 
with border agencies in this capacity. The Ministry of Fisheries (MAF) and the Department 
of Conservation (DOC) also have links to agencies that police the border at the airport as 
they enforce various laws that prevent certain species from leaving New Zealand. The 
Ministry of Health (MOH) also has strong links to agencies that police risk at the border as 
SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and other global pandemics have become more 
of a risk to New Zealand. There are MOH plans in place should a pandemic be detected at 
the border that involves liaison between core border agencies such as Customs and the 
MOH. 
 These departments and agencies mentioned are only the main ones with links to the 
border and border specific agencies, whose workers are the focus of this thesis.  
Ladley and White in reference to the SARS epidemic sum up the benefits of the various 
government agencies having links to the border 
The border is also a useful opportunity to disseminate information as well 
as to collect it. (2006: 48) 
 
These various agencies all have one factor in common when looking at their link to the 
border and this is a focus on preventing a risk manifested or apparent at the border. 
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Unions 
 Many of the workers of the border belong to Unions that are linked to all the 
different border agencies such as the Public Services Association. Other agencies also have 
unions that are specific to their organisation alone such as the Police Association and the 
Customs Officers Association. Some agencies at the border are very well represented in 
certain unions (100% membership in some workplaces) whereas other agencies union 
representatives see their workplace as under represented. The unions forge links between 
the workers of the border from different agencies, and their role in the communication of 
information between the workers of different agencies, especially around terms of pay and 
employment conditions cannot be under estimated. 
 
Theoretical Background 
Latour and Actor Network Theory 
 Bruno Latour’s theories will be a key method used in this thesis to analyse the 
hybrid assemblages workers of the border composed of the multiple technologies 
mobilised in the performance of their work. Latour’s Actor Network Theory (Latour 2005) 
focuses on the maxim of “follow the actor.” This following of the actor looks at how new 
technologies are introduced to a network. Latour acknowledges the importance of objects 
and persons as networks. In this view the border is a network though Latour has not done 
any specific work on state borders, as it is made up of a range of actors who can be defined 
as “entities that do things” (Latour, 1992: 241).  
 Other studies of workplaces have used actor network theory to look at and 
supplement their analysis of the relationship between human and non human participants 
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within a network. Orr used the theory to look at the relationships between photocopier 
technicians, photocopiers and the customers: 
This analysis is based on Bruno Latour’s assertion (1986, 1988) that 
machines participate in society; the interactions of people and machines 
are interpreted by the human participants through a form of social 
bricolage, with actions and meanings negotiated in context by the 
participants. (1996: 3)  
 
This thesis will similarly use actor network theory to look at the relationships between 
different border workers and the machines they use to mitigate risk. The third chapter will 
analyse different ethnographic examples in which social bricolage occurs. Bricolage can 
best be described as 
the reflective manipulation of a closed set of resources to accomplish 
some purpose. The set is the accumulation of previous manipulations, 
one’s experience and knowledge and, in literal bricolage, physical 
objects. The manipulation is done in the context of a specific goal, which 
influences the process. The items in the set are not limited to a single use 
or a single meaning, but their properties limit their possible applications. 
(Orr, 1996: 121) 
 
The theory outlined here is appropriate to use at the border as the border is best understood 
as a network. Latour’s various works have accounted for the role of certain actors within 
networks and their appearance or in the case of the work ‘Aramis’ the death of 
technologies before they arrive. The use of this theory allows the border workers to be 
studied on an equal footing with the technologies that are present at the border and for both 
to be understood as a hybrid entity. As both human and non-human workers are involved 
in policing the border this is important. Due to the border network being in a constant state 
of change the use of this theory allows for an account of change within the network as 
opposed to a black and white ethnography of a site in a fabricated state of limbo. 
 The key literature of Latour’s that was used in this thesis was focused upon his 
work on technologies and their place within actor networks. The two main books used 
were ‘Reassembling the Social’ (2005) and ‘Aramis or the Love of Technology’(1986). 
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‘Reassembling the social’ focuses upon actor network theory and it has been used as a core 
text to complement his earlier and diverse articles and chapters on actor network theory 
that have also been used. ‘Aramis’ is a pseudo detective story that tracks he demise of a 
new technology and how it was ‘killed’. These articles and chapters are various works of 
Latour and others such as Laurier (2004) who discuss Latour’s theories on actor networks 
in the context of specific examples and general applications. 
 One of the main criticisms of actor network theory is that it does not account for 
existing structures and their power dimensions. In this thesis rather than bringing in the 
critics I have introduced other  approaches that do account for power such as Foucault. 
These are individual arguments that are used such as Foucault’s application of power upon 
the public, which I use to describe aspects of the border workers world. Organisational 
culture also addresses power as it looks at groups that shape their identity in opposition to 
one another.  
 
Occupational Community 
 Occupational community is an applicable description of a specific group of border 
workers discussed in this thesis. Unlike actor network theory which can analyse human / 
non human hybrids, occupational community simply accounts for one group’s identity and 
the consequences of this identity being expressed. Occupational community in this light 
does have a place within the arguments presented in this thesis. Occupational community 
does not describe all border workers, but does accurately represent a large group effective 
at policing the border. 
The idea of an occupational community is drawn from industrial sociology and was 
popular initially as a means of understanding how modern workers share cultural and 
social values. Salaman  wrote on the topic extensively in the 1980s and traces the decline 
in its use to lack of sociological concern concerning a “vanishing form of work/ 
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community connection” (1986: 75). Salaman argued that an occupational community is 
constituted through 
people who work together (and) choose to form a relationship amongst 
themselves, which can sensibly be described as an occupational 
community. They may or may not live together… But whether they live 
together or not spatially, they live together socially and culturally. They 
inhabit the same world of meaning and identity; share a language; a 
vocabulary of symbols, knowledge of the work world, a world taken for 
granted and shared references, mythic figures, incidents, jokes, in short a 
culture. (1986: 75-76) 
  
Full time workers, who have been in their positions or have had a variety of diverse 
experiences at the airport, make up this border occupational community. They do not live 
together in the ‘army officer’ type scenario that Salaman talks of, but most do live in close 
proximity to the airport, and interestingly during the research I found a disproportionate 
number tended to live outside the traditional suburban limits of the city either on rural 
properties or lifestyle blocks. This large number of rural dwelling border workers is a 
source of amusement for those border workers who live in suburbia. The occupational 
community studied meets all the other defining point;, they share cultural values, a 
vocabulary, jokes etc but the key facet in separating them from their other border workers 
is seen in the way they have a special ‘knowledge of work’. The border workers studied all 
understand work in a different way to those outside of the occupational community, and I 
would argue that this makes them more effective at policing the border as they can 
communicate between the various border agencies in a effective manner.  
 This leads on to the question as to why when using this concept all the border 
workers studied do not meet the criteria outlined above. The reason that the other border 
workers are not part of this occupational community is that they cannot join due to not 
having learned the procedures or not having demonstrated a willingness to accept the 
authority of the community  
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Joining such an occupational community involves not simply or primarily 
learning the formal procedures and skills, but becoming an insider to the 
highly restricted social code which is incomprehensible to the outsider, 
and which is not open to entry until the newcomer has demonstrated his/ 
her willingness to accept the authority of the community. (Salaman 1986: 
76) 
 
This will be discussed in more detail in the chapter on the workers of the border but it is 
important to note as Salaman does that “studies of occupational communities are more 
interested in describing in what such communities are like than they are in explaining them 
or analysing their consequences” (1986: 77). While I will focus on what the occupational 
community is like and talk about the shared identity I will also draw upon two other main 
theorists who use occupational community in a pragmatic way. 
Zaloom (2006) looks at what could be described as an occupational community of 
brokers, but she looks beyond their shared identity to how they exploit risk to shape their 
identity and also how risk attitudes shapes them. In a similar vein is Kondo (1990). Kondo 
writes of communities of Japanese artisans and how their work shapes their identity. 
Kondo looks at the effect their work identity has on the work itself, especially as to 
efficiency and coping mechanisms.  
Foucault’s views of Power 
 Foucault’s ideas on power and governmentality will be the basis of my arguments 
in chapter four of this thesis. These arguments and the chapter will not be as 
comprehensive as occupational community and actor network theory as the points that will 
be analysed will have already have been raised in earlier chapters. Chapter fours focus on 
power therefore seeks to frame how power is involved in the way the border workers go 
about ‘working the border’. Foucault’s view on power is split into three focuses, one on the 
power of disciplinary, controlling power this is in the context of the border seen as state 
power and knowledge. The second focus is on relational, interactional forms of power 
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between two or more entities, and the ways in which one entity tries or succeeds in 
disallowing the other certain things or behaviours. The border workers can be seen as 
instruments of state power. Border workers can also be seen as actors in relational 
competitions for power between each other and people crossing the border. The third focus 
is on the pastoral power of the state and its duty of care towards it’s citizens. 
 This thesis is concerned with communication between border workers and how this 
communication makes the border work. As mentioned earlier power at the border is 
expressed between the complicated relationships of workers, passengers and technologies. 
Simple polarities of power such as ‘all border workers wield absolute power over the 
travelling public’ or ‘the x-ray machines, ion scanners and metal detectors allow the border 
workers to control passengers’  are not appropriate to this study. Rather power must be 
acknowledged as Jermier and Knights do 
Relations of power and resistance operate in more complex ways than can 
be depicted in simple all or nothing polarities (1994: 3). 
 
Foucault’s views of power are wide ranging and linked to his studies of governmentality. 
Foucault study of power and governmentality of which his work ‘Governmentality’ (2006: 
131-143) provide a good example of the way in which he accounts for the historical 
aspects of governmentality and looks at aspects of the exertion of control and power from 
the individual governance of self to state governance. Power at the border is linked to 
governmentality which in Foucault’s views was not necessarily top down power and was 
also not necessarily linked to the creation of identity. 
Power then does not directly determine identity but merely provides the 
conditions of possibility for its self-formation – a process involving 
perpetual tension between power and resistance or subjectivity and 
identity (Jermier and Knights, 1994: 8). 
 
Power to Foucault is not automatically held by the individual subject nor is it always held 
in centres of government in the case of the border this could be seen as the workers 
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management. Power is best viewed as a relationship within a society, there can be in his 
discussions no grand theory of power as one would perhaps expect in a traditional concept 
of border management. In a traditional concept of border management the border is a wall 
with the gates presided over by all powerful workers who convey the states will over those 
who wish to pass through. Knights and Vurdubakis summarise Foucault’s argument 
concisely and say that 
Power… is the name given to a certain coherency of social relations 
which in turn make possible the construction of a ‘grid of intelligibility’ 
of the social order: ‘one needs to be nominalistic no doubt; power is not 
an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are 
endowed with, it is the name one attributes to a complex strategic 
relationship in a particular society.’ (1994: 172) 
 
A criticism of this argument is that it is Eurocentric which can mean that it does not 
account for the realities faced in parts of the world where individuals and states do 
apparently hold tangible and all encompassing power over the actions of those they govern. 
Rather than critique Foucault’s arguments in this was a better way to understand them 
would be to realise that Foucault is instead saying that the mechanisms of power do not 
necessarily 
tend to convey the exercise of a will over others in the most homogenous, 
continuous and exhaustive way possible. It is a matter rather of revealing 
a level of the necessary and sufficient action of those who govern (2007; 
66). 
 
An appropriate way to talk of power in relation to workers mitigating risk at an 
international airport is to twist the metaphor of the panopticon that Foucault in his ‘College 
de France lectures’ refers to. The panopticon is a concept based upon a central eye of 
governance that sees all and thus ensures compliance through the behaviour of those under 
observation, assuming that they are always possibly under observation.  
The idea of the panopticon is a modern idea in one sense, but we can also 
say that it is completely archaic, since the panoptic mechanism basically 
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involves putting someone in the centre- an eye, a gaze, a principle of 
surveillance- who will be able to make its sovereignty function over all 
the individuals [placed] within this machine of power (2007: 66). 
 
The panopticon at the border is in fact made up many all seeing eyes from below rather 
than above. This is an argument that will be presented in chapter four of this thesis. The 
argument is facilitated through the use of Foucault’s concepts of power, which 
complement the description of the border workers in an occupational community and the 
theory of how these workers relate to the technologies at the border as viewed through 
Latour. 
 
Risk 
Risk refers to… external dangers… The systems for communicating risk- 
its people, rules, formats, and technologies- is a part of the social meaning 
of risk. That is, threats and dangers are recognised, responded to, and 
made real through the human intervention and use of risk classifications 
and technologies. (Erickson and Haggerty 2002: 238) 
 
 Risk at the border can be defined in two ways. The first way, individual risk is not 
the principal focus of this thesis but will be addressed on occasions as part of the 
ethnographic detail. Individual risk can be defined as the risk to workers of the border as 
they go about their work. This risk to quote two informants thinking at opposite ends of the 
individual risk spectrum can be viewed as follows  
“I run the risk of being dismissed from my job or personal prosecution 
should I do something unlawful at work”  
to 
 “a jumbo jet might run over my foot if I am not looking out carefully 
enough!” 
 
Like every worker going about their job the workers of the border face some degree of risk 
in their day. The main risk focus of this thesis is the risk that the workers of the border are 
paid to mitigate, that is risk to the border itself. Risk to the border can come from, drugs, 
people, flora and fauna or any number of potential things that the New Zealand 
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government has deemed cannot come into, or leave the country at all or without revenue 
being collected off it for the crown. The community of border workers can therefore be 
understood as a risk community, it is made up of 
institutions that organize on the basis of knowledge of risk. These 
institutions expend a significant proportion of their resources on the 
production and distribution of knowledge of risk. This knowledge is used 
to manage populations, provide security and take risks. (Erickson and 
Haggerty 2002: 238) 
 
Other risk theorists that are useful in the discussion and study of risk include Lupton 
(1999) and Joffee (1999) both of whom look at the way in which risk is externalised. 
Externalisation of risk is a useful albeit obvious way to understand risk at the border. 
Caplan is a contemporary risk theorist and usefully outlines Beck’s argument that risk has 
increased as a side to the “productive forces in the modernisation process” (2000: 2). The 
growth and production of risk will be a core concern in the third and fourth chapters of this 
thesis in relation to technology and power at the border.  
   
Research Methodology – situating myself “you are not the border” 
Instead of studying the work, they report on its organization and 
administration; instead of describing what the men do, they examine their 
feelings and values. These may be worthwhile things to do, but they 
cannot be done properly unless the observer understands the nature of the 
work whose administration he is examining, and the constraints and 
contingencies which effect the men who do it.  
(Orr 1996: 155-156) 
 
Orr conducted his fieldwork on photocopier technicians through participant 
observation. He worked as a photocopier repair man and observed interesting and mundane 
events that occurred during his work time. Following the incident when opportunity arose, 
Orr would conduct interviews and discussions with those involved in the incidents. These 
incidents and the participants feedback were recorded and then analysed in the context of 
his writing at a later time. The benefits of conducting fieldwork in this way are described 
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by Orr in the quote above. The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted in the same way. 
The fieldwork was able to be conducted in this was as the author is a full time border work, 
who wrote this thesis in his time off over several years. The benefits of fieldwork 
conducted in this manner is an intimate understanding of the research area, and open and 
honest relationships with participants based upon shared experiences. These relationships 
could be used to conduct revealing interviews and ‘on the record’ discussions.  
The downside of conducting fieldwork in this way is outlined by Orr who faced the 
same problems as were encountered in this thesis: “I also found that I had a tendency to 
regards certain phenomena as unremarkable which was not really so to outsiders” (1996: 
7). This tendency was often apparent in meetings with my supervisors, when I would 
causally mention that last week I had been involved in a strip search that had ended up in a 
person’s prosthetic limb being x-rayed. To them incidents such as these were remarkable 
but to me the incident was an everyday occurrence in a day at work. 
The method of research that was conducted falls under the umbrella of participant 
observation. Specifically my role within the airport is on the Customs enforcement team 
and I tend to spend much of my time roving1 and trouble shooting2 as well as working in 
the control room. As such, a large part of a workday is spent liaising with other agencies 
airport staff.  
 Through work relationships I have been able to conduct a range of formal 
interviews and casual ‘on the record’ conversations that have provided me with a range of 
information pertinent to my topic. The formal as well as the informal interviews were 
conducted in accordance with the ‘University of Canterbury Sociology and Anthropology 
                                                 
 
1
 Roving- involves patrolling the arrival hall and ‘profiling’ passengers for search activity as well as 
observing known targets of interest to Customs.  
2
 Trouble Shooting – being the officer in charge of the ‘primary line’ processing staff. This involves 
managing the passenger queues and taking passengers to immigration officers or contacting immigration 
officers if they do not meet the requirements to enter NZ. 
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Department Human Ethics Committee’ guidelines and approval from Customs 
management. All participants who have been quoted or mentioned have either not been 
given names, or have been given false names and in some instances their gender was 
changed in the text so as to maintain their privacy. 
 The number of formal and informal interviews conducted ran into the thirties over 
the course of the research. Most of these interviews were ‘informal’ rather than formal and 
were probably only differentiated from a professional conversation by the fact that I would 
be taking notes or recording the conversation. Often the interviews would run into subject 
matter that is not published in this thesis for reasons of privacy and security. In general the 
interviews however allowed me to see incidents that I had myself observed from another 
border worker’s perspective, to understand the risk they focused on and how they 
communicated it. Questionnaires were also distributed to staff which provided valuable 
ethnographic material to gauge what kind of incidents staff had been involved in (see 
appendix one).  
 Throughout the thesis the use of the phrase ‘I’ gives my account of an event or 
incident that was observed. This I believe does not detract from an impartial ethnography 
as I have not given my personal account of what I do or look for in regards to risk. 
Accounts of what staff look for and how they go about their work or what they believe 
when doing so are not prefixed with ‘I’, but they are “italicised” and put in quotation 
marks. 
 An international airport is a place of security and law enforcement. So in the course 
of the fieldwork various incidents that occurred have in some cases been adjusted slightly, 
so as not to divulge organisational security for the agency concerned. In other instances, 
for example where a staff training table is used, that shows the ability of staff to detect a 
range of risks, the specific risk had been #### out so as not to divulge specific intelligence. 
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This is particularly applicable with respect to incidents or intelligence around drugs and 
counter terrorism. This does not detract from the arguments or analysis in relation to the 
workers of the border, as this thesis focuses on their behaviour towards, and ability to 
communicate about risks to the border and themselves rather than the specific risks.  
 Throughout this research the awareness that criminal and terrorist groups are just as 
willing to gather intelligence on the governments policing agencies as the agencies are on 
these illegal groups has been a consideration. As such, specific descriptions of processes 
and methods of enforcement have in a few instances left some aspects out. This thesis, 
while making a study of the workers of the border will not reveal the non-public methods 
that they use any more than a television episode of the series ‘Border Patrol’ would. 
 Over the course of the research phase of this thesis my standing at the airport meant 
I was invited to a variety of interagency meetings of direct relevance to this thesis. One 
such example was a BSGG meeting, which involved the local managers of different border 
agencies being briefed by a national steering group manager on the BSGG. Similarly I was 
also involved in a meeting and ongoing project in which MAF was trying to bring in a new 
biosecurity enforcement process and utilise roving officers, a practise familiar to officers 
like myself but unfamiliar to MAF. At this meeting with MAF I was involved in putting 
into place Customs ‘tools’ and ‘methods’ to be used to mitigate an entirely different risk 
set. Exposure to meetings such as these, and my work relationships with officers of other 
agencies at the border has meant that I have had, what I believe to be, a large amount of 
access to information, people and research material to do justice to the topic of ‘working 
the border.’ In doing so I wish to follow in the footsteps of the only anthropologist that I 
encountered in the course of my fieldwork, Robert Lee Maril, who conducted participant 
observation with the Texas Border Patrol and who argued: 
The objectives and the goals of the Border Patrol can clearly be advanced 
by employing social scientists (2004: 301-302).  
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Through only accounting for the opinions of other border workers and using their 
observations as the core of my fieldwork rather than my own, this thesis will present a 
balanced account of the border workers ‘policing’ the border. This account is separated 
from my acknowledged desire to provide a meaningful and useful analysis of their work, 
through theoretical analysis and the previously mentioned stylistic differentiation between 
my accounts of events and informants opinions.  
 Can someone within the border network research and write about it in a reflexive 
manner? This is a question that the author has kept at the forefront throughout this research 
due to his dual role as worker and researcher. My honours dissertation looked at ‘humour 
within the navy’ of which I was a serving officer at the time. As such I have experience in 
writing about the area in which I am working. It could also be argued that the actor 
network approach allows for or perhaps even forces the author to ‘step back’, and in the 
course of acknowledging the importance of non human actors within a network he or she 
must also therefore look at the importance of himself or herself as a member of the 
network.  
It is worth mentioning ‘sick days’, the author was forced by to take a sick day 
during the course of the research and in the course of complaining that he should go to 
work because he had jobs to do was told “you are not the border, and it will go on without 
you…” The focus therefore that has been taken is that the author is indeed not the border 
and as such he has withdrawn himself from as many emic opinions or ruminations as 
possible. 
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A ‘Typical’ Border Crossing 
 As a one of the final components to this introduction a fictional but altogether 
typical border crossing will be presented to illustrate how the border is crossed by a 
‘routine traveller’. This is presented in order to escape the risk that is presented by the 
writer’s active participant observation in the border network, of taking the border network 
for granted. As the thesis progresses various ethnographic examples and accounts will be 
given that will talk of workers at various places and conducting various activities. It is only 
in this introductory chapter that opportunity exists to give an account of the arrival process 
in action in order to frame latter non fictional but ‘fragmented’ accounts and examples.  
The border is legally defined, it is enforced, it defines a place of work, but it is not a 
physical entity. The border is an assemblage of things and people and ideas. Miller asks 
how one might  
define the swarming multiplicity of actors, agents, practises, tools, 
instruments, inscriptions and ideas that form from time to time, and that is 
defined by the temporarily stabilized networks of relations between it’s 
constituent parts, the abstract lines that pass between it’s components, 
rather than the contours that surround them (1997: 355).  
 
If we look at the border and those who work it and communicate in the medium it provides 
we must answer this question. Miller states that Bruno Latour “offered a deceptively 
simple answer to such questions: follow the actors!” (1997: 355).  
So here for an example early in the piece let us do just that, follow a fictional actor as he 
arrives at the border and travels through the border of New Zealand. 
 Mr T. Raveller from Mexico wants to come to New Zealand for a holiday to see 
some sheep. Fortunately for Mr. T Raveller, he is from one of the 55 countries that do not 
require a visa to enter New Zealand for a visit of three months or less. If Mr T. Raveller 
was from a country that did require a visa for a visit or if he wanted to come to New 
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Zealand to work or study for a period of time he would have to apply to a New Zealand 
embassy or consulate or go online, to be issued with a visa to come to New Zealand.  
 It is worth noting at this point that a visa allows one to come to the border. When 
one arrives at the border and if immigration authorities (or Customs staff enacting their 
legislation) are satisfied they will be granted a permit to enter the country. Mr T. Raveller 
reads the New Zealand Immigration Service website (www.immigration.govt.nz) and sees 
that all he needs to come to New Zealand is an outward ticket within three months of his 
date of arrival, a clean criminal record including no deportations and evidence of sufficient 
funds for his maintenance whilst in New Zealand. Mr T. Raveller comes from a very 
wealthy Mexican importation / exportation family, so is therefore comfortable in the 
knowledge that his entry into New Zealand will be a smooth process. 
Already in this example there has been a potential for the New Zealand border to be 
stretched far offshore. If Mr T. Raveller was from India rather than Mexico he would have 
had to have gone to a New Zealand embassy or consulate to apply for his visa to come to 
New Zealand. The embassy or consulate far away from any typical notion of the border of 
New Zealand, would have conducted background checks on Mr T. Raveller similar to or 
more thoroughly than would be conducted in New Zealand.  
 Mr T. Raveller flies to Singapore where he boards a connecting flight to New 
Zealand SQ123. This flight leaves Singapore 12 hours before it arrives in New Zealand at 
15:30 local time. When checking in at Changi airport the diligent Singapore airline staff 
check that Mr T. Raveller has indeed got an outward ticket, lest Singapore airlines get a 
notice of infringement and a possible fine for not ensuring passengers they bring into NZ 
are complying with NZ immigration requirements. Singapore airlines, once all passengers 
are onboard, will then send a passenger list of names and nationalities to New Zealand 
Customs and Immigration (electronically). This list of names is checked both automatically 
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and manually against lists of known Immigration, Customs and other agencies’ people of 
interest, who will be stopped and searched or questioned on arrival in New Zealand, and 
unless they are New Zealanders potentially turned away to return to their previous point of 
departure at theirs or the airline’s expense. 
Fortunately, Mr T. Raveller is not on any of these lists, but an eagle eyed officer of 
the airport or one of the Customs or Immigration intelligence teams checking the list sent 
by Singapore airlines notices that there is only one Mexican on the flight. The officer does 
some further checks and finds that the ticket was purchased in what appears to be a normal 
fashion for a traveller from Mexico, so decides to leave Mr T. Raveller unmolested for the 
time being and let normal risk assessment in New Zealand takes its course.  
Due to the success of his import/ export business Mr T. Raveller is travelling 
business class, and is therefore at the front of the plane when it lands, where he gets to 
observe a MAF officer come onboard to spray the plane because this was not done in 
Singapore. Once the plane has been sprayed and the insects have been fumigated the 
Customs officer, who has been waiting by the gate, observes the passengers get off the 
plane, looking for any adverse reaction to his presence. Mr T. Raveller smiles politely as 
he gets off the plane and notices that unlike in his native Mexico, or America or even 
Singapore the officers here do not carry weapons, apart from one Police officer that he 
notices down by the wheels of the plane talking with an AVSEC team patrolling the 
tarmac. 
After walking down from the gate Mr T. Raveller stops in to the duty free shops 
and buys a carton of cigarettes and a bottle of tequila. After queuing for some time he gets 
to the front of the queues where he meets a Customs officer who is immigrating passengers 
into New Zealand sitting in a raised booth. Mr T. Raveller presents his arrival card which 
he filled out on the plane and his passport to the officer who notes his occupation as 
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importer and exporter, and asks him what exactly it is he imports and exports from 
Mexico. Mr T. Raveller explains that his company imports and exports surveillance 
equipment much like the camera that he is standing in front of, mounted in an obvious 
fashion on top of each immigration booth, as well as the many cameras placed more 
discreetly throughout the airport being manned presently by Customs officers in the 
‘control room.’ The officer in the booth accepts this and thinks that Mr T. Raveller seems 
to know too much about cameras to be involved in the importation of anything illegal out 
of Mexico. She then asks Mr T. Raveller for his ticket out of New Zealand, Mr T. Raveller 
explains that he is here for fourteen days but that he left his ticket in his packed in luggage 
after showing it to the airline in Singapore.  
The officer in the booth calls over the trouble shooter who takes Mr T. Raveller to 
an Immigration officer who has an office just down from the booths. Mr T. Raveller takes 
a seat alongside several Malaysians, who are also waiting to see an Immigration officer 
due to having come to New Zealand as ‘visitors’ but having displayed no knowledge of 
any typical tourist intentions. The Malaysians also have all put Timbuktu as their intended 
destination which the Customs officers in the immigration booths know is a typical 
destination for illegal workers who go there to pick fruit.  
After a short wait Mr T. Raveller is seen by an Immigration officer who checks that 
he does indeed have an outward ticket on his computer which interfaces directly with the 
airlines. Mr T. Raveller is then taken back to a booth by the Customs trouble shooter and 
his passport and arrival card are stamped with a three month visitor permit. As he walks 
away from the booth towards the baggage conveyor a Customs officer asks him to stop as 
his drug detecting Labrador sniffs Mr T. Raveller for any drugs before moving on to a 
group of backpackers.  
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While waiting for his bags to come off the conveyor another dog sniffs Mr T. 
Raveller, this time it is a Beagle, and a MAF officer asks Mr T. Raveller if he has fruit in 
his bags. Mr T. Raveller says that he does not but that he did have some yesterday. The 
MAF officer looks in Mr T. Raveller’s day bag and sees no fruit but does notice a carton of 
cigarettes. The MAF officer then goes to the Customs rover and tells him that he has 
noticed that the Mexican businessperson waiting for his bags has a carton of cigarettes in 
his day bag and a carton in a local duty free bag as well. The rover makes a mental note of 
Mr T. Raveller’s face and when he notices that Mr T. Raveller has picked up his bags and 
has been spoken to by a MAF officer at the exit, before the x-rays, he asks him to follow 
into the Customs search area.  
Mr T. Raveller takes a seat next to the backpackers that he saw the drug dog 
sniffing earlier and is eventually taken to a bench where a Customs officer explains that 
you are only allowed one carton of cigarettes duty free. Mr T. Raveller apologies for his 
oversight and says that he forgot about the one in his day bag, which he had purchased in 
Singapore. The Customs officer believes Mr T. Raveller, and is more interested in 
searching one of the backpackers that have been indicated as being a drugs risk by the drug 
dog. The Customs officer asks Mr T. Raveller to pay the $70 duty and GST on the 
cigarettes which Mr T. Raveller duly does before being taken to the MAF x-rays where his 
bags are screened by a MAF officer for quarantine risk items and also any Customs risk 
items.  
 In this short example there have been five kinds of border workers already 
mentioned working together and communicating with one another to mitigate any potential 
risk posed by Mr T. Raveller. The following chapter looks at some real examples of these 
border workers working together and communicating or attempting to communicate with 
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one another about the risk posed by people and things passing through their border 
network. 
 
Direction of Chapters 
 The second chapter of this thesis will address the human workers of the border and 
will break them into two distinct categories, those within the occupational community of 
border workers, and those outside of this. The third chapter will focus on the hybrid human 
worker / non human border technologies and look at their role within the border network in 
much the same way as the human workers of the border are looked at. Chapter four will 
address power within the border network in it’s various manifestation. Chapter five will 
readdress and reinforce the framing argument of this thesis that has been outlined in this 
introduction. The key question of ‘how is the border worked at an international airport’, 
and issues that arise from this question will be analysed and answered in this final 
concluding chapter. 
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Chapter Two, Workers of the border 
 
 
“The border was at least in part this: an enormous, dark brown, hairy 
tarantula…. a beast moving at it’s own pace through time and space , 
oblivious and amorphous, hideous yet compelling, it’s sweaty infectious 
bite the front edge of decay and death. Although not human, this border 
creature was a product of human society, a scumbag nightmare from the 
Freudian deep.” 
(Maril, 2004, 116). 
 
Framing (not literally) the workers of the border 
 The workers of the border negotiate their understanding of their world in the border 
network in which they work. These workers are often faced with a sense of isolation that 
comes from working in this environment and not what they would view as a ‘normal’ 9-5 
office based existence. In this light, the workers of the border see themselves as members 
of something more than their various job titles implies. The border as opposed to their job 
title is the boundary that helps define who they are and what they do to affirm this.  
 It could be said the nature of the enforcement work required at the border 
dominates the nature of the people employed there. Certainly, the nature of the work 
dominates the gender bias at the border. Customs for example has to have a certain number 
of female staff employed on any given shift so as to be able to undertake the Section 149 – 
strip searches of female suspects and children and young persons. Police, AVSEC and 
Customs officers, who may be involved in physical confrontation in their work, also 
require a certain level of fitness to perform their work effectively, though this is a matter of 
some contention. At an intellectual level the workers of the border require foreign language 
skills and staff from many different agencies are recruited ahead of those without language 
skills. Certain agencies within the border environment also require a higher level of 
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education in order to be recruited into the position such as MAF, who requires its 
enforcement officers to hold science degrees. 
 The workers of the border can be broken into two main groups, those within the 
occupational community and those outside of it. Those outside of the occupational 
community are generally made up of the staff, who are not fulltime or who do jobs that are 
not considered to be as enforcement focused. This distinction is important in framing the 
workers of the border, as it allows us to understand the way in which the border is actually 
worked. The workers outside of this occupational community are better viewed as sharing 
an organizational culture. Organisational culture  
in common usage the term refers to a shared system of ideas (including 
assumptions, beliefs, values, collective interpretations and meanings), and 
related patterns of behaviour, that are distinctive or unique to the 
members of a particular institution or formal organization. (Baba 1996: 
891). 
 
Organisational culture like risk, can be seen as a important factor in the workers of the 
border communicating with one another effectively. Each worker of the border, whether or 
not they are a part of the occupational community, will be exposed to their departments’ 
organisational culture and will have an awareness of other departments’ organisational 
cultures.  
 All the different workers of the border are looking to mitigate various risks and it is 
going about this that provide the workers with a sense of identity. It is important to 
acknowledge the degree of agency that the border workers have whilst going about their 
work, but also it is equally important to bear in mind the way in which the discretionary 
power that they wield is part of the state apparatus expressed at the airport. This dual 
approach will complement the analysis of the links between border workers and herald 
later arguments in this thesis about the roles of human and non-human actors, and it will 
wilfully blur the distinction between them.  
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 This chapter will initially focus on the identity and community of the border 
workers, and will then look at what the border workers do when they work the border. The 
consequences of this identity will be shown as the ethnographic examples are explained. 
The connections that the border workers share through risk will be demonstrated as the key 
way in which power is exerted at the border. Rather than power being demonstrated as an 
ongoing all encompassing aspect of international travel, power will be seen operating in 
the context of communication between the workers of the border. This communication is 
about risk, and in this chapter the focus will be on the positive elements of risk and the way 
in which it allows a level of communication between otherwise disparate groups of 
workers. As Zaloom says “when we define risk as synonymous with danger, the 
orientation towards hazard occludes theoretical attention to the productive dimensions of 
risk” (2006: 109). This chapter will present these productive dimensions to a word 
otherwise imbued with negative connotations. In the context of this chapter we can draw 
from this that the benefit of risk to the border is that it allows border workers to have a 
shared language of risk. This shared language allows them to mitigate not just their 
departments’ risk but all risks to the border. 
 There are some strong arguments that risk can be used to shape identity, be it 
through risk taking sports in one’s spare time or occupations that are focused on the 
mitigation of risk to the public, such as border workers. Zaloom studied workers in the 
Chicago ‘pits’ or trading floors and states that  
analysts have characterised high-risk activities as ways of escaping the 
routinized contemporary world. Sky-divers and mountain climbers report 
their attempts to escape social constraint to draw closer to their “true” 
selves. Traders participate in this Romantic understanding. They take on 
risks that are generated in modern institutions through the exercise of 
rationalised control (2006: 109). 
 
Several important aspects come from Zaloom’s assertions that are relevant to border 
workers and their collective identity. 
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 The first aspect of Zaloom’s assertion is that high risk activities are a way of 
escaping the ‘normal world’. Like the trading pits discussed by Zaloom the airport is in 
itself a ‘risk filled’ location outside of the normal world. In the introduction to his book 
‘The Naked Airport’ Gordon (2008) quotes Arthur Hailey “in the main passenger terminal, 
chaos predominated”. Workers of the airport tacitly acknowledge this, and it is even 
accepted by the mainstream media who use this to publicise the successful ‘Border Patrol’ 
TV shows. One of my informants said to me in an interview that “the border is basically a 
chaotic environment, you can never anticipate what will happen next.” Another informant 
stated to me that the border is a chaotic environment due to the passengers who “determine 
how chaotic it will be”. Maril’s (2004) book on the Texas Mexican border is aptly titled 
“Patrolling Chaos.’ 
 Secondly Zaloom argues that risk filled environments are used to “escape social 
constraints”. The airport is a place where workers live a risky existence based on the work 
they perform in order to enforce social constraints. Workers will detain and strip search 
passengers and have no second thoughts about asking a person what religion they are, or if 
they use drugs (or is more often the case “what drug did you use last” – to elicit a more 
honest response). This questioning and behaviour is common across all uniformed border 
workers.  
 The third relevant aspect of Zaloom’s assertion is that the workers will “take on 
risks that are generated in modern institutions through the exercise of rationalised control.” 
All the workers at the airport are employed to ‘take on risks’. It is important to note that for 
most this is a lifestyle choice. For the most part the workers of the border I interviewed in 
my fieldwork worked at the airport through choice. On one occasion a border colleague 
was most upset at being transferred to a work area outside of the airport (without being 
consulted) for six months. The officer referred to the transfer as akin to detention.  
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The risks the border workers seek to mitigate in themselves cannot always be 
rationalised, for example methamphetamine is made in New Zealand from ‘Contact NT’ 
(similar to concentrated cold and flu medicine) capsules imported from China. Which 
means that all cold and flu medication containing pseudoephedrine is a risk. Border 
workers have to exercise discretion over this risk and must adapt a flexible cultural 
approach when dealing with people importing it. A Chinese student may for example bring 
in more of this medicine than would a student from Australia, as the Chinese student has as 
one of my informants put it an “ambulance at the top of the cliff vs. ours at the bottom of it 
approach to medicine”. Therefore although the risks to the border cannot be arbitrarily 
rationalised and most importantly communicated to other workers of the border, the 
processes by which they are identified and mitigated can be. Like traders having a hunch 
about stock and acting on this hunch, which fellow traders recognise as an action they can 
identify with, so too must border workers recognise the relevant behaviour towards the 
rationalised identification of risk and take action to mitigate it.  
 
Those within and those without 
 The workers of the border are divided into two main groups, those within the 
occupational community and those outside of it. A key concept in occupational community 
is based on the idea that there have to be people on the ‘outside’ of it to give those within it 
a sense of identity. This difference between the groups is not a marked one, indeed to the 
causal observer at the border there are no differences between the workers. Salaman argues 
in relation to the work force that groups do not have to be markedly different: “many 
groups can differ more gradually, by degree of their differences” (1986: 95). 
 The occupational community of border workers does not include the part-time and 
new border workers as well as staff who do not work ‘proper shifts’ – for example staff 
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who work six on three off, but only during the day. The occupational community does 
include staff, who are mostly set to day work but who are on call such as Immigration 
officers. The only workers who are an exception to this criterion are very long serving part 
time workers, or part time / day shift workers who used to be full time shift workers. 
Examples of workers outside of the occupational community of border workers are: 
variable hours Customs officers, MAF quarantine assistants who load the x-ray machines, 
and AVSEC part time officers, who do not work in the international terminal frequently or 
who are not involved in patrolling the tarmac. 
 The reason that these workers are not part of the occupational community is that 
they do not share the same values as those within it, because their experience of work is 
very different from those within the occupational community. As such these workers 
outside of the occupational community by nature of the hours they work do not share the 
requisite requirements of being a part of the occupational community, or to fall back on 
Salaman’s definition “identity, share a language, a vocabulary of symbols, knowledge of 
the work world ” (1986: 75-76). The key aspect that border workers outside of the 
occupational community do not share is the ‘knowledge of the work world.’  
 The way in which the members of the occupational community work is markedly 
different from the way in which the workers of the border outside of the occupational 
community work. This difference comes in part from the different hours that members of 
the occupational community work. The working of the shifts means that the workers within 
the occupational community spend more social time with each other such as, dinner and 
breakfast, as opposed to lunch, which due to arriving flights is generally short and rushed.  
 Members of the occupational community engage in a different kind of work than 
those outside of it in the respect that they are not for the most part only engaged in the 
processing and screening of flights which those outside of the occupational community are. 
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Members of the occupational community are more frequently involved in the processing of 
the private, commercial and military flights, as well as other wider Customs, quarantine 
and security tasks. This work generally involves communication and liaison between 
members of different agencies. For example, during my fieldwork the arrival of a military 
flight from Antarctica would involve liaison between MAF, AVSEC and Customs. This 
kind of liaison between the agencies occurs on a regular basis outside of the 9-5, hours 
which are covered by members of the occupational community and it relies upon the 
common language that is shared as a feature of the occupational community. The workers 
of the occupational community share hours which those workers outside of the 
occupational community do not. The sections of this chapter will explore aspects of the 
border workers’ identity and will look at how border workers as observed during the 
fieldwork are members of the occupational community or outsiders to it. 
 
Playing the Risk Game: Hide and Seek at the Border 
 The workers of the border are involved in what could be described as a game of 
hide and seek. They believe that the travelling public are trying to hide something from 
them, be it drugs, weapons or intentions, and that it is their job to find it. This gives all 
border workers a sense that they are different from the travelling public, but it also gives 
the workers of the border themselves a sense of commonality. The workers of the border 
value the ability to find things that are hidden. In doing so I argue that the workers of the 
border take on the risks to the border and personalise them. Customs officers become 
passionate about finding drugs, Immigration officers with illegal workers and so on. This 
game that the workers of the border play revolves around the ability to identify, find and 
deal with, risks to the border.  
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A sense of identity comes from partaking in this game at the border and I argue that 
this ‘game’ is an aspect of the organisational culture of border workers. It is only the 
members of the occupational community of border workers that take this game a step 
further and make it a shared value that they talk about in ways that can only be understood 
amongst themselves. 
 
Success in Talking About Policing Risk 
 Success in the border network is measured through the management or policing of 
risk and the ability to convey this to other border workers. This is true at individual and 
agency level. Success in this way allows workers of the border to become full members of 
the occupational community as Orr states “the primary status within the community is that 
of member. One participates in the community by becoming and remaining a competent 
practitioner” (1996: 147). The following discussion will focus on success in talking about 
risk mitigation within the border network as opposed to agency success. It will demonstrate 
how success in talking about successful risk mitigation opens the door to becoming a 
member of the occupational community. In order to become a member of the occupational 
community and remain a member, one must be a component practitioner. 
 On the surface the workers of the border measure success as agency related, that is 
to say Customs officers are successful if they find drugs and AVSEC officers are 
successful if they find knives. Success within the occupational community is in fact the 
ability to talk about and describe these achievements to members of other agencies. This is 
the common language of the border, and it is through this communication that the true 
networks of power to police the border are created. An example of this, encountered during 
my fieldwork, was observed when a variety of full-time Customs positions were appointed 
from amongst part-time staff. One staff member, who got the job, had been widely 
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acknowledged as having made several ‘finds’. A ‘find’ being border worker terminology 
for discovering prohibited or restricted goods that had been concealed or smuggled to 
avoid detection. After it was announced that the staff member had been appointed to the 
position, other staff members were heard to comment: “’Rupert’ was the obvious choice 
after all his finds, he would have had a lot of examples of his finds to talk about in the 
interview.” This demonstrates two things. The first was that whether or not ‘Rupert’ was 
successful based upon his prior finds, it was perceived to be so at ground level. Secondly 
and importantly, for the arguments that will follow in this chapter the staff members 
implicitly acknowledged that being able to “talk about” risk mitigation was as important 
as actually mitigating risk. This was especially important when it came to progressing 
one’s career and justifying this progression to colleagues within the border network. From 
an analytical perspective building up this kind of reputation is the way into the 
occupational community for workers outside of it. 
 At the border network level ways in which organisational success is judged upon 
risk mitigation can be seen every time the newspaper is opened. If there has been a 
successful border intercept, the headlines will laud it “Customs seize $1m of Ice” 
(Stuff.co.nz 2008). Alternately, if a border agency has been perceived to have failed even if 
it was a policy failing rather than organisation failing, the media and government is quick 
to notice it, such as was seen in the news follow up to the light airplane (alleged) hijacking 
out of Nelson in February 2008. 
Police and Transport Minister Annette King says she has asked NZ Police 
and the Aviation Security Service to provide her and the Minister for 
Transport Safety, Harry Duynhoven, with urgent reports (Stuff.co.nz 
2008). 
 
Interestingly success is often deemed as being attributable to an individual within the 
network but failure is associated with an agency or the network as a whole.  
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 The way in which risk is managed can lead to financial reward but it can also lead 
to social recognition, again this is at both the organisational level and individual level. 
Successful government departments are given bigger budgets and more standing, and staff, 
who perform their job descriptions and find items of risk, contribute to organisational 
success and are given pay rises. Despite this, success in managing border risk cannot be 
succinctly defined and demarcated. The border is a zone where the government tasks the 
workers to protect it from outside risks whilst also facilitating entry and departure. This 
dichotomy is summed up by Salter who believes that: “The problem of borders is a result 
of two powerful government desires: security and mobility” (2004: 72). This dichotomy 
also means it is difficult to measure success. Maril in his work on the Texas Mexico border 
and the border patrol agents acknowledges this difficulty in measuring success, as has been 
discovered by border patrol management and the US government: 
For years the efficacy of the US Border Patrol was measured by rates of 
apprehensions… Chief Reyes turned this logic upside down. Declining 
numbers of apprehensions now validated the newest strategy against the 
entry of undocumented workers (2004: 162).  
 
In this light success could be measured in both high and low numbers of seizures making 
numbers and statements like “More than a thousand people were stopped from boarding 
planes to New Zealand in the year to June 30” in reference to refused entry to suspected 
illegal workers,  meaningless (stuff.co.nz 2008). Therefore an argument of this chapter is 
that while measuring organisational success is difficult or impractical, observing the way 
individuals talk of successful risk management will yield results.  
 During my research, every border worker interviewed believed that they looked for 
‘collective risks to the border’ as opposed to the specific risks that their agencies were 
tasked with mitigating. An informant advised me in regards to how border workers ‘work’ 
and by that, I mean what they actually do as opposed to what they are supposed or 
perceived to do by management namely 
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“we have a great vantage point to be 100% active with regards to all 
risks to the border- I do not narrow my scope when working but feel I am 
open to all possibilities. I believe risk to the border is shared but as an 
individual we must take ownership of the risk at hand.” 
 
When I asked another border worker if she believed risk to the border was shared she 
replied: 
“Customs, MAF, Aviation Security, INZ, Police amongst other agencies 
share the same belief that to minimise risk we work together sharing 
similar values and the exchange of new information and ideas.” 
 
 This shared view and ownership of risk fits neatly into the theories of occupational 
community which can be surmised by Orr’s account of occupational communities among 
photocopier repair technicians.  
The technicians should be viewed as an occupational community (van 
Maanen and Barley 1984) they are focused on the work not the 
organisation, and the only valued status is that of full member of the 
community. That is being considered a competent technician. In pursuit 
of this goal they share information, assist in each others diagnoses, and 
compete in terms of their relative expertise. Promotion out of the 
community is thought not to be worthwhile. The occupational community 
shares few cultural values with the corporation (1996: 76). 
 
In a similar way the workers of the border studied could be seen as an occupational 
community focused around the work of incoming and outgoing international flights. Status 
as a full member of the community is what is valued, as this allows members to effectively 
and efficiently perform their jobs. As in the photocopier technical community, promotion 
out of the community to other positions is to a degree looked down upon. Furthermore, the 
occupational community of the border has values of its own distinct from the values of the 
individual organisations that the workers are employed by. 
 An example of these points in action occurred during my fieldwork when one 
hundred historic medals including Charles Upham’s Victoria Cross and Bar were stolen 
from the Waiouru army museum in December 2007. Through liaison between various 
government border agencies border workers were quickly able to put a profile in place 
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through liaison with officers of Customs, Police and AVSEC using existing Customs and 
AVSEC tools such as x-rays, and human methods such as profiling, as well as Police 
intelligence. Though the risk to the border was in this instance a new risk, the language that 
was used to describe the risk, it’s repercussions and a method of mitigating the risk was 
familiar to all parties concerned. This discussion allowed a informal network of human 
actors in alliance with non human tools, to be prepared to intercept the medals and their 
couriers. It was only possible through the interaction between experienced members of the 
occupational community.  
In discussion with an officer involved in the case I asked him how this network 
came to be so rapidly put into effect. He described to me that an existing framework for 
managing another classified risk was put into place and this was able to be adjusted 
following some discussions with the concerned groups, such as Customs, Police and 
AVSEC and a sharing of information as to the capabilities of staff and realities of 
legislation. This was never tested, as the medals never left New Zealand, but the staff 
involved in putting the network into place was confident that it would have worked. The 
staff who were only aware of their specific job within the network were doubtful of its 
ability to succeed with comments such as “well I doubt they will come through departures 
with the medals on their chests.” The difference between the two groups being those who 
doubted the efficacy of the network were only aware of a small part of it, those aware of 
the wider network were more confident in it as they were able to communicate the risks 
across several existing networks. 
 From this example, we can see that risk is the common language between workers 
of the border, who are fully-fledged members of the border worker occupational 
community. Until these workers are full members of the occupational community they are 
restricted to speaking in a language of risk relevant only to their specific work area. Full 
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members of the occupational community will happily approach other members for instance 
and point out to them items or people who they believe may be of concern to their 
colleagues agency rather than their own. In my fieldwork an AVSEC officer approached a 
Customs officer with an x-ray image from a bag on an outgoing flight showing some sea-
horses (dried) and advised the Customs officer of the bag they were in. The Customs 
officer was able to have the bag stopped and the sea-horses were seized under CITES 
(Convention on trade in endangered species) legislation which Customs administers. The 
AVSEC was a full member of the occupational community, as he could identify risks for 
other workers outside of his job description and convey the relevant information such as 
which passenger, which bag,  which flight, and possible risk, to the right person, in this 
case a Customs officer.  
 Workers of the border also demonstrate that they are not yet full members of the 
occupational community through a failure in the ability to use the correct discourse of risk. 
One occasion on which this was observed during my fieldwork was when a new Customs 
officer had searched a bag and was taking the passenger out to the public area. Normally 
full members of the occupational community will just let a MAF officer know that there 
was no food or biosecurity risk items in the bag and take the passenger straight out. 
Generally during searches I have conducted, I would tell a MAF officer that there was no 
food or biosecurity items and he or she would say “if you are happy I am happy”. On this 
occasion, the new officer took the passenger to the MAF x-ray. At this point the Customs 
officer was asked if there was any food in the bag by the MAF officer and the Customs 
officer answered in the negative and put the bag through the x-ray. Throughout this 
interaction I had been observing, having been at the x-ray waiting to intercept a particular 
target of an operation being run. From my vantage point, I could see that there was clearly 
an apple on the x-ray image and I winked at the MAF officer. The MAF officer asked the 
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Customs officer again, “are you sure there is no fruit in there… you did say you searched 
it didn’t you?” The Customs officer replied that he didn’t think there was any fruit in there. 
At this point the MAF officer opened the bag, showed the apple to the very embarrassed 
Customs officer and warned the passenger that they were lucky that the Customs officer 
was not switched on or they would have a $200 fine. This serves to illustrate that new 
Customs officers searching bags will not be thinking or communicating in terms of the 
wider risks that the occupational community is looking for and communicating about. Nor 
will an inexperienced Customs officer be trusted in the way that experienced officers such 
as myself would be. Similarly, an inexperienced MAF officer is even more unlikely to be 
aware of much smaller items like deal bags of drugs that have been deliberately concealed 
that may be of interest to Customs.  
 This analysis of the ability to talk about risk at the border shows that the workers of 
the border, who are members of the occupational community, are able to identify 
colleagues, who are not, and will treat them in a different way than they would members of 
the occupational community. Tension between members of the occupational community 
and those outside of it is avoided as demonstrated in scenarios like the one outlined above, 
where it as officer from a different agency that is treating a non occupational community 
member differently. Were it officers of the same agency making as apparent the exclusion 
from the occupational community, tensions would be more obvious. This was witnessed on 
various occasions during my fieldwork, when for example part time staff would say things 
like “full time shift workers get all the courses”. This was said in reference to full time 
staff, who did proper shifts, being perceived as being put on career progressing courses 
ahead of day shift and part time staff.   
During the fieldwork sentiments that illustrated the different work that members of 
the occupational community did were also noted. On one occasion after flight processing 
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had finished, which is to say the passengers had all left the arrivals hall, some staff had 
begun to clear some mishandled bags for the airlines to release. This is a process involving 
Customs and MAF staff making sure the bags that have arrived separately from passengers 
do not need to be looked at for prohibited or restricted goods. On one occasion in my 
fieldwork a part time staff member said to another part time staff member who had started 
to clear the mishandled bags “we don’t do that, that is a job for the full timers”. Any 
manager or senior staff member would in fact know that it is every one’s job, and part time 
staff would generally be more than welcome to stay ‘signed on’ as to assist with clearing a 
large number of mishandled bags. This does illustrate that the work actually done by the 
members of the occupational community is different to the work done by those outside of 
it. Differences that occur in the practises of workers and the actual work that they 
undertake leads to differences in how they identify themselves as border workers, and 
members or non members of the occupational community. 
 
Private worlds in public spaces and “the look” 
 The ‘look’ is a fine example of the way in which the workers of the border share an 
embodied ‘private’ world in a very public arena. The workers of the border when 
processing flights are doing so under the eye of the travelling public. Looks and 
communication between workers of the border are designed to transfer information, 
intelligence or intuition in a public space but in a private manner are one of the most 
important forms of interagency communication. In later chapters a section will discuss the 
lack of shared audio networks at the border in the form of radio communication. At this 
stage however the focus is the way in which informal modes of communication such as 
‘the look’ allow the transmission of information between the workers of the occupational 
community, under the noses of the travelling public without the need for coded radio 
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communication. All the workers of the border share the need to communicate in private in 
a very public space, however only the workers of the border who are members of the 
occupational community are able to communicate with workers from agencies other than 
their own with any success in a private manner.  
At the 'MAF x-ray exit, which is the point where passengers wait to be spoken to 
by a MAF officer before either being directed to the MAF or Customs search area or a 
MAF x-ray, an interaction was observed during my fieldwork that illuminates the non 
verbal communication between workers of the border. Customs officers often choose to 
wait at this point and listen to MAF officers interact with passengers. The MAF officers 
will be asking questions specific to their work area such as "do you have any food?" or 
"were you in any rural or wilderness areas while you were away?" Sometimes the MAF 
officer’s questions are more specific such as during times of biosecurity scares such as a 
bird flu pandemic or mad cow disease outbreak. At times such as these questions like 
"which countries did you visit, which provinces there?" and "what is your occupation?" 
may be asked so the MAF officer may better assess a passenger’s bio-security risk.  
In this particular incident a MAF officer was talking to a passenger about his bio-
security items of which he determined there were none. The MAF officer, I later 
interviewed, happened to be an ex-police officer and the passengers answers led the MAF 
officer to believe that there was no biosecurity risk to the border. As he finished his ‘risk 
assessment’ of the passenger he turned around and gave the nearby Customs officer, who 
was not appearing overly interested in the passenger, what he would later describe to me to 
be “the look”. Just a glance, just for a fraction of a second, but “the look”  for an 
experienced Customs officer as opposed to the inexperienced Customs officer in this 
instance would have been enough to have pulled the passenger aside and at the least have 
questioned him to ascertain his Customs risk to the border. Probably “the look” from a 
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trusted member of the occupational community should have been enough to take the 
passenger to the search area for a baggage search. Later the MAF officer told me about this 
incident and how the new Customs officer had let the passenger walk straight past. He said 
to me “I gave him the look, you know? The look!” The MAF officer advised me that 
through his talk with the passenger he had been given the distinct impression that the 
passenger was either under the influence of drugs or had been so recently, based on his 
eye’s dilated pupils, appearance and speech. The risk to the border that the MAF officer 
could not mitigate, but that the Customs officer potentially could, is that the passenger may 
have had personal use amount of drugs on him or in his luggage. Personal use being in 
contrast to a large scale professional importation could be a party pack of a dozen or so 
pills such as ecstasy. 
 The organisations of Customs and MAF have no set down standard operating 
procedures where MAF officers or Customs officers at the exit select passengers for each 
other for agency specific intervention. Instead, actions like “the look” are best viewed as 
informal practices that embody the community and cover for the absence of rules. Informal 
practices like this are noted by Kondo as being important, in that they allow workers to 
‘get the job done’, and facilitate and reinforce a workplace identity. Kondo talks of the way 
in which the “variety of institutional and informal practises… make work life more 
pleasant in accordance with meaningful, accepted cultural practises, but it is also intended 
to make work more efficient and productive” (1990: 203). ‘The look’ is a way in which the 
workers of the border can communicate effectively as it allows them to communicate 
amongst each other without passengers being privy to their hunches. Maril researched the 
gulf between border workers and the public and argued that:  
Their spatial isolation from those whose interests they represented was 
embodied to some degree in the language they invented and employed; this 
language was part of the shared agent culture from which civilians were 
excluded (2004: 229) 
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This unspoken language in the context of an analysis of ‘the look’ serves the purpose of 
collectively mitigating risk at the border but it can also be seen as reinforcing the shared 
border worker culture. 
 ‘The look’ is one of many unspoken gestures within the border workers culture, and 
it has yielded positive results on many occasions for allied agencies. In the course of my 
research one of the biggest seizures was of 7500 codeine phosphate tablets which were the 
result of MAF screening being referred to Customs. Seizures such as this come from an 
understanding of the risks that other agencies at the border look for. Were it not for the 
workers of the borders ability to communicate this between each other the tablets would 
have got through.  
 Other unspoken bodily gestures that are used by members of the border worker 
occupational community include ‘the nod’, which is used between border workers when a 
passenger comes to their attention as being a bit different in their answers or appearance. 
Border workers are also acutely aware of where they are standing in relation to each other 
and to passengers and what this indicates about other officer’s intentions towards 
passengers. MAF officers for instance are aware that a Customs officer that has put him or 
herself between a MAF officer and a passenger and the exit to the x-rays could be waiting 
to intercept the passenger.  
During Section 149 ‘personal’ searches, when two officers are strip searching a 
passenger for prohibited goods, unspoken communication becomes a safety issue as 
officers need to second guess the actions of each other as to present a ‘united front’ to the 
suspect who is being searched. During a Section 149 search the risk of a passenger 
attacking an officer is at its highest and any window of opportunity that demonstrates to a 
suspect that officers are not ‘watching each others back’ could be seized upon. During the 
fieldwork, I was the lead officer in a Section 149 search. The officer who was witnessing 
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the search was not a member of the occupational community (he is now); he was not full-
time (he is now), and he did not speak the unspoken language or share the common values 
shared by other members of the occupational community. This was demonstrated when we 
undertook a Section 149 search. The officer who was witnessing the search, and myself 
had been briefed prior to the search that the suspect was ‘volatile’ and could be considered 
to be high risk when it came to our personal safety. Normal procedure dictates that the 
searching officers have chairs available in the search room and that these are used by the 
witness if the officers conducting the search believes that the suspect is being compliant 
and is unlikely to jump up and attack the officer conducting the search. In this instance I 
believed that the suspect was being ‘compliant’ and in order to ‘de-escalate’ the situation I 
subtly nodded to my witness to take a seat so as not to be standing over the suspect being 
searched. Unfortunately, and I argue that this comes from not being a part of the 
occupational community as opposed to a lack of comprehension due to inexperience, the 
witness did not pick up on this and further non-verbal communication attempts and I was 
forced to have to tell him in front of the suspect to take a seat. The suspect was then privy 
to what should in normal circumstances be the ‘private world’ of Customs officers. An 
informant at another regional airport advised me that he had once had a passenger ask him 
if he could skip the baggage search and go strait to the ‘####’ 3. This showed that the 
passenger, who had been searched many times, had been exposed to border terminology 
such as ‘####’ which means a Section 149 strip search. The argument presented here is 
that when open forms of communication such as radios are used in front of passengers, 
such as must have been observed by this passenger the private world of border workers 
becomes public. By drawing on understandings of the occupational community, closed 
modes of communication are used amongst the members, who can therefore keep their 
                                                 
 
3
 Edited out for organisational security. 
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world private and in doing so more effectively perform their duties in public and police the 
border. 
 
Shared sense of time – shifts and decision making 
 The workers of the border share a sense of time outside of their family and friends 
in social networks and also in ‘normal employment networks’. This is an aspect of border 
worker identity that is commented on by all border workers, not just members of the 
occupational community. This is apparent in two main ways. Firstly the social networks of 
most workers of the borders’ family and friends are based on a 9-5 Monday to Friday 
week. Most of the workers of the border do a six days on three days off pattern or similar. 
‘Days on’ is a misnomer because on days could be 4 am-1235 or 1730-0205. Secondly, the 
sense of time is also different due to the amount of time that workers can have to decide on 
whether or not people or goods are of risk to the border. This split second decision making 
is required at all hours of the day and night when normal decisions of a far less important 
nature are not made. The workers of the border are well aware of this and it is one of the 
key factors in them sharing a sense of identity at the border. 
 Risk is certainly the main factor in the creation of the occupational community of 
border workers and at the border risk and time are inextricably linked. All workers at the 
airport, especially those working in enforcement in the international terminal, are regulated 
by the international flight schedule, both arriving and departing. This schedule is published 
far in advance and the industrial realities mean that though tasked to do different things the 
workers are all there for 8-10 hour periods over a six or five day shift period. This means 
that workers of MAF shift teams will often see more of workers of a particular Customs 
shift team than they will of members of another MAF team let alone their families, who 
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may be asleep when they get home from work. During his fieldwork on the Texas Mexican 
border Maril came to the realisation that 
The shift structure at the McAllen station, in contrast to that of many 
other law enforcement agencies throughout the nation, served to isolate 
agents not only from their own families and friends but also from 
community social networks (2004: 214). 
 
Throughout my fieldwork it was readily apparent that the workers of the border were 
isolated from other social networks. For instance getting leave over school holiday periods 
was at a premium as many staff wanted to have the opportunity to be around their families. 
Christmas in particular, which is a day most workers spend at home was not as easily 
adjusted to at the border where workers still had to cover flights leaving from 4 am and 
arriving through until 2 am the next morning. 
 As a way of adjusting to this the workers of the border build up close friendships 
with other border workers; staff working night shift do not have an evening meal with 
family, instead they have it with other border workers. They inevitably often talk about 
work because while on night shift they have slept during the day and may not have much 
else to talk about. This builds up a sense of communitas across the workers of the border.  
 It is worth mentioning that all the border workers are affected by the fact that on 
night shift, if serious incidents have occurred or if work has been particularly busy, the 
border workers will return home and it will be unrealistic to go straight to sleep. The 
workers all share this frustration of getting home at three in the morning and knowing as an 
informant told me that:  
“tomorrow the sun will be burning through the curtains at 7 am and the 
children will be up and awake, and I will be exhausted because I made it 
home and lay in bed thinking about whether or not I should have 
searched that last passenger of that last flight that just didn’t seem quite 
right.” 
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This echoes Maril’s account in his research, when he talks about border agents going home 
at the end of a shift, and are applicable to my own research experience minus the high 
speed pursuit and about $950,000 worth of drugs  
Agents could not spend time in a high speed pursuit of a van loaded with 
$1 million worth of drugs, then immediately return home after the shift 
ended, drink a glass of warm milk and go to bed. Blood chemistry would 
not allow it (2004: 213). 
 
This is a sentiment that all the workers of the border I spoke to could share and it links in 
with the effect divergent times and the workers having to make important high-risk 
decisions in a matter of seconds. 
 Officers at the border are measured by management in the way they ‘process’ 
passengers. All interactions with passengers are linked in some way to a measurable and 
checked by head office for quality assurance and surety. Officers face the realisation that 
they cannot devote all their time to dealing with one issue (aside from the exceptional 
issues that arise only occasionally – like large-scale importations). Furthermore, officers 
generally interact with passengers, when they are walking out the door, and both 
passengers and officers know there is a legal and practical limit to the amount of time they 
can spend deciding if a person is of risk to the border. This means many decisions that 
border workers make are risky decisions based upon the fact that they only have a limited 
amount of time to make them and have little recourse for follow up. This was explained to 
me by an informant who is an experienced border officer: 
“Basically working at the airport we have to make then and there 
decisions… are you going to search him or her, if not they are gone and 
whatever they had on them will be gone out the door and into NZ, it is not 
like working at a mail centre or inspections base, you can’t put a person or 
a bag on a shelf and come back to it after lunch or even a coffee, it is then 
and there that the decision is made and risk is defined.” 
 
A Customs drugs investigator stated that a major difference in the work he did as an 
investigator as opposed to the enforcement work done at the airport was timeframe; airport 
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work is controlled by the flight schedule and enforcement could be limited by it. He stated: 
“in investigations you work to the operation or to the clock when operations are not going 
on, but at the airport you work to flights.” The reality of the work for the border workers at 
the airport is restraint imposed by time and also by the sheer quantity of passengers passing 
by and the multitude of decisions that have to be made. For example, on an average day 
shift one can expect to have around 1200- 2000 passengers being processed in a seven hour 
period. The average baggage search takes around twenty to thirty minutes. The number of 
staff responsible for searching bags or persons in any of the border agency as opposed to 
those who are involved in risk assessing them is roughly a 25% ratio. For every four 
Customs officers working roughly three will be immigrating passengers and one searching 
the risky ones. For every four AVSEC officers screening passengers there will be three 
operating x-rays or loading baggage onto x-rays and one will be searching bags. Similarly, 
for MAF the majority of staff are based in a role, where passengers are risk assessed rather 
than searched. Officers of the border all manage a virtually limitless scope of risk to the 
border posed by large passenger numbers in comparison to small numbers of staff policing 
(through physical intervention) the border. The workers of the border are united by the 
magnitude of their tasks. 
 The workers of the border are aware that their work environment that they are in is 
unique and shared only amongst them. Workers manage the risks they face at the border in 
a unique way. There is more similarity in the way the workers of the border manage risk 
across their agencies than there is between workers of the same agencies in different areas. 
For example, Customs officers at the airport risk management is more  closely aligned with 
airport MAF officers than the work of airport MAF officers to mail centre MAF officers. 
 
 57 
Shared concept of the use and abuse of Power 
 Workers of the border share a sense of power at work that they do not carry home, 
save perhaps the Police officers who work at the border. This shared concept of power at 
the border is an aspect of the organisational culture at the border as opposed to a facet of 
the smaller occupational community. When working the border all workers are well aware 
that if they ask a passenger to do something such as “step this way please”, or “take a seat 
here please”, or “hand me your passport please” – the passenger will likely acquiesce to 
the request, be it lawful or not. During the course of my fieldwork workers of the border 
did not abuse their power in any way. As discussed in earlier chapters the ability to get a 
passenger to wait for instance at an x-ray while a MAF officer fetched a Customs officer 
was not a legal power that the MAF officer had, however the Customs officer on his arrival 
would have certain powers that he or she could exercise over the passenger. This use of 
perceived power over passengers, who were probably unaware that they had an option to 
stay or go, allows workers of the border to collectively mitigate risk to the border. 
 All workers of the border share the understanding of the ‘collective’ power that 
they wield over passengers, but they are also acutely aware of where that power stops 
spatially (outside the airport) and territorially (between agencies areas of jurisdiction). As 
an example of this awareness of the limits of power shared by border workers, a discussion 
over the problems of youth drunkenness and violence in the inner city came up as a group 
of Customs and MAF officers were talking at the entrance to the MAF queues. This 
position is where MAF officers ‘risk assess’ and direct passengers into x-ray or search 
areas depending on their answers to the quarantine questions on their arrival cards. As such 
it is a popular spot for Police and Customs officers to wait and listen to the conversations 
as information that the MAF officers extract can be very useful for them in assessing risk 
to the border from their agencies perspectives. On this occasion a MAF officer, whilst 
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waiting for passengers to come through, was describing a situation when in town recently 
on a Saturday night he was accosted by a group of three female teenagers who threatened 
him with a knife and demanded his wallet. The MAF officer stated that the girls were 
advancing on him until he shouted at them to back off as he was a Police officer. This 
convinced the three girls to run away rather quickly! All officers present were well aware 
that within the bounds of the airport their uniforms would guarantee compliance from 
passengers in 99% of cases but in town on a Saturday night would much rather shout 
“back off I am a Police officer” rather that “back off I am a MAF officer!” Salter  would 
argue that this power over the public that border workers hold comes from the fact that the 
public, both visitors and residents, understand that at the border they have  
a greatly circumscribed set of rights” and that “Border officials have wide 
powers of search, seizure, detention, and of course the ability to exclude 
travellers from the country (2004: 78). 
 
 The awareness of this shared power within the border environment is a facet of the 
occupational community of border workers as well as being something that separates them 
from social networks outside of their workspace. Border workers will often not tell people 
in social situations outside of work what they do because outside of their border work their 
power is questioned. Furthermore, the power that is generically held at the border is also 
questioned by those outside of it who have experienced it directly or indirectly. All border 
workers in social situations cringe when someone says to them “you guys make old people 
take their shoes off before they go through immigration!” The workers of the border cringe 
because this use of power that is being ascribed to them is both incorrect and only used in 
limited contexts (mostly overseas). In New Zealand it is rare for shoes to be removed for 
screening unless there is metal in them and this is not done at immigration, it is done pre-
boarding when a person passes through security. The point being that within their 
occupational community when working the border workers are used to having a large 
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amount of unquestioned power, but outside of the airport this power is perceived as 
ineffective and questioned. This is not something limited to border workers in New 
Zealand, Flynn argues that border workers “as representatives of the state who regularly 
attempt to restrict and control cross-border movement… bear the brunt of local anti state 
antagonisms” (1997: 317) . In this sense the job could be said to be stigmatised in some 
ways. 
 As a concluding remark to this section, it is reasonable to say that collective power 
at the border is one of the key factors in the creation of an occupational community over 
and above the power of individuals and individual agencies at the border. This power that 
is used at the border however causes tensions between the border workers and the 
travelling public, which are generally manifested outside of the border. As such these 
tensions are also experienced by the workers of the border when not at work, and serve to 
make the workers more acutely aware of their separation from normal society and their 
membership of the border occupational community. 
 
Every decision being a risk decision 
 When confronting the various risks to the border the workers face a dichotomy of 
risk. The first is that they fail to identify a risk to the border and this risk object or person 
then enters or leaves New Zealand. The second is the risk they face as professionals in 
failing to perform their jobs properly. This is a perception of risk shared by other 
occupations such as Police and money traders, as it is illuminative on the way they go 
about their work. This is because all workers of the border, whether making ‘risk 
decisions’ about fruit, drugs or security, make the decisions under an umbrella of risk to 
them personally and to the border. When money traders or Police take on risk, they do so 
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individually, the risk of injury or death or prosecution for Police and the risk of losing 
money or face for money traders. 
 Like the decisions of money traders every decision a border worker makes is 
imbued with potentially catastrophic risk. This risk derives from the fact that decisions 
border workers make are about locating and stopping risk objects and people from entering 
New Zealand or leaving New Zealand and posing a risk to other travellers or other nations. 
Zaloom states “the norms of risk taking in the pits shape the habitus of the traders who 
work there” (2006: 189). The workers of the border work in a risk imbued environment, 
where the language that they talk is the language of risk. All workers of the air border are 
aware that although certain legislation is held by their respective agencies allowing follow 
up after a person has left the airport, they generally have to make a here and now decision 
as to a person’s risk, as discussed in the earlier section as to time constraints at the border. 
The language that the workers of the border speak pertaining to human and non human 
actor’s risk is a language that defines and creates a shared community.  
 The reality of workers of the border having to make instant decisions as to risk on a 
constant basis came clearly through in my fieldwork. Participants were acutely aware that a 
moment’s inattention at an x-ray could lead to a bomb being smuggled onto a plane or a 
potentially catastrophic biosecurity outbreak. Others talked of their biggest fear being 
“searching a bag and overlooking some hard drugs” or even issues like “making an 
unlawful decision – such as illegally detaining a person”. These are all fears that come 
from the fact that workers of the border have to make spot decisions based on risk 
assessments of people and things. All the different workers of the border face the risk of 
making a wrong decision with major consequences when attempting to define and mitigate 
risks to the border. 
 
 61 
Policing Risk 
 The workers of the border, who are member of the occupational community as 
opposed to simply being part of the organisational culture, are all involved in ‘policing the 
border’. This is in opposition to the concept that they are just policing the risk(s) defined 
by their agency. One of Orr’s key questions and a question that is key to this chapter is the 
question “what do the workers of the border actually do?” What is it about this that makes 
the workers of the border more than their specific job titles implies? Orr asks 
What is almost completely missing from most of the studies discussed so 
far is a focus on the work itself. What role do the events of a day’s work 
play in the process of defining identity? What are the relationships 
between work and the worker… Authors may presume that modern jobs 
are in some sense known, perhaps from formal job descriptions (1996: 
152). 
 
The various workers of the border, whose agencies have been separately defined and 
whose focus as to what they do at prima facia value, appears clear cut, in fact all do one 
thing, and they do this one thing together, they police the border. A study of what this 
policing involves is important, not insomuch as it reveals to us what happens when they 
work as it reveals what happens at the border. A study of what the workers of the border 
actually do tells us about how power is exerted and contested at the border and how the 
border network actually works (or not). 
 This assertion fits neatly into Orr’s argument as management, passengers and 
sometimes even the workers are not actually aware of the exact work that they are doing. 
The workers of the border all go about their day making decisions that mitigate risk to the 
border. Essentially their work is going about defining risk and communicating it, and in 
doing so they are all doing the same thing as other border workers who work for ‘different 
agencies’; they just happen to be looking for different things. The workers of the border, 
especially those who are members of the occupational community, communicate the 
information about risk to each other through formalised and informal methods of 
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communication. Formal methods of communication between border workers include: 
databases, briefings, codeword’s, radios, pagers and telephones. Informal modes of 
communication between border workers who are members of the occupational community 
include looks, body language, jokes, casual briefings and reminiscences about shared 
experiences.   
Ericson and Haggerty talk of Police as 
the fulcrum of risk communication among institutions. They are first and 
foremost knowledge workers who think and act within the risk-
communication systems of other institutions (2002: 238). 
 
The border workers can be seen in this light. For example, the work done by all border 
workers in regards to enforcement is stored in databases, which communicate information 
nationally and internationally. Through using these databases the workers of the border 
communicate their assessment of risk to others. Eventually through the accumulation of 
names and information the databases in themselves begin to police the border in alliance 
with the human workers. 
 My various interviews with border workers about what they did all shared a 
common theme. That is that they believed their job to be about looking for ‘people’ as 
opposed to the distinct ‘things’ or prohibited commodities that their agency defined as 
being of risk to the border. The following table was copied during my research and showed 
the results of a test given to Customs officers as to their ability do define objects of risk to 
their agency such as drugs and counter terrorism, and to other agencies such as MAF, and 
INZ. The table in lay terms demonstrates officers ability to look for ‘things’. 
Item Identified /56  %  
 
Correct Seizure Reason %  
Drugs  
LSD  34  60  34  60  
White powder in 52  92  52  92  
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false bottom  
Pseudo4 disguised 
as 100/1000s  
56  100  54  96  
Pseudo in sock  55  98  53  94  
Objectionable  
#### DVD  56  100  56  100  
#### magazine  53  95  53  95  
#### DVD  53  94  47  83  
Psilocybin Guide  51  91  16  28  
Counter Terrorism  
#### 5 52  93  49  87  
####  53  95  51  91  
####  56  100  53  94  
#### 52  93  51  91  
####  47  83  46  82  
Ties/Cites  
Snake/Scorpion in 
bottle  
56  100  56  100  
Po Chai pills  56  100  52  92  
#### #### book  53  94  48  85  
INZ  
CV  56  100  56  100  
Job Vacancy  53  95  53  95  
MAF 
Beef lollies  56  100  56  100  
Eucalyptus seeds  56  100  56  100  
Hacky sack  48  85  45  80  
False documents  
Nokia labels  54  96  42  75  
#### Drivers 
Licence  
56  100  52  93  
Visa card  56  100  52  93  
Certificates  53  95  48  85  
Other  
 ###### ##l (Intel)  3  5  2  3  
 
From this we can see that the role of workers at the border is blurred from what would at 
prima facia value be their job. Though focused on people the workers of the border are 
able to identify items associated with risk activities at and away from the border. Workers 
are identifying, and then communicating the risk to appropriate agencies or persons across 
a whole range of commodities. The initial drug items would be easily recognisable as 
being of Customs concern, but the list progresses into objectionable material, counter 
terrorism, trade in endangered species items, items in relation to immigration risk, MAF 
                                                 
 
4
 Pseudo – pseudoephedrine – the precursor ingredient to make methamphetamine or ‘p’ or ‘meth’. 
5
 ### = edited out for security reason 
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quarantine items, fraudulent items and assorted other risk items. This example shows the 
workers of the border policing the border as opposed to performing their individual ‘job 
descriptions’ as Orr critiqued at the start of this section. It can be said that the workers of 
the border are an occupational community centred around policing risk above all else. In 
justification of this claim it is necessary to look at what the workers of the border actually 
do. The primary focus within the occupational community that was observed during my 
fieldwork was a focus on communication with other members of the occupational 
community. While members of the occupational community did focus on facilitating 
passengers into and out of New Zealand their primary focus was on policing these 
passengers. The members of the occupational community did not talk about facilitating the 
passengers in their lunch break, they did not talk about the fastest ‘screening’ (checking a 
person or bag for prohibited items) they had conducted, instead they talked about their 
‘finds’ or their detections of some breach of legislation amongst themselves. In doing so 
the members of the occupational community showed their shared focus of policing the 
border and educated other members of the occupational community as to the risks that 
could be found at the border. 
 An apt quote to finish this section on policing the border comes from Caplan’s 
‘Risk Revisited’. The quote pertains to the way in which we can see that the border 
workers share the policing of the border and are not in fact limited to their job descriptions. 
They share the common fears of threats to the border and look to identify these and 
communicate the risk to other agencies should the need arise. Policing is the common 
value and the common fear is risk itself at the border: 
Common values lead to common fears, thus the choice of risks and the 
choice of how to live are linked and each form of life has it’s own typical 
risk portfolios (2000: 9-10). 
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Concluding remarks on the workers of the border 
 There are two kinds of border workers at the international airport studied, both 
manage the risks to the border, and the risks posed to themselves by failing to manage 
these risks appropriately in different ways. These two kinds of border workers can be 
broken into the group that makes up the occupational community of border workers and 
the group outside of this occupational community. Those within the occupational 
community are for the most part made up of experienced full time shift workers. Those 
outside of the occupational community are made up for the most part of part time or day 
working newer staff. 
 The workers of the border who collectively police the border are best viewed as an 
occupational community, as they are not what their job description or title limits their 
capacity to mitigate risk to. There are also workers at the border who also police the border 
but who are not part of this occupational community. This group outside of the 
occupational community share the organisational culture of border workers but are limited 
through their relative experience, and often their employments status, such as ‘part timers’, 
to policing only one set of risks. The set of risks that those outside of the organisational 
culture police are those defined by their agency, such as MAF officers only policing MAF 
bio-security risks.  
 The definition provided by Orr as to an occupational community’s workers is an 
appropriate one for the members of the occupational community discussed in this chapter. 
The workers are typically 
focused on the work not the organisation, and the only valued status is 
that of full member of the community… In pursuit of this goal they share 
information, assist in each others diagnoses, and compete in terms of their 
relative expertise (1996: 76).  
 
Examples of this in action have been demonstrated throughout this chapter. To name but 
one, AVSEC officers can help Customs officers identify and treat risk as outlined in the 
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example of the sea horses that AVSEC found, Customs seized and then passed on to DOC. 
As such the workers of the border are best viewed as nodes of the network/s that are 
centred around the larger node, that is the international airport. The workers have a high 
degree of reflexivity within the network, in that they understand, and can identify the risks 
of other actors in the network.  
 The AS/NZS 4360:1999 Risk Management Standard outlines risk management as 
the ability to identify, monitor, treat and communicate risk. A worker of the border, who 
can identify a risk (even if not his own), monitor it, and then pass on appropriate 
information to someone able to treat it, is a full member of the occupational community.  
 
NZCS, AS/NZS 4360: 1999 ‘Ad Hoc Risk Management Group, 1999.  
‘The New Zealand Customs Service Risk Management Framework’,  
Published Internally pp. 10. 
 
This membership is because he is following the same process to mitigate risk that the 
person, whose ‘job’ it is to mitigate that particular risk, would. This reflexivity and agency 
within the border network is for the most part limited to members of the occupational 
community. Salaman states that one of the key requirements of an occupational community 
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is that members must share an identity (1986: 77). The members of the border worker 
occupational community share an identity based around mitigating collective risk to the 
border. 
 The important question as to the consequence of this aspect of the identity is that 
collective risks to the border are effectively mitigated by members of the occupational 
community, even though this is not their ‘core’ or perceived job. A secondary consequence 
of this is that members of the public, who see this ‘private’ world played out in the ‘public’ 
space of the airport perceive that risk is mitigated in a fluid fashion by all workers of the 
border. Tension in this arises, when border workers, who are not members of the 
occupational community, cannot mitigate all risk to the border in this fluid fashion in a 
public space. Then for members of the occupational community and for perceptive 
members of the public (or nefarious travellers observing the border network for 
weaknesses) the use of power to police risk in this public space appears ad-hoc and less 
effective. 
 The workers outside of this occupational community work in a slightly different 
way and though they still police risk to their agency they do not share the generic ability to 
police risk across agencies. As such tensions between these workers and the members of 
the occupational community arise. These tensions can be expressed in a light hearted 
fashion, as was illustrated in the section on ‘the look’, but the tensions can also have more 
antagonistic repercussions between border workers. For the most part members of the 
occupational community will always be working alongside those who are not members. 
Therefore the workers have the ability to communicate within their agency at most times 
and draw upon other officer’s knowledge of divergent agencies risks. 
 There are two groups of border workers, those within and those outside of the 
occupational community. Having an occupational community means that there must be a 
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group outside of the occupational community in opposition, identity wise, to it. Both 
groups, both those inside the occupational community and those outside of it, share equal 
success in policing the border. The fickle nature of border policing means that a border 
worker outside of the occupational community is just as likely to open up a bag and find a 
prohibited item as a member of the occupational community. Questions of effectiveness 
come down to questions of effective communication, border workers outside of the 
occupational community are forced to rely upon mediators to communicate with members 
of other agencies. These mediators are often the machines that also police the border and 
these machines and their ability to be mediators as well as actors within the border network 
are the focus of the following chapter. 
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Chapter Interlude: 
Occupational Community to Actor Networks? 
 
Going from a discussion on the idea of an occupational community of border 
workers to the actor network theories of Latour may seem a big jump. At this point 
therefore it is necessary to reflect on the introductory comments as to the complimentary 
use of this idea and this theory. In the second chapter the idea of an occupational 
community argued that the workers of the border can for the most part effectively police 
the border because they share a world. This holds true throughout this thesis. Unfortunately 
actor network theory makes has no space for ideas like occupational community and 
doubtless its proponents would scoff at the idea of using it alongside a 1980s idea used in 
the study of the labour market.   
In the introductory comments of this thesis I outlined how my prime method of 
research was participant observation and the author therefore cannot leave this idea of 
occupational community behind when it is a ‘best fit’ method to describe a group of border 
workers that were studied. As one of my informants an experienced and senior customs 
officer said to me “some people work here, and stay here out of a sense of vocation.” 
Sentiment such as this is best accounted for within the idea of an occupational community. 
In the same way through my participant observation I cannot ignore the fact that 
border workers are as much intertwined with the machines that police the border as much 
as they are with the other human border workers. Therefore it is necessary to explain the 
major disparity between occupational community and actor network theory that will come 
to light, which is the question of what holds the workers together. Actor network theory 
would argue that it is the mediators and intermediaries which will be discussed in the 
following chapter that holds the network of the border workers together, or more precisely 
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that constitute the border network. Occupational community on the other hand would focus 
on the core groups shared values and work life world in which they collectively exist.  
To bring the idea and this theory together it is important to look at the wider 
argument that the border is collectively policed by the many workers of different agencies 
as well as the human – machine hybrids that police the border. The border is in effect 
policed through a many eyed panopticon and made effective by lateral communication 
within the border network. This lateral communication is made possible for some border 
workers by the occupational community in which they work. These members of the 
occupational community have perhaps lesser reliance upon the human machine hybrids 
and technologies of the border to communicate at this lateral level. Workers of the border 
outside of the occupational community rely upon the technologies of the border and the 
human technology hybrids to communicate amongst themselves and also to effectively 
police the border. 
 Occupational community can explain why one group of border workers is 
successful at communicating laterally within the border network. The border network as a 
whole is best explained and illustrated through the actor network theories which will give 
as much importance to the technologies of the border as it will to the humans within this 
network. Neither the idea of occupational community nor actor network theory will 
effectively address the issues of power within the border network. Both occupational 
community and actor network theory will however bring out examples of power in action 
which chapter four will attempt to frame using the ideas of Foucault. 
 71 
Chapter Three: 
Working the Border Together, 
the Technologies of the Border and Risk 
 
1982 Time Magazine Person of the Year – “The Computer” 
 
* 
“Computers are useless. They can only give you answers” 
Pablo Picasso. 
 
The non-human workers of the border 
 The previous chapter focused on the human workers of the border, and explored 
how they go about their ‘work’ policing the border as members of an occupational 
community and as workers outside of it. This chapter will focus upon the alliances between 
the human and non-human workers of the border.  
 Pablo Picasso, quoted above, argues that computers are useless because they can 
only give answers. This chapter will argue that standing alone the various technologies of 
the border are ineffective. The previous chapter acknowledged that unless they 
communicate with each other the human workers of the border are also ineffective. A 
critical focus of this chapter will be upon what answers the technologies of the border give 
their human colleagues, and how these answers are interpreted by humans. Latour advises 
readers of his actor network theory 
Every time you want to know what a non human does, simply imagine 
what other humans or other non humans would have to do were this 
character not present (1992: 229) 
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This question is pertinent, as this chapter will look at the technologies of the border and 
will ask the same question that was asked of human workers: “what do the non human 
workers of the border actually do?” This chapter will trace the difference in what the 
public and workers alike take to be the prima facia job of a border  technology and unravel 
constantly shifting configurations and reconfigurations of workers at the border.  
The technologies that make up the non-human workers of the border can be divided 
into three main types of technology: visual technologies, tracing technologies and audio 
technologies. These three technology types serve different purposes within the border 
networks. Visual technologies include cameras and x-rays, allowing humans to observe 
people or items in a way that they could not do with the human eye. Visual technologies 
relate to surveillance, which can be roughly described as “a mode of ordering” (Donaldson 
and Wood, 2004: 373). Tracing technologies from the highly advanced itemiser to the 
mundane notebook allow the people and commodities within the border network to have 
their pathways traced in a way that can be referred back to by human agents. Audio 
networks within the border such as pagers and radio communication allow the workers to 
transmit messages of and about risk to each other covertly and through obstacles. 
 The various technologies of the border all have certain perceived roles within the 
border network. These roles are not always what they would be at face value. The 
following chapter explores these different roles and acknowledges that the only certain 
eventuality that comes from the introduction of new technologies into the border network 
is the expansion of the network; “as the actors multiply, so the network expands.” (Miller 
1997: 359) 
 
Biometrics as a technology of (in)security 
The politics of security becomes a technology. One such technology is 
biometric identification. Biometrics refers to the automatic verification of 
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individual identity on the basis of their physical / behavioural 
characteristics, including finger printing, facial and iris scanning, 
signature recognition etc  
(Fierke 2007: 116). 
 
 The technologies at the border cannot arbitrarily mitigate risk, however new 
technologies through political promotion are often linked to the concept of providing 
greater security. The new biometric technologies that are gradually being introduced are a 
good example of erroneous interpretation of the utility of new border related technology. 
These new technologies and their possible introduction have been established by the 
popular press as technologies that will streamline air travel and at the same time make it 
more secure and cheaper for governments: 
Customs and Border Protection officers can more quickly match the 
biometrics to verify that visitors do not pose a threat… if the person in 
line is a criminal, immigration violator or requires further questioning, the 
officer will know this more quickly and remove them from the line for 
additional screening without delaying legitimate  visitors… Collecting 
biometrics also helps protect visitors against identity theft Delay times 
and inefficient security procedures had put off many travellers. However, 
he (CBP spokesman) said passengers were not averse to biometrics 
because they were concerned about their safety and protecting their 
identity (Travel Trade, 2008: 2). 
 
The practise is that unless a passenger is on a wanted list, meaning they would be detected 
anyway at a biometric screening point border workers will be in no better position to detect 
an ‘under the radar’ terrorist or criminal than was previously the case. Delay times for 
passengers will not be reduced by this new technology, this is apparent when considering 
new aeroplanes’ passenger carrying ability. One such new high capacity aircraft will be the 
A380-900 aircraft, which according to Leahy  
would have a seating capacity of 650 passengers in standard 
configuration, and around 900 passengers in economy-only configuration 
(2008 online). 
 
Even the proponents of the biometric technology acknowledge that biometrics cannot 
necessarily keep up with large numbers of passengers arriving at once. 
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) already has its back up 
about wait times, claiming that they can’t control and can’t predict delays. 
However, a spokesperson for DHS admitted that there would be severe 
delays at times, especially when several planes land at once (Travel Trade 
2008: 1). 
 
Salter would agree with this sentiment (2007: 59). Salter’s comprehensive study of the 
dynamic of balance between mobility and security at a Canadian airport (mentioning a 
whopping 82 enforcement agencies), which he analysed using Foucault’s ‘heretopia and 
confessionary complex,’ argues of biometrics that  
the introduction of biometric measures has done nothing to diminish 
either the examination or the reliance on documentation (2007: 59). 
 
The introduction of biometrics at the international airport that I studied is still in an early 
phase, some new passports are equipped to be biometric capable with e-chips, but there are 
no biometric scanners yet for passengers or documentation. Latour (1986) asks the famous 
question who killed Aramis, the new technology for mass individual transport. Though not 
yet dead the technology of the biometric scanner and travel document is certainly in the 
process of not so much being killed as mutilated into a new shape. This new shape will 
make an appearance within the border network in future and doubtless be the cause for 
translation and negotiation in much the same way the events of 9/11, which heralded and 
‘necessitated’ the arrival of ‘new’ and ‘secure’ technologies such as the biometrics. Fierke 
has a similar argument to that presented here in regards to biometric technology: 
Against the backdrop of the War on Terrorism, government elites have 
hailed biometric technologies as a tool for confronting new security 
challenges. The incorporation of biometrics into all travel and 
identification documents is currently a subject of discussion in 
intergovernmental forums. Since 9/11, forms of biometric identification 
have been deemed critical to increased security (2007: 117). 
 
In the context of 9/11 the argument could be presented, and this would fit within the 
securities studies approach taken by Fierke, that biometrics would not have prevented the 
9/11 attacks happening, rather they would have simply provided more certainty that the 
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attackers were, who they claimed to be upon arrival at the airport. This technology is not 
yet active within the border network studied, so we will turn to some technologies that are 
and endeavour to track them within the border network and examine ‘what they do’. 
 
X-ray Machine – a visualising Technology 
 At the international airport, where the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted, the 
x-ray machines are owned and operated by both MAF and AVSEC. These machines are 
relied upon by MAF, AVSEC and Customs directly, and a myriad of other agencies 
indirectly. The x-ray machines are visualising technologies. The x-rays allow human 
operators to see what is within or behind objects and AVSEC workers use them to look for 
weapons being smuggled or inadvertently taken onto planes. MAF uses their x-rays to look 
for bio-security risk items being taken into New Zealand. Customs who does not own the 
x-ray machines uses the MAF x-ray to screen for specific items they have identified as 
being of risk. Some MAF officers are also attune to certain Customs items that are easily 
detected such as cannabis pipes and will alert Customs when they come across them. 
 X-ray machines are now synonymous with air travel. They allow what was in the 
past impermeable spheres of privacy around personal items, within baggage, to be looked 
through. X-rays open the private world of a traveller’s possessions to border workers, who 
use the revealed contents of the baggage to make risk assessments about the traveller. They 
are an Orwellian artefact that the majority of people put as much thought about putting 
their baggage into as they do about putting it into their car boot, when they leave the 
airport. In the future x-ray machines may progress from looking through luggage to 
looking through layers of clothing and even, under the human skin. This not so distant 
technology will determine if people are carrying weapons or explosives onto aeroplanes, 
and if people are internally carrying drugs or other contraband on or within their bodies 
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across the border. This future technology will open up a vast field of ethical questions and 
moral issues which should first be resolved, but will probably not come into public 
consciousness until the technology is well entrenched. During my research there were 
rumours amongst the border workers that a scanning machine such there are mentioned 
above, had been trialled, but was abandoned as a technology (despite being successful 
from a technical perspective). This project was abandoned because the people, who were 
part of the trial process, had to step into a small cubicle that would then close around them. 
Those trialled took issue to being treated like cattle at a drench. 
 The x-ray can be seen as a visual technology of classification. Burrows and Gane 
look at how technologies of classification through geodemographic software and class are 
interlinked. Their work explores classifications, and though not policing or border related it 
provides some interesting insights into classification software which is of a kind used at the 
border in database form. They believe that “technologies of classification have long been 
an endemic feature of modernity” (2006: 803). Perhaps most importantly given my focus 
on the border and goods and people crossing the border, they state: 
the growth of such technologies should not necessarily be viewed as 
forms of oppressive control; rather the drivers of such development tend 
to be an institutional fixation with the smooth flow of objects, goods and 
services (2006: 804). 
 
X-rays as a technology of classification can also change the flow of objects and people, as 
will be shown in the following example.  
 
Covert searching using x-rays 
 When a traveller departs New Zealand he or she will progress past Customs and 
through the AVSEC screening point. The first stage of this is a metal detector which relies 
upon magnetic technology to detect the presence of metal, then that traveller’s luggage will 
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go through an x-ray machine. The x-ray machine looks for metal weapons as well as 
explosives, which can now be in liquid form. AVSEC is tasked with looking for dangerous 
items that may be taken on to a plane either with innocent intent or criminal / terrorist 
intent. Other agencies also use AVSEC’s departure x-ray machines: 
At the request of Customs, the Service (AVSEC) will carry out targeted 
screening where there are suspicions that illicit substances have been 
concealed (AVSEC online 2008).  
 
During my fieldwork I was tasked with undertaking a covert WEG search. WEG is the 
wild-life enforcement group. The goal of this search was to determine if a passenger was 
smuggling any wildlife out of New Zealand. Certain New Zealand species such as tuatara 
and native birds are endangered and are therefore unfortunately highly sought after by 
overseas collectors. These endangered species will fetch a high price on the illegal wildlife 
markets overseas, and smugglers will go to great lengths to steal them from New Zealand 
wildlife reserves. 
 In this incident during my fieldwork I was able to assess that the passenger leaving 
New Zealand did not have any wildlife in his carry on luggage. This was done covertly 
through the use of the AVSEC x-ray, which I unobtrusively used to observe the passengers 
bags whilst he went through AVSEC security screening. In its use in this manner the x-ray 
is not limited to looking for items that are of danger to the security of the flight.  
 It is not the ability of the x-ray machine itself that is the key focus here. We have to 
ask the key question what is the x-ray doing? The x-ray has the ability to look through 
bags, but without a Customs officer who is able to interpret the image within the risk 
context that he is seeking to mitigate an AVSEC x-ray is simply an expensive ornament. 
Similarly, the AVSEC officer operating the x-ray and looking for craft knives and not 
native species is also of no use (to WEG). Were it not for the x-ray this covert search 
would not have been so easily achieved, so it can be said that it is the human Customs 
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officer and x-ray working in alliance that provide the level of surety within the border 
network in this instance. The x-ray is limited in the respect that it can indicate that there are 
no native birds in a  bag, but it cannot indicate if the books in the bag are  entitled 
“smuggling native reptiles on your body for dummies”, which a human searcher could 
determine as indicative of risk. 
 The final interaction around this WEG covert search occurred sometime later when 
I was privy to a seizure made at AVSEC. The AVSEC officers had found some WEG 
items, which they had passed on to a colleague in Customs. This occurred through 
individual AVSEC staff being aware of previous Customs use of their x-ray to look for 
wildlife with their x-rays. If the Customs officer on previous occasions had taken the bags 
covertly to their arrivals search area, the AVSEC staff may not have been aware of 
Customs interest in these WEG items. In the previous chapter the communication between 
the workers added layers to the networks when it came to mitigating risk. This is an 
example of human interaction with machines generating new practises that add layers to 
the border network. 
 It is important to note in examples such as this that the x-ray technology allows the 
workers of the border to carry out discrete policing work in a very public space. The 
workers of the border go about their work in a public space but they maintain their private 
world through the use of technologies like the x-ray. 
 The x-ray technology is inherently a highly flexible one as it is not designed to look 
for specific things, it is simply designed to look through the material of luggage and reveal 
what is inside. In this light it is not as effective as a human searcher who can make 
suppositions as to risk based on what is not there. An x-ray can however look within 
objects that a human would have to break into to see inside. This flexibility is seen through 
the way in which the x-ray  machine is often used for other agencies outside of the 
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immediate airport border environment. Other agencies include the Ministry of Fisheries 
and the Department of Conservation. The government tasks the Customs service with 
making sure excessive amounts of pounamu (greenstone) are not exported from New 
Zealand. Mitigating this risk in departures is a task that Customs, within its current 
budgeting, resource and staff constraints could not do without the x-ray machines that are 
owned and operated by AVSEC. Ladley and White discuss Customs role in liaison with 
agencies such as the Ministry of Culture and Heritage to prevent  
the illicit trade in endangered species and Maori taonga…from an 
operational perspective, however, the Customs service has taken the lead 
role in detecting and responding to the emerging threat, as the point of 
border control both defines the offence and in many cases provides a 
controlled detention and detection opportunity.” (2006: 24) 
 
This detection opportunity for the most part replies upon intelligence outside the airport to 
target screening and AVSEC technology being used to maximum effect by operators, who 
are aware of other agencies’ risk and who have been exposed to screening for it. 
 At this point in the discussion as to what the technology of the x-ray actually does it 
is necessary to refer back to Latour who talks of visualising technologies and the 
dichotomy of old and new science. The first example given about what x-rays do, when 
used by human operators, is a simplistic example, best understood as a stepping stone to 
the following more layered example. The next example will elaborate on this discussion as 
to what x-ray technologies actually do. Pertinently to the discussion as to what non human 
actors can do Latour states: 
We must admit that when talking of images and print it is 
easy to shift from the most powerful explanation to one that is trivial  and 
reveals only marginal aspects of the phenomena for which we want to 
account. Diagrams, lists, formulae, archives, engineering drawings, files, 
equations, dictionaries, collections and soon, depending on the way they 
are put into focus, may explain almost everything or almost nothing 
(1986: 32). 
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This is pertinent to the following argument as it serves to provide for the explanation above 
as to the adaptation of AVSEC x-ray technology to Customs needs. This adaptation occurs 
through communication and observation between agencies and strengthens the 
enforcement capabilities of the border network. An x-ray image would fit within Latour’s 
definition of an inscription; as it is something which different actors can use to negotiate a 
meaning from a level playing field so to speak. Latour in his work on visualisation and 
configuration uses the example of a map being able to be interpreted by both the French 
explorers and the ‘primitive’: 
Strictly speaking, the ability to draw and to visualize does not really make 
a difference either, since they all draw maps more or less based on the 
same principle of projection, first on sand, then on paper (1986: 5). 
 
In this light an x-ray image can also be seen as something in which all border actors,  be 
they, Customs or AVSEC or MAF can visualise and utilise to detect certain risks. Some 
readers of the image may not read all risks, as they may lack in particular skills to be able 
to read certain aspects of the image, much like the way a London local would read a map 
of the tube as opposed to a tourist. 
 
X-rays re-assembling strip searches 
 X-rays are a technology that initially travelled from the medical world to the 
airport. In this section the example shows how the x-ray is able to bring the medical world 
to the airport. In the Customs controlled arrivals area, where there is no AVSEC presence, 
MAF operates x-ray machines to screen the baggage of incoming passengers. All 
passengers, unless they have been fully searched by Customs or MAF, put their bags 
through the x-ray machine. The MAF operator of the x-ray machines is primarily looking 
for fruits and risk biological items or matter that may pose a risk to New Zealand’s bio-
security. If the MAF x-ray operator has a working knowledge of Customs (gained through 
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experience or briefings) he or she will also endeavour to keep an eye open for items that 
may be of interest to Customs, the most obvious being narcotics, but more frequently being 
the more noticeable cannabis pipes and commercial quantities of goods in passenger’s 
bags. If a Customs officer has searched a passenger’s suitcase, the officer will then put the 
empty suitcase through the MAF x-ray machine to determine, if there is anything 
concealed in the suitcases lining or frame. 
 During my fieldwork an incident was observed that involved a S149 search or in 
common parlance a ‘strip search’. This is defined under the Customs and Excise Act 1996 
as 
149 Searching of persons if reasonable cause to suspect items hidden 
(1) A Customs officer or a member of the police may cause to be detained 
and searched a person to whom this subsection applies if the officer or 
member has reasonable cause to suspect that the person has hidden on or 
about his or her person— 
(a) any dutiable, uncustomed, prohibited, or forfeited goods; or 
(b) evidence relating to any such goods; or 
(c) any thing that is or might be evidence of the contravention or possible 
contravention of this Act (2009 Online). 
 
It is also important to note this following section which pertains to the use of various 
technologies used when policing the border. Interestingly the nonhuman actors such as x-
rays are put in the same category as living animals (dogs): 
172 Use of aids by Customs officer 
(1) In exercising any power of boarding, entry, or search conferred by this 
Act, a Customs officer or any member of the Police may have with him or 
her, and use for the purposes of searching, a dog, a chemical substance, x-
ray or imaging equipment, or some other mechanical, electrical, or 
electronic device. 
 
In this incident I was in the control room operating the cameras, so I had a good vantage 
point to observe the interactions. The incident panned out over the period of about two 
hours. I observed a roving officer talking with a female passenger that I had noticed was 
walking awkwardly. Often from the control room, passengers who walk awkwardly are 
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profiled and are pointed out to staff on the ground to talk to, as they could have illicit items 
strapped to their body6.  
 The female passenger was taken to the search area where a searching officer 
questioned her for some time about her drug use and associations with drugs users. I then 
observed the searching officer get out a ‘Form 3A’ which is a legal declaration that a 
passenger fills out before being searched, in which they declare any dutiable or commercial 
goods, or anything they may want to declare. It is often at this point that passengers declare 
non-prescribed prescription drugs, they have picked up overseas, such as Valium and 
Viagra. This is a good example of what Salter refers to as Foucault’s concept of the airport 
being a confessionary complex:  
anthropological studies of administrative discretion at the border illustrate 
that anxious confession becomes readable by border agents… Suspicion 
by a border guard, which is derived from their discretionary power of 
examination, is enough to warrant further questioning, detention and 
expulsion from the country (2007: 59). 
 
The passenger in this incident must have succumbed to the confessionary complex, 
because a later interview with the searching officer revealed the passenger had admitted 
extensive drug use including ‘P’7. Once the form had been completed, the searching officer 
began to search her bags and evidence of the drug use was found in the form of deal bags 
and ‘P’ utensils.8  
 As the baggage search was completed the searching officer was observed using her 
notebook. This is usually a fair indicator that things of consequence (such as drug 
admissions) have been said by the passenger, and the officer wants to transcribe them to 
refer back to, in case the passenger changes their story later in the search or in court. The 
                                                 
 
6
 Body packing is one of the main methods used for importing drugs into NZ through the airport. Drugs are 
wrapped in sealed or vacuum-packed plastic bags and then cling filmed to the body. This technique is also 
used by wildlife smugglers leaving New Zealand. 
7
 P – also known as Methamphetamine, meth, ice. 
8
 P utensils can include ‘P pipes’ – specifically made or ad hoc utensils such as a light bulb with the metal 
filament removed and spoons. 
 83 
searching officer began filling out additional S149 forms, which set out to a passenger that 
they are being legally detained for the purpose of a personal (strip) search and that they 
have the right to consult with a lawyer. The searching officer also read the passenger her 
bill of rights that set out the person’s right to a lawyer, right to silence and so forth.  
 Normally the process from the forms being completed to the strip search is a fast 
one. This is because the passenger is legally under detention and the longer they sit around 
waiting, the more likely they are to become aggressive, and this increases the likelihood of 
a confrontation. To clarify at this point, a S149 search involves a passenger removing all 
their clothes one item at a time and then lifting up arms, running hands through hair etc to 
show that no items are concealed about the body. At no stage in the search will a passenger 
be touched by the searching officer or the witness, nor will they be asked to open their 
mouth or any other orifice. In some situations, if an officer believes that a passenger has 
drugs concealed internally they can be held for a period of time to ‘wait out’ the 
contraband leaving their body. During my fieldwork, whenever I conducted a personal 
search, I always said to the passenger about to be searched: “you need to know I will not 
touch you at any point in this search nor will the witness. However I do require you to 
follow my instructions implicitly and to only take off one item of clothing at a time, place 
the items on the ground and do not throw them to or near me, if you do this we will not 
have any problems.”  
 In this instance the delay was caused by the searching officers and passenger 
having to wait for a doctor to arrive. This is not normal procedure, however in this instance 
the doctor was necessary because the awkward movement that I had noted in the 
passengers gait was due to her having a prosthetic leg. As such the passenger ‘has’ to have 
the leg removed under medical supervision so that it can be x-rayed. In the past in most 
cases a personal search would be the limit of Customs intervention with a passenger. The 
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passenger in this instance had been observed, questioned, had her bags searched, 
personally searched by a human actor then as an additional step had the prosthetic leg 
removed and x-rayed. The example outlined here shows that just as the workers of the 
border must have their network reshaped by the arrival of new technologies into it, so to 
must the travelling passengers, who are subject to the application of these technologies 
upon them. 
 Within the border network the x-ray machine is mostly used by MAF to screen for 
quarantine items. The presence of the x-ray links Customs to MAF in situations where they 
would normally be separated. Due to its presence and ability to mitigate risk to a level that 
a human actor cannot (unless they saw the prosthetic leg in half) the x-ray machine 
becomes a ‘vital’ part of the border network through its ability to x-ray the leg. Latour 
describes humans and nonhumans as “equally actors, that is entities that do things” (1992: 
241). The x-ray in this example is doing the same thing as the human Customs officer, 
which is analysing an object or person of risk to the most detailed level it can.  
 The machine works in what Latour calls assemblages, working one way for MAF 
and another way for Customs. The different functions work based around different things 
that the human actors are focused on looking for; food or drugs or weapons. The x-ray has 
the ability to introduce other actors such as doctors and MAF quarantine staff to the 
network that has expanded around the risk posed by the prosthetic limb. Traditionally 
during serious events such as personal searches any non-essential outsiders are kept well 
away from what is occurring. The x-ray machine predicates the introduction of new actors 
to the border network. Latour as a litmus test for his actor network theory states that 
you have to ‘follow the actors themselves’  that is try and catch up with 
their often wild innovations in order to learn from them what the 
collective existence has become in their hands, which methods they have 
elaborated to make it fit together, which accounts could best define the 
new associations that they have been forced to establish (2005: 12). 
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The use of the x-ray in this manner reinforces the collective existence of the border 
workers. Without the x-ray a search, such as the one in my example, would involve only 
Customs officers. Due to the advent of the x-ray machines’ widespread use and an 
anomaly in the border network in the form of the prosthetic limb new associations are 
established within the network. 
 As part of the research for this section, I had a discussion with one of my 
informants about how searches were conducted prior to the arrival of the x-ray, whether 
prosthetic limbs were x-rayed or not. He replied “prior to the x-ray we would not have 
looked inside a leg. In many ways around here (the border) technology is the driver of 
policy and procedures.” This topic was also discussed with Police and Corrections 
Department informants outside of the border network, in regards to how they conducted 
strip searches. Both parties advised that due to the absence of available x-ray machines 
they would not be able to look inside prosthetic limbs as a matter of policy for contraband.  
 The diverse use of the x-ray machine within the border networks and its ability to 
shape the network depending on the context in which it is used fits within Latour’s  
arguments of  the nonhuman being shaped by the human, then  the impact of society on 
machine, followed by humans being shaped by machines (1992: 63). Initially designed for 
medical purposes, the x-ray is used in the airport environment to screen for weapons 
(departures) and fruits and other quarantine risks (arrivals) as a primary function by 
AVSEC and MAF.  
 The x-ray machines potential in the arrival hall was quickly realised by Customs, 
who could use the x-ray to detect prohibited imports such as hookah pipes in packed bags 
and hidden narcotics in emptied luggage. The x-rays ability to screen large numbers of 
people meant the travelling public became used to having bags x-rayed and not searched. 
Importantly from an enforcement perspective drug smugglers also adjusted their behaviour 
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to avoid this new technology and started to body-pack drugs. Drug runners are widely 
acknowledged as being able to constantly and quickly adapt to the changing technologies 
in the border environment: 
One informant claimed that the drug smugglers owned sniffer dogs that 
had undergone the same training as those of the border patrol. If one of 
the dogs smelled the drugs hidden aboard a tractor rig, the contraband was 
removed, repacked and hidden again until the sniffer dog could no longer 
detect it (Maril, 2004: 276) 
 
The travelling public, criminals and the border workers are all effected by this new 
technology in the border network. The x-ray changed the way that MAF officers actually 
went about their jobs. 
 Since the arrival of the x-ray MAF officers are split between searching passengers 
that have been profiled by their staff as likely to carry risk items and searching passengers 
who the x-ray has detected as having risk items. Prior to the arrival of the x-ray MAF was 
dependant on having larger numbers of staff to profile and to search bags. When a 
passenger goes to leave the terminal, they are directed by a MAF officer either to another 
MAF officer for screening or to a x-ray for screening. Both the officer and the machine 
that the passenger could be directed to are screening. The x-ray has changed the way the 
workers of the border go about their jobs, but it has also changed the way in which 
passengers are screened.  
 In the final stage Latour talks of we see “humans shaped by the machine”. At this 
point, the actions of human actors are changed by the x-ray machine, positive returns on 
fruit or items in the lining of bags turn passengers into ‘border risks’ and bags into 
‘exhibits’. Latour refers to this ability to be able to determine “the faithfulness of an ally”’ 
and continues “an actor is an actant endowed with a character (usually anthropomorphic)”. 
In the case of the x-ray and itemiser machines the anthropomorphic ability is one of 
decision-making. 
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X-Ray machines linking actors 
 Latour uses the example of ‘guns not killing people’ and ‘people not killing 
people’, instead the ‘citizen-gun kills’. In a border network example that I came across 
during my fieldwork, Customs officer Glover was searching the suitcase of passenger 
Crook, who was a ‘drugs risk’. Customs officer Glover fully searched the suitcases and 
wanted to put them through the x-ray machine in an empty state to check for any internal 
concealment of drugs, so he did not have to drill into the suitcase. The x-ray machine is 
owned and operated by MAF to mitigate quarantine risk so Customs officer Glover 
approaches MAF officer Apple at x-ray B and requested him to “put this through on drugs 
mode to check there are no drugs hidden inside the frame?” MAF officer Apple replied 
“yes”. The suitcase goes through MAF x-ray B and MAF officer Apple stated “no, 
nothing in there apart from the glue that shows up red”. In the mind of Glover, who has 
brought the bag to MAF x-ray B the Customs risk posed by the suitcase has been 
mitigated. In Customs officer Glover’s activity report he will write “All suitcases x-rayed 
at MAF x-ray B – NEGATIVE result – On this occasion passenger Crook appears of a low 
risk to the border.” The network is not reassembled or changed in any meaningful way by 
the human and non-human actors involved. 
 Prior to being x-rayed the passenger was of an unknown risk to the border (from a 
Customs perspective), but post search and x-ray the passenger became ‘low risk’. This new 
status has come about through the alliance between MAF x-ray B and MAF officer Apple, 
to mitigate a Customs risk conveyed by Customs officer Glover. The ‘man x-ray machine’ 
actor has mitigated the Customs drug risk in a way that neither, Customs officer, MAF 
officer or x-ray machine could independently. 
 Speaking generally to this specific example the risk posed by the suitcase is 
unlikely to be fully understood by the MAF officer Apple, who is used to using MAF x-ray 
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B to look for items like hiking boots and fruit. Even Customs officer Glover’s description 
of “drugs” inside the frame: is not specific to the risk that the Customs officer is looking to 
mitigate. Customs officer Glover, if searching a backpacker, may be thinking in terms of a 
trace amount of cannabis in the lining of the pack. Alternatively, if searching a high-risk 
passenger who may be a professional drug courier, he may be looking for heroin expertly 
and densely packed into the frame, or even painted on the lining of the suitcase. This world 
or network that the Customs officer is working in is based upon his prior search of the 
passenger and previous passengers that the MAF officer has not been privy to.  
 It is not until the suitcase is brought to MAF x-ray B that the competing networks, 
one looking to mitigate quarantine risks and one looking to mitigate drugs risks, converge. 
At this point of merging it is the tool, in the form of the MAF x-ray B, that allows the 
human actor from the Customs network to use the visual technology in the form of x-ray B 
and its human operator to mitigate a Customs risk. At no point in this example is a 
quarantine risk mitigated. When talking of security clusters Fierke looks at the 
relationships between people and objects in a similar way to Latour and states: 
a subject or object does not stand alone, but is surrounded by other 
subjects or objects which contribute to its contextual meaning.” 
The core of security, the protection from harm, assumes a field of 
relationships, including a threatner, the threatened, the protector or means 
of protection and the protected (2007: 46). 
 
The border can be seen as a network, where the object, in this example a suitcase, has its 
contextual meaning defined through the relationships between the ‘protectors’ of the 
border (Customs and MAF) and their ‘means of protecting’. In this example the ‘means of 
protecting’ is two fold, through inter departmental liaison and, also through the alliance 
between the MAF officer and the MAF x-ray. Neither has the technical skills or knowledge 
to mitigate risks, but their technical skill, when applied to a machine or process that only 
they can use means, their networks can converge to mitigate risk in a complementary way.  
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Itemiser – a tracking technology 
 Akin to the x-ray machines in the respect that it is used both in arrivals and 
departures the itemiser is described by it’s maker General Electric 
Itemiser is the first trace detector in the world that simultaneously detects 
positive and negative ions, enabling the detection of the broadest range of 
explosives while also detecting narcotics. Detection of both positive and 
negative ions allows for effective identification of even the most difficult 
substances from a single sample. Extremely easy to operate, Itemiser 
delivers fast, simultaneous explosives and narcotics detection in a package 
that is ergonomic, robust, and portable (GE Security 2008). 
 
Both Customs and AVSEC own and exclusively operate itemiser machines in arrivals and 
departures sections respectively. AVSEC use the itemiser to look for explosives and 
Customs uses the itemiser to look for narcotics and explosives. It is important to note that 
while the itemiser gives an indication that a trace of explosives or narcotics is present it 
does not actually identify that a dangerous or illegal amount, is present. In the case of 
AVSEC screening departing passengers a trace of explosives is a risk. For Customs in 
arrivals a trace of explosives is an indicator of possible terrorist related links whilst a 
positive result for drugs is simply an indicator that a person may have been around drugs. 
A positive narcotics result could mean a passenger is, in order of highest to lowest risk, a 
drug courier, a personal use carrier or simply a drug user that has no drugs on or in his or 
her person. 
 To briefly explain how the itemiser is used it is important to understand the context 
that the machine creates. The machine creates different contexts for different agencies. 
AVSEC’s contexts are limited to explosives. When searching for explosives there are less 
shades of gray in the context of positive results than there are for drug detection. There are 
only a few ‘reasonable excuses’ for a passenger having an item that gives a positive result 
for explosives contact, such as a mining engineer who has clothing with him that he wears 
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when conducting blasting operations. Generally, the context that the itemiser creates for 
AVSEC, if a positive result for explosives is present is one of immediate high risk. The 
contexts that the itemiser can create for Customs are much more diverse. 
 Customs officers using the itemiser look to find ‘indicators’ for a passengers drug 
use, or alternately that they are carrying drugs. Before using the itemiser a passenger is 
asked if they use, or have been around drugs. If a passenger admits that they are a habitual 
user or that they have drugs on them the machine does not really need to be used as it is 
confirming a known, though some officers will still do so. An example of this occurring 
was seen during my fieldwork when I profiled in a passenger from the luggage pick up 
area. I suspected the passenger was of a risk to the border. The passenger was taken by me 
to the search area where a searching officer asked him the following questions in regards to 
the itemiser. 
CUSTOMS OFFICER: “do you use drugs or are you around drug 
users?” 
PASSENGER: (hesitates)……”no” 
CUSTOMS OFFICER: “Have you ever used drugs, or been around 
drugs? It is important that you are honest because that machine will 
analyse the swab to the billionth particle and if you have been around 
drugs it will indicate this to me.” 
PASSENGER: “I may have smoked some marijuana in the past” 
CUSTOMS OFFICER: “How long ago? Have you used any other 
drugs?” 
PASSENGER: “Years ago and that’s all I have ever used, I am a 
professional, I am not into that scene.” 
CUSTOMS OFFICER: “Okay I am going to take a swab from your 
laptop here. This is your laptop and it hasn’t been around drugs, aside 
from marijuana years ago?” 
PASSENGER: “Yes of course its my laptop- and no it’s never been 
around any drugs.” 
MACHINE: “Beep! Beep!” – Sounds of printing. 
CUSTOMS OFFICER: “The machine printout here shows me that the 
swab I took from your laptop came up positive for cocaine and 
methamphetamine…..” 
 
The reason, as shown here as to why the machine is still used even if a passenger confirms 
that they are using drugs or are around them is that the machine, while giving a yes - no 
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indication for drugs, also gives a risk indication. This is because the machine will, as 
shown in the dialogue above, demonstrate that a drugs trace is present. In itself the drugs 
trace is not an indication that a passenger has not answered questions truthfully. However 
when used in context with a human operator’s questioning this can demonstrate a 
passenger is in fact lying.  
 The machine will also show what drugs a person has been around and give a 
strength reading on the drugs presence. This information presented by the machine can be 
added to what is known about a passenger. For example a high strength reading for 
marijuana from a passenger arriving from Amsterdam would be lower risk than a low 
strength reading for cocaine from a passenger arriving from South America. The machine 
use is always used in context of the passenger, where they have come from, what they 
admit to having been around, their social demographics etc. In some situations where 
everything at face value appears low risk, a positive result can create a risk context by 
itself. This is best seen in cases of professional drug couriers, who will appear legitimate, 
have good cover stories, be relaxed, and appear honest. 
 The x-ray machine, which is used to screen all passengers, is in general use, the 
itemiser is only used on specific passengers. All passengers if targeted could be deemed to 
be of risk as all bank notes have been found to be contaminated with cocaine due to 
cocaine users using rolled up notes to inhale their cocaine and then the notes come into 
contact with other notes in ATM machines etc. Morelle states in an article for the BBC on 
this subject: 
Almost every UK banknote in circulation is tinged with drugs such as 
cocaine and heroin, the research finds… We are talking traces - these are 
amounts we cannot see or feel, these are amounts that require sensitive 
instrumentation to detect. They are in the order of nanograms - billionths 
of a gram (2007 online). 
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It is at the level of billionths of a gram that itemisers work and it is at this level that risk it 
detected. Therefore Customs officers have to eliminate certain procedures such as 
swabbing banknotes and wallets or money clips in order to accurately assess risk. Positive 
drugs readings are not always high risk for Customs when using the itemiser, however a 
positive explosives reading for AVSEC, when using the itemiser, certainly is. The different 
uses of this same technology within the relatively small physical limits of an international 
airport depend on the agencies core focus.  
 It can be argued that the use of the itemiser as a specific screening device rather 
than a general screening device is influenced by things that move into the network from 
outside of it such as banknotes. The fact that all bank notes and as a result wallets are 
contaminated with drugs, means that a machine that is intended by its makers simply to 
detect drugs and explosives has to be used in specific contexts and specific ways when 
searching for drugs. Explosives are not as widely used in society as drugs and the 
responses that a positive explosives hit would instigate in a human operator as opposed to a 
positive drugs hit are very different. The machine’s use is shaped by a societal context 
which influences the machine’s human operators response to the machine detecting 
specific commodities as well as the human operators subsequent actions towards the 
‘subject’, whose property has been tested by the itemiser.  
 The workers of the border look at the itemiser in conflicting ways. During the 
fieldwork, I would often feel frustration at not getting positive ‘hits’ off passengers, who I 
was certain were concealing something from me, and then the next day getting positive 
results from a passenger who appeared to be in no way affiliated with any drug scene or 
use. When the itemiser has played up during the fieldwork, team leaders would say that the 
key to using the itemiser was not so much the result that the machine gave, instead it 
should be the way in which an officer questioned a passenger when using the machine. 
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Explaining the capability of the machine and waiting to see a passenger’s reaction was just 
as important as actually using the machine. In this way the itemiser can be seen as an 
‘mediator’. This is because although it should give a simple yes no answer as to the 
presence of narcotics or explosives, it in fact gives much more unpredictable and complex 
result. Latour talks of mediators: 
Their input is never a good predictor of their output; their specificity has 
to be taken into account every time. Mediators transform, translate, 
distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to 
carry (2005: 12). 
 
At the international airport studied in this fieldwork there were many mediators. The foil of 
mediators are intermediaries which are described by Latour as “what transports meaning or 
force without transformation; defining its inputs is enough to define its outputs” (2005: 
12).   
 To more specifically focus on mediators and intermediaries, the itemiser which is 
best viewed as a mediator when used to detect drugs, can sometimes be seen as an 
intermediary depending on the context. In the fieldwork conducted, I observed the itemiser 
being used for the most part to look for drug traces. By contrast, on the occasions where 
the itemiser was used to look for or found explosive traces, it could be argued that the 
machine is best viewed as an intermediary. An example of the machine’s use that 
demonstrates it as an intermediary occurred during a baggage search being conducted by a 
colleague. The search was on a passenger who had previous recordings in the computer 
system Customs referred to as Cusmod that were of concern. This led to the passenger 
being brought into the search area where a baggage search was conducted. Halfway 
through the search the searching officer took out a cellular phone and scanned a sample 
from it using the itemiser. The familiar beep-beep sound that usually accompanies a 
positive drugs hit was heard. The searching officer rushed straight into the room with the 
printout, which is the opposite of what happens for a drugs hit.  
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Generally when getting a hit for drugs the officer goes straight to the search bench and 
asks the passenger: “I just received a positive return for drugs, what drugs will this 
printout tell me you have been around”. This is to give the passenger minimal time to 
make up a false story after hearing the beep-beep. On this occasion, the officer raced 
straight into the ops room and said, “I have a positive hit for explosives”. The supervising 
officer immediately called the airport Police. Due to operational security I will not go 
further into the response from this point, but it is important to note that the response is 
similar to an actual suspected IED (Improvised Explosive Device) being found and also 
that the response was exactly the same as every other response to a positive hit for 
explosives observed throughout my fieldwork.  
During my fieldwork, when explosives were detected, no matter what passenger, 
what explosive or what item it was found on, the response was the same. With drug returns 
the response to the machines positive result varied, depending on passenger, drug type 
returned and where the sample came from. As such the itemiser when dealing with drugs is 
to be understood as a mediator, as opposed to its occasional use for explosives where it is 
always a intermediary. This difference in use is also illustrated when comparing Customs 
and AVSEC, whose itemisers are only used to look for explosives and are only ever 
intermediaries.  
Miller talks of technologies and people being linked by the former: 
So, no technology without the flexible technologies of rules, signatures, 
bureaucracies and stamps. Actors are supplemented by the modest 
technologies of writing, registering, verifying, and authenticating that 
make it possible to link together and align people and statements (1997: 
356). 
 
Miller is talking of the context of engineers and their projects based upon his critique of 
Latour’s Aramis. If taken in the context of the argument presented here, we can align this 
statement with the idea that the agents of the border are all working to prevent very 
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different risks. In doing so the artifacts of the border such as the itemiser with its printouts 
are necessary to verify the statements of passengers crossing the border to the questioning 
by the actors working the border and policing it. Again to further reinforce the theoretical 
argument and reinforce the importance of focusing upon non-human actors and actants 
within the border, we can look at Dodier who states that Boltanski and Thevenot believe 
“people refer to objects. That is, they refer to a common world” (1993: 558). When border 
workers question passengers about drugs, and then using the itemiser, the workers of the 
borders are linking the passengers unseen actions and contacts of the past (such as drugs) 
to the here and now of risk at the border, through the itemiser. 
 Latour mentions that sociologists have difficulty in crossing “the sacred barrier that 
separate human from nonhumans” (1992: 240). During my research, the following text 
came from an email about the Itemiser machine when it was not working 
“Well you can all sleep well tonight knowing that the ITEMISER has had 
a complete makeover and is on its way home ☺… for those of you upset 
at its departure dry your eyes as before you know it u will be swabbing 
swabbing swabbing… so thanks everybody for your kind words, and well 
wishes when the itemiser left.”  
 
This email is ironically suggesting that the itemiser is missed, as a human border worker 
would be if they were away sick. Though not necessarily indicative of the human border 
worker treating a machine such as the itemiser as an equal it is certainly indicative of the 
emphasis on the importance of the machine in creating a shared world. This shared world 
is created in the context of the passenger’s risk of having been around explosives or drugs, 
that are not present or are concealed, during their interaction with border workers when the 
itemiser is used. The machine allows this shared world to be created. The machine has the 
ability to introduce the risk of items like drugs or explosives into the border network even 
if they are not present in a physically visible amount. 
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Border Databases – tracking and visualising 
 Databases can be seen as a as a form of mobile technology in the respect that they 
allow information to be taken from one domain to another to be analysed. This fits within 
Latour’s definitions of mobility as well as his understanding of visualisation, which serves 
the purpose of bringing together different realms of reality. At the border, many different 
realms of reality come together. Imagine each agency that is linked to the border as a realm 
of reality akin to Latour’s comparison of “mechanics, economics, marketing” (1986: 25), 
the different border agencies all have their own databases.  
 The argument of this section on databases is not so much on what the workers of 
the border see the databases as doing, which appears to be simply recording information 
that they enter into them. Instead this section will focus on the change in the databases of 
the border since a significant event occurred that was linked to international border 
networks. This significant event was the September 11 attacks. This section will trace the 
change in border databases by looking at the Customs database Cusmod, and how it had 
information from other networks added to it, then the change from Cusmod to Cusmod II 
which later became the Joint Border Management System. The section will explore how a 
significant event outside of the immediate border network changes the databases of the 
network studied and will then trace the innovations of the actors within the border network 
to this ‘new’ technology. The databases of the border were traditionally focused on sorting, 
but are becoming increasingly focused on their ability to link agencies to information held 
by other agencies. This is not happenstance and the transition of the role of the databases 
tells us as much if not more about the border workers as the workers themselves can. 
 Power is linked to border databases in so much as having the databases allows 
workers of the border to wield considerable power (the disciplinary power of the state) 
over those who the databases record information on. Latour says 
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a man is never much more powerful than any other- even from a throne:  
but a man whose eye dominates records through which some sort of 
connections are established with millions of others may be said to 
dominate. This domination however, is not a given but a slow 
construction and it can be corroded, interrupted or destroyed if the 
records, files and figures are immobilized, made more mutable, less 
readable, less combinable or unclear when displayed (1986: 26). 
 
What the managers of the border agencies aspire to is power, as this power is used to allow 
them to facilitate mobility of people across the border while at the same time enforce 
compliance within it. The databases at the border can give them this power, but, as Latour, 
says the ability to access and combine this information influences the power they wield. 
The use of databases at the border fits into the government promoted approach of “high 
assurance, light touch… to reduce physical intrusions and better facilitate legitimate 
passage.” (Ladley and White 2006: 34). This means that the border agencies endeavour to 
facilitate movement and have enforcement happening in a way that limits physical 
intrusions on passengers – such as searching. In this way the technologies of the border 
allow for the public work they conduct to be conducted in a covert manner.  
 There are numerous arguments about the risks posed to individual privacy and 
human rights by the advent of these new technologies. Biometric technologies are hotly 
debated in academia and the media, as are the less glamorous database technologies. 
Problems in Canada with border security and databases are the topic of one such current 
debate, technologies such as “inadequate watch lists, outdated technology, and poor record 
checking” are but some examples of the issued presented by these technologies (Lyon, 
2008: 42). Though the intent of the border agencies is high assurance light touch, 
enforcement is not guaranteed by the use of database technologies. 
 Lyon argues that database technologies are a product of the late-modern “capitalist 
world system” (2008: 29) and that “in the 21st century surveillance is a global 
phenomenon”. The database systems, be they product or not of this day and age and be 
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they surveillance focused or not, are pitched to the public as a tool to facilitate travel by the 
users of the databases. 
Customs chief information officer Peter Rosewarne said last year that the 
new system should cut the red tape for both freight and passengers. It may 
do away with the need for departure and arrivals cards for passengers and 
would see sophisticated technologies such as neural networking and 
artificial intelligence used to assess risks to border security (Pullar-
Streckar, 2008: 9).  
 
Rosewarne is talking of the Cusmod II database system and its capabilities over and above 
those of the system that is currently used by Customs to police the border. Based upon my 
observation of the use of Cusmod during my fieldwork a travelling passenger will have 
their name and passport details sent to Cusmod by the airline before they fly, where it will 
be checked manually by a human operator against recordings of that name in the Cusmod 
database. In this way Customs officers can see for example if the last time a passenger 
travelled they were stopped and found to have a cannabis pipe etc in their luggage.  
Following September 11 databases that simply worked on the information contained 
only within themselves were found to be of limited value. Cusmod prior to September 11 
did draw on limited information from other databases, such as Immigration and the Police. 
Agencies such as the Ministry of Justice and IRD are not (post September 11) expanding 
information in their databases into Cusmod, to be used to place border alerts on specific 
people. This fits within Fierke’s description on the use of technologies and the “war” on 
drugs and terror 
The liberal way of war is preoccupied with knowledge networks, 
complexity and the operation of organizational and social technologies, 
which populations are required to possess if they want to survive within 
an environment defined by global capital and governance (2007: 117). 
 
It was planned that Cusmod would be replaced by Cusmod II that would allow for more 
effective policing of the border from a Customs perspective. This however changed during 
its development phase and Cusmod II was changed to become the JBMS, which is 
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designed to better amalgamate the systems of Customs, Immigration and MAF. An 
informant who was on the project team for the development of the JBMS, described it to 
me 
“Providing border risk management. The integration of the information 
held by the New Zealand border agencies, external border partner 
agencies and the New Zealand compliance community enables federated 
identity management and border risk management to manage risk in real 
time. This reduces compliance costs whilst improving risk management.” 
 
It appears from this statement that JBMS will be an impressive tool with many capabilities 
such as the ‘integration of information, reduced costs, increased risk management and 
identity management.’ The question for the border workers in the context of this section is, 
how will the technology actually be used upon arrival at the border by the workers? What 
will their innovations with the technology be and what impact will it have upon the border 
network?  
At this point in time these questions are obviously moot but during my fieldwork 
the uses of Cusmod that were noted were often in contrast with the context that it’s creators 
intended it would create. An example of an innovation in use that will not breach any 
security protocols about the discussion of the use of Cusmod is the liaison between Police 
and Customs to use Cusmod to retrieve lost passports. Often if a passport is lost the Police 
who are usually given the lost passports will come to Customs who use Cusmod to check 
the passport number and then correspond this with an incoming flight. Once the incoming 
flight is known the arrival cards for the flight can be checked which should reveal a contact 
address or phone number for the Police to track the passenger down to.  
 The use of databases at the border is highly political, but what is important to bear 
in mind from the perspective of this thesis is that these databases allow for tracking and 
visualising both within the border network and outside of it. The databases allow for 
people and things outside of the border network or unknown to the border network, as in 
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the example above, to be brought into it and to have their risk assessed and treated by the 
innovations of the workers within it. 
Border Networks Databases, Communicating Risk? 
 Much work has been done on technologies such as databases that allow data on and 
about people to be sorted and analysed for the exercise of governments and their power. 
For various reasons including of course legality and privacy rights, the argument could be 
made that a Customs officer at Auckland airport would find it easier to share database 
information on a risk passenger with a Customs officer in Christchurch than a Immigration 
officer in the office next to his in a way that was mutually understandable. A brief 
literature survey will reveal information on databases and power, pertinent to border 
security from the work on Police reporting in the 1960s by Ericson and Haggerty to the 
work on Biometrics and Privacy done by van der Ploed (2003) and Burrows and Gane’s 
(2006) work on Geodemographics, Software and Class. Fierke directly attributes the 
increase in technologies such as biometrics and associates technologies such as the 
databases that record this data to 
The fact that the individuals who carried out the attacks on the World 
Trade Centre and Pentagon were foreign nationals living in the United 
States… has led to an increased scrutiny of those crossing US borders and 
the deployment of forms of biometric identification (2007: 50).  
 
Likewise in New Zealand the use of these technologies has increased since September 11 
attacks. The sharing of these technologies between border agencies however has not 
markedly increased. Though agencies at intelligence levels do communicate certain 
information, some agencies at the border do not have intelligence teams. Therefore 
information that one agency stores and uses is not necessarily transmitted to other relevant 
agencies. At ground level, which is what this thesis is focusing on, the communication 
between agencies via technologies such as databases is limited. Fierke would argue that 
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technologies such as these allow actors to share an understanding of risks and the way 
actors interpret them: 
people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the 
meanings that the objects have for them (2007: 101). 
 
Officers from one agency all make sense of objects and persons through the meanings that 
are in part endowed through the technologies and databases they have access to. These 
meanings can be with high-risk associations and they can be meanings that are narrowed 
through the technology in question. A technological network exists across these database 
technologies as the database is a nonhuman actor that links human actors via information 
recorded or produced therein.  
 The information at the border that is transmitted across these networks is risk 
information. Within these networks risk communication that exerts the most power over 
passengers requires “assemblage involving the combination of different technologies and 
social arrangements into particular configurations” (Farnsworth and Austrin, 2005: 15-16). 
This can be applied to my fieldwork at the border and will be demonstrated, but firstly it is 
appropriate to cite an example of this in action in a technological network. Erickson and 
Haggerty looked at 1960 Police databases and said of these risk communication networks 
Risk communication systems are not simply conduits through which 
knowledge of risk is transferred. Rather, they have their own logics and 
autonomous processes. They are themselves the producers of new risks, 
because it is through them that risks are recognised, subject to calculation, 
and acted upon. They govern institutional relations, and they affect what 
individuals and organizations are able to accomplish (2002: 238). 
 
This summation fits neatly into actor network theory and an example they use of this is 
Police reporting forms. These forms changed from being recorded as a page or two of 
narrative to a series of tick boxes that allowed incidents to be statistically analysed. This 
new technology binds the officer to “report the collision (or incident) within the constraints 
imposed by the risk relevant-criteria of external institutions” (2002: 243).  
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An applicable example in my fieldwork of a similar vein is the database recording 
technology of the Cusmod computer system. This technological network records all 
interactions an officer has with passengers in an enforcement capacity for the Customs 
service. As with the revised Police databases examined by Ericson and Haggerty the 
Cusmod system is heavily dependant on tick boxes and builds reports on the assumption 
that they will be about people. This does not always fit with the situation, as observed 
during my fieldwork when after evening flights, a MAF officer and Customs officer  went 
‘airside’, that is past the arrival booths into the arrival hall, to look for passengers and 
discarded contraband (Customs) and food or biosecurity items (MAF) in the airside toilets 
and rubbish / amnesty bins. On this occasion the Customs officer found a small can of 
pepper spray and complained bitterly about the fact that at 2 am in the morning he was 
filling out the Cusmod and database recordings. The work he was doing included bar-
coding the pepper spray and photographing. Meanwhile the MAF officer had walked past 
with a large sack full of collected biosecurity risk items that he was simply going to put in 
the incineration bin on his way out. The existence of the bar-coding and interlinked image 
storing in the database meant that the job required was much more than just a simple job 
sheet report. The officer involved confided in me that to him it seemed: 
“MAF have it sweet, no paperwork, no irate passengers, no hanging 
around at 2 in the morning, and their bag of bio-security material is a 
way bigger risk than one can of pepper spray which has probably been 
carried by a young female backpacker for her own protection.” 
 
Previously it had been that when seizing something like pepper spray, a hard-copy job-
sheet would be completed. The advent of the Cusmod database and existing legislation 
meant a matching Cusmod report needed to be completed and following the introduction of 
an electronic bar-coding system the bar-coding now needed to be completed. Finally the 
introduction of digital cameras with the ability to store images into Cusmod and shared 
computer drives, meant an electronic and hard copy image was needed. The key phrase 
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here is needed. The pepper spray had been abandoned by a passenger. It is highly unlikely 
that a person will be able to be linked to it and less likely that a prosecution would be 
mounted. All the data entry and bar-coding and photographs are linked to getting a 
prosecution. However the driver is the technology in itself which creates the need to do 
these things even when there is no foreseeable need at ground level. The Customs 
technological network has been reassembled as time progressed. Until now an officer treats 
a can of pepper spray found in a bin in the same way as a can of pepper spray that had just 
been found in a passengers bag after the passenger stated “only clothes and toiletries in 
there, no nothing like a stun gun or pepper spray.” 
 As a final note as to the power of technologies and the tensions that they cause 
within the border network is a ‘tick box’ technology within the Cusmod database system. 
This simple ‘tick box’ that comes up on electronic reports is worth mentioning due to a 
comment made by a senior information technology staff member giving a briefing on a 
Cusmod update. The tick box function had been expanded to include more options to tick 
and much to the frustration of officers it stays up and comes back if different screens were 
scrolled between, much like a pop up page on the internet. The information technology 
officer said to staff at the briefing “well its there to stay and don’t forget it’s that box that 
pays you!”  He explained that it was from this box of actions completed (such as 
questioned, searched, risk assessed, items detained etc) that the government was given it’s 
run down of the tasks performed by staff and as such it was the source of funding and 
resource allocation for the department. The technology designed for law enforcement, to 
exercise power over travellers for the purposes of governance had over the workers of the 
border (pay-wise) a considerable amount of influence if the words of the I.T professional 
were to be taken as true. It is therefore in the interests of border workers to tick as many of 
the task boxes as possible in the pesky ‘pop up’ task completed bar. Whether or not this 
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influences the power they then choose to exert over the travelling public and the requests 
of other agencies that they make to exert their power remains to be seen.  
 
Camera Surveillance System – A Visualising technology 
CCTV is considered here as a Sociotechnical device that involves science 
and technology, cultural and legal aspects, as well as social 
representations. This amounts to CCTV not as a lifeless and inert object 
but rather as a dynamic sociotechnical system that is constantly in the 
making  
(Klauser & Ruegg & November 2008: 106). 
  
 This sub-chapter on the border workers use and adaptation of surveillance cameras, 
which are understood as a visualising technology, argues that the workers of the border 
through the influence of power and events outside of the border will through their ‘wild 
innovations’ use the cameras not simply for surveillance and the recording of people and 
places. The  subchapter will endeavour to track the way in which the “sociotechnical 
system is constantly in the making” . The workers of the border use the camera 
technologies to shape subjects that cross the border and transform actions into evidence 
and commodities into exhibits. The border is in essence through this use turned into a kind 
of panopticon where those transiting the border confess to those working it 
More recently, Michael Foucault (1975) has described the Panopticon as a 
paradigm of modern self discipline under the gaze of authority. The 
design was applicable to prisons, schools and factories… because the 
subject never knew for certain they were being watched they had to 
assume at all times they were, and monitor their actions; that is the 
subject always acted as if they were under observation (Fierke 2007: 
183). 
 
 Within the airport, there are hundreds of surveillance cameras. Both Customs and 
AVSEC as well as the Police, use the cameras to monitor people (not just passengers), and 
things such as planes and fences in the airport and around it. This monitoring serves the 
obvious purpose of watching or observing known risks to the border, detecting risks to the 
border through action, body language and behaviour as well as providing evidential surety 
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and the safety of staff. This is the case when drugs are discovered in a bag and the 
passenger claims that they are not his. The cameras, which are constantly recording, prove 
to be a reliable witness that cannot unlike Customs officer’s statements and notebook 
records be cross-examined by defence lawyers. Similarly, if a passenger claims that an 
officer took money from his bag, the cameras should be able to verify that this was not the 
case. In this way cameras are used to mitigate the risk posed by both people and things. 
The adaptation that has occurred is that the cameras, which were initially intended to 
monitor passengers, are now used to monitor staff and their actions. This adaptation 
occurred through the demands of parties in the border network (the passengers), who were 
the ones who were supposed to be observed. Instead the border workers themselves have 
become the directed focus of this technology. 
 The use of cameras at the airport is useful as a study of how the same technology is 
used in very different ways within the same space, by border workers focused on different 
contexts of risk that they are looking to mitigate. AVSEC uses the cameras to look for 
things like unattended packages, and to guard the physical space of the airport. AVSEC 
will also use the cameras to monitor people around high security areas or prevent people 
gaining unauthorised access to certain areas. Customs uses cameras to covertly assess large 
numbers of passengers and how they behave in the public spaces, and what they assume to 
be the private spaces of the airport (areas where they do not see human border workers). 
Both agencies however use the cameras to differentiate between people and objects of risk 
and people and objects not of risk. 
 One of the most important uses of the cameras for Customs is in monitoring body 
language. It is far more frequently heard over the radio “Rover from control room, will you 
have a talk to that passenger at the end of carousel three, his body language doesn’t look 
right.” This is different from a call from an officer that is not behind a camera, to ask 
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another officer to talk to a passenger, based upon their body language observed through the 
human eye as opposed to the camera lens.  
One of my informants advised me “one of my greatest fears is in reading body 
language incorrectly, people often appear like they are concealing something when they 
are afraid, or may appear stoned when they are tired.” Cameras allow body language to 
be appraised from a distance. Officers when approaching a passenger will often use the 
phrase “the cameras have noted that you appear very anxious to leave, why is this?” 
Despite this benefit, cameras as shown by my informant also create anxiety amongst 
border workers, who fear that they have read body language wrongly through the camera. 
Cameras do not allow the operator to go and ask a passenger, why they are anxious to 
leave. A camera operator cannot find out from a passenger that they are anxious to leave 
because they have flown in to see a dying relative. To create and resolve a context of risk a 
human agent able to talk to the passenger is also necessary, this supplements the 
technologies capabilities and involves procedures for talking. 
 Cameras allow officers of the border agencies read bodies of passengers and 
translate this into something that they can enforce. The awareness that passengers have of 
the cameras around them is because the border agencies make no real effort to hide them. 
Similarly, the large screens of one-way mirror glass that passengers walk past contribute to 
the feeling of being under surveillance. This cameras have the capacity to view all 
passengers all the time but human operators behind the cameras do not have the same 
capacity 
the majority of screening technology operate under capacity because of 
the relative slowness of human operators to clear alarms… The human is 
the weakest, and the most adaptive element of secure flow management 
(Salter, 2008: 8). 
 
In this way the border would appear at outward projection to passengers within the 
network who see cameras everywhere to be like a panopticon. This is not in fact 
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the case as every camera noted by a passenger does not have an officer watching it. 
In the first chapter the way in which the border workers communicated was shown 
to be an effective ‘many eyed panopticon’ working on the same level as the 
passengers rather than an all seeing panopticon eye of surveillance cameras from 
above. 
As part of my role during the fieldwork, I was a member of the enforcement team, 
discussing the placement of a new security camera in a previously un-surveilled area was 
discussed. It was agreed that it was important to have the area covered and this could be 
done through a camera or through the use of roving patrol officers randomly checking it. 
The discussion came to the conclusion that officers randomly patrolling the area would be 
a better option than cameras permanently recording the location’s activities. This was 
because of the fact that the area was one with a high level of human traffic and lots of 
cover for people to be concealing things, therefore if an offence did occur it would still be 
hard to detect on rewound camera footage. The best defence would be the human officers 
randomly checking on the area. The irony of this is that the human officers would be 
working in the same way as the cameras, their unannounced ability to observe would 
hopefully mitigate the thought of illegal behaviour before it occurred. In a similar way the 
visualising technology of the camera is enhanced by the mundane artefacts of signage that 
announces the presence of cameras.  
The argument could be presented that within the border network the signage 
announcing the cameras is just as important as the cameras themselves, when it comes to 
the protection of secure spaces. The difference between border agencies becomes apparent 
when this is considered, as for AVSEC the camera’s presence is the key deterrent in 
stopping people breaking into secure areas. For Customs the cameras ability to silently and 
inconspicuously record and allow human operators to observe the actions of passengers is 
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paramount. For both Customs and AVSEC, and all other border agencies, the use of 
cameras has been adapted so as to allow the agencies’ management to observe staff – 
passenger interactions should complaints or accusations arise. 
 With no camera surveillance system roving and fixed point officers would have to 
be in every secure hallway, at the end of each gate and mounted around the airport in 
numerous checkpoints to achieve the same level of projected surveillance. Without 
cameras an impartial witness would need to be present at every high risk search and 
officers would need a considerable amount more protection and self defence training as 
they would not be assured of swift backup should a confrontation arise. Despite the many 
advantages of cameras in the border environment their role is often far more complicated 
than simply recorded surveillance.  
 
The Arrival card – a tracking technology 
 The arrival card is another vital but mundane artefact within the border network 
that will be explored in the following sub chapter. Of note like the cameras within the 
border network, the arrival card is another non-human actor that contributes towards 
making the border network a confessionary complex. The arrival card is a two-sided piece 
of A4 paper the bottom third of which is filled out following instructions on the top two 
thirds by all passengers arriving into New Zealand. The arrival card has questions that 
must be answered by all arriving passengers including New Zealanders and Australians. 
The arrival card has some questions on it that New Zealanders and permanent New 
Zealand residents do not have to answer, such as whether or not they hold criminal 
convictions, or have been deported from any country. Customs, Police, Immigration, the 
Department of Statistics and assorted other agencies all use the arrival card to assess the 
risk of people arriving into New Zealand, to record statistics of arriving passengers, to 
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assess larger scale trends that may pose a risk to the border, and for general statistical 
purposes. 
 The New Zealand ‘passenger arrival card’ is a mundane artefact and a tracing 
technology. The arrival card should allow officers of both MAF and Customs to quickly 
risk assess through passengers answers to whether they are carrying prohibited or restricted 
goods. This is unfortunately not the case as drug smugglers and international criminals 
rarely fill out the occupation space with ‘international criminal’, and rarely declare the 
drugs they are carrying. As such, the card is instead used to create a context between the 
passenger and the border worker to allow the border worker to question the passenger on 
precisely the things he has not declared on the arrival card. The border worker is adapting 
the use of the arrival card within the context of the border network, and his training and 
prior experiences within the network with other passengers and other arrival cards. The 
card is a selection device that provides an assessment profile of passengers that allows the 
workers to proceed it with questions. 
 The card provides a myriad of information when correctly filled out by an arriving 
international passenger. Much to the chagrin of officers cards are as often as not 
incorrectly filled out and officers of different agencies are faced with passengers questions 
that direct a risk assessment to them that they are not trained to make. The following 
example will illustrate this. It takes the true form of a question put to any Customs officer 
who is processing passengers hundreds of times over their career. 
CUSTOMS OFFICER: “You have ticked here (officer points to Q4 first 
box) that you have goods that are prohibited or restricted?” 
PAX: “Yes….. (Guilty pause… the first time this happens the officer may 
briefly contemplate that the big drug bust of his career may have walked 
into his arms)… I have some peanuts” 
CUSTOMS OFFICER: “peanuts” 
PAX: “Yes, I am sorry, should I have thrown them out…, they are cooked 
and I didn’t even think that they may be illegal?” 
CUSTOMS OFFICER: “That questions in blue refers to goods that may 
be prohibited or restricted, for Customs, so do you have any drugs, drug 
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paraphernalia, weapons, even stun guns or pepper spray, objectionable 
material and things like that…?” 
PAX: “Heavens no, just the peanuts.” 
CUSTOMS OFFICER: “Well, it’s always good to ask, just around the 
corner a MAF officer will ask you about the peanuts, don’t throw them 
out like most people do before then as they may be fine and as long as you 
have declared them which you have done it is not a problem, even if they 
are prohibited for quarantine.” 
 
It is important to note on the second page of the arrival card, which is where this dialogue 
would come from, that Customs questions in the top right corner are in blue, and 
quarantine questions on the left hand side are in green. Customs Officer wear blue shirts 
and pants and MAF officers wear green shirts and uniforms. The form in this way carried 
the transference of a Customs officers’ and a MAF officers’ authority. For a passenger 
arriving into New Zealand for the first time their first contact with these authorities will be 
through a mundane artefact as opposed to a human actor. Finally, in the bottom left hand 
corner of the form there is in red ink the statement that:  
Failure to make a correct declaration may result in an instant fine of $200 
or prosecution resulting in a fine of up to $100,000 or up to five years 
imprisonment. 
 
 It is an offence to lie on the arrival card and it is an offence to mislead a Customs 
officer in respect of certain questions put to a passenger. There is no instant fine for a false 
statement to a Customs officer but there is for a false declaration on this ‘mundane 
artefact.’  
 
Sorting Passengers 
 Arrivals cards mitigate risk for the border agencies is through sorting passengers. 
The arrival card must be completed by all passengers arriving in New Zealand (there are 
also departure cards, and crew cards). In this way the passenger arrival card risk assesses 
all passengers coming into New Zealand and importantly ties them to a commitment. If 
something that is not on the card is later found, such as a prohibited weapon the passenger 
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has committed two offences. Bringing a prohibited weapon into New Zealand, and not 
declaring the prohibited weapon on the arrival card. 
 During my fieldwork I had a discussion with a colleague about the passenger 
arrival card and why he thought people filled them out correctly or incorrectly. He told me 
about a card that he had himself filled out when travelling to the United States. 
“I was reading the questions and they were similar to our (New Zealand) 
arrival card apart from a couple. The one that really grabbed my 
attention was asking ‘were you involved in the Nazi Germany leadership 
between 1939 and 1945 or something to that effect.’ It struck me that any 
self respecting Nazi war criminal that had been on the run, hiding out in 
South America since 1945 is highly unlikely to slip up and tick yes in 
2007. So I guess they (the Americans) feel that people will somehow feel 
compelled to answer the question truthfully. Just like ours that asks 
people if they have criminal convictions.”  
 
To further build the sorting picture in relation to arrival cards it is worth mentioning two 
other instances that occurred during my fieldwork that relate to sorting and arrival cards. 
The first involved a man, whom I was questioning and who I noted had put down ‘pirate’ 
as his occupation.’ I asked the man if he understood that this was a serious form and if he 
was in fact a pirate. The man, who was from the United States and had been visiting New 
Zealand, said that yes he was a pirate. I flicked through the man’s passport and said “well I 
don’t see any travel to Somalia or the Indonesian islands in this passport, do you have 
another passport, or are you lying to me, because I am not aware of pirates working 
outside of these areas!” The man said to me that this was his only passport and that he in 
fact worked as a pirate at Disney land. I asked the man if this answer to the question 
caused him grief in the United States and he said “yes – every time, especially at Los 
Angeles which is where Disney land is, but then if you don’t answer it correctly they give 
you a hard time!” The man was sent on his way with instructions from me that he should 
watch out for the Royal Navy if he didn’t want to be hung from the yard arm.  
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A second example that relates to stated profession or occupation on an arrival card was 
related to me by a colleague who ‘profiled’, an arriving passenger to be searched due to her 
answer on her arrival card.  
“A lady came up to me at the booth and I noted her occupation was; 
‘dealer’. So I asked her what kind of dealer she was thinking car, card 
(croupier) etc and she replied to me ‘what do you think – drug dealer!’ 
Well, I sent her around for a search.” 
 
These two examples and the discussion as to the American arrival card do not demonstrate 
that I have a sense of humour and my colleagues do not, they instead demonstrate the 
power that the arrival card has over people as a self-sorting mechanism. The examples also 
demonstrate the way in which border workers enforce this aspect of the arrival card by 
exercising their powers to search and question those, who answer the questions, or in this 
case the questions about arrival card answers spuriously. The power of the arrival card as a 
technology far outweighs its apparent mundane appearance when compared to more 
‘advanced’ technologies that have been discussed. The arrival card allows border officers 
to create a context with passengers from alien cultures and social backgrounds. The arrival 
card is another aspect of the confessionary complex that the airport and the border network 
can be described as. The card is marked with stamps, border workers initials and passenger 
signatures, all of which ascribe consent and legitimacy to it. This legitimacy adds weight to 
the sovereign power of a nation expressed at the border and through border workers. 
Though the border workers have no power to refuse entry to returning New Zealanders, the 
arrival card does give them a context in which they can trace the movements and activities 
of the person and search and question them based upon this.  
  Another apparently mundane artifact with tracking powers within the border 
network is the notebook, which is carried by officers of the border and carries a large 
amount of agency and power over travelling passengers and the workers of the border 
themselves. 
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Notebook – a tracking technology 
 Every Police, Customs, AVSEC and some MAF officers within the border network 
studied carry a notebook. They are simple flip cover notebooks, with some pertinent 
legislation and quick reference facts at the front of them. These facts include such 
information as relevant sections of the Customs and Excise Act and information on the 
detection of persons under the influence of different drugs. This ‘mundane artefact’ records 
everything an officer does that may later have to be referred to. Similar to Xerox machines 
copying an inscription of data placed under them, notebooks, in theory, record a border 
worker’s impartial sequence of events that occur when he or she interacts with passengers 
or their luggage. An example of this is that if a passengers bag is searched, a officer will 
record all date and time details, all the passenger’s details and the answers to questions put 
to the passenger as well as what was found or not found in the luggage. The notebook is 
used to turn what a passenger would consider a conversation into a ‘risk assessment’. 
When an officer talks to a passenger in the arrivals hall while they are waiting for their 
bags, their details are recorded and even if they are not later searched that conversation is 
recorded (not against their details) as a ‘risk assessment’. In this way the government has a 
quantifiable measurable as to the work being undertaken in border compliance 
enforcement. All notebooks have a margin down the side of the page that encourages 
officers to record a time for the start of a shift, a search or the discovery of an exhibit. This 
margin encourages a practise on forgetful officers who may otherwise not record the time 
of important incidents. 
 Certain details, such as a passenger or item being looked for, are also recorded at 
the start of the shift in officers’ notebooks so that the details can be recorded for later 
reference. This is a way of managing risk and recording information that officers could 
potentially forget. Risk is also managed through a notebook progressively. As a search 
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progresses to a more serious conclusion, for example a baggage search progressing to a 
personal search, notes will reflect smaller facts than would otherwise be recorded. An 
example of this progression can be seen in a personal search where the details of a belt 
buckle will be recorded as opposed to a bulk baggage search where all of the baggage 
could collectively be described as ‘standard travel clothing.’ 
 Perhaps one of the most important facts about notebooks is that they are fully 
discoverable in court. This means, defence and prosecution lawyers will look at the 
notebook entry relevant to the case and refer back to it in their cross examination of the 
officer involved. If an incident occurs, that results in a prosecution being undertaken, a 
Customs Officer could end up in court as a witness for the prosecution. In this scenario an 
Officer would only be able to refer to his notebook to refresh his memory on an incident 
that could have occurred over twelve months ago. Without a notebook an officer’s 
credibility as a witness could be minimal as it is unlikely that small but important facts 
such as times and location or even descriptions of people could be remembered.  
 During my fieldwork a situation arose that illustrates differences in the ways a 
notebook is used As I was waiting for an international flight to arrive at an air bridge gate, 
I struck up a conversation with two AVSEC officers who were also waiting for the flight. 
Like me border workers involved in policing generally hang back from airline staff, who 
were also waiting for the flight, as border workers such as Customs and AVSEC have to 
‘police’ the actions of airline staff as well as passengers. The AVSEC officers I was talking 
to mentioned their notebooks and how little they used them. One showed me his, which 
was half full and said he had been at AVSEC for three years, the other was on his second 
notebook and had been there for seven years. I was able to check the front of my notebook 
and see the consecutive number, which I had written on it, and advise them that it was my 
ninth notebook in three years with Customs. The two AVSEC officers were suitably 
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impressed with this and we began to discuss what they actually used their notebooks for. 
The AVSEC officers told me that they used them if for example they found someone in a 
restricted area, who should not be there, but not if they searched a passengers bag or 
scanned them for explosives or metals. I was able to advise the AVSEC officers that I used 
my notebook on a constant basis for every passenger I questioned, every bag I opened, 
every person I strip-searched or even to just record certain names or details to watch out 
for. 
 Within the same border network two technologies that were the same, used to 
‘protect and police’ the border, are used in very different ways. AVSEC was only using 
their notebook to track certain people, who had been found in certain places whereas my 
notebook was used to track all people and items that I dealt with for anything longer than it 
takes to say “how was the flight? Good holiday? Yup, the exit is over there.” This was not 
out of necessity, I have yet to refer back to my notebook in court, it is out of practise and 
training certainly, but the practise, as opposed to the training is driven by certain contexts 
created by other non-human actors within the border network. Some of these non-human 
actors are linked to the border workers such as ion scanners and databases and others such 
as the actual items that Customs is looking for. These are not directly linked until the 
notebook is used to create a context or link between the item and the border worker. For 
example a positive return for drugs is recorded in the notebook and this then links the 
passenger, who the ion scan was taken from, with the positive drugs detection. The 
notebook turns a positive ion scan taken from a person into a person who has been around 
or is carrying drugs. 
 Other technologies within the border network also mean that the notebook for 
Customs is used differently than for AVSEC. Cusmod the border database that Customs 
uses requires that certain information be entered into it such as a person’s name and 
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passport details, addresses etc, if a person is searched. This is a database used by Customs 
and AVSEC does not have a comparable database system. The two technologies of 
database and notebook mean that a Customs officer will use his notebook more frequently 
than an AVSEC officer. The nature of the items that Customs is looking for means the 
notebook is used in a different way to the context created by the items or people other 
agencies are looking for. 
AVSEC and Customs officers are both playing a game of hide and seek within the 
border network. That is in may ways to say they are doing the same thing, looking for 
items that are prohibited to enter or leave New Zealand that the travelling public has 
hidden from them or has inadvertently travelled with. Due to the nature of the Customs 
officer looking for items that are generally illegal, as opposed to simply prohibited on 
flights, a Customs officer when he finds these items must trace their ‘chain of evidence.’ 
This means the Customs officer has to account for where and in whose bag an item was 
found and who handled it and where it was stored once it was seized or detained. 
 
Audio Networks 
“We worked right alongside each other but not with each other,  
I didn’t really know what they (Customs) were doing.” 
– Former AVSEC officer. 
 
 The above quote came from a discussion about how the different border agencies 
manage the various risks posed by passengers and crew departing New Zealand. When 
leaving the international airport studied international passengers check in with their airline, 
then pay any applicable departure tax, and present proof of this to an airport company 
representative who grants them access to the ‘upstairs’ international departure zone. The 
passenger then fills out a Customs departure card, and presents this with a passport and 
boarding pass to a Customs officer who ‘emigrates’ them out of NZ and assesses their risk 
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to the NZ border via database checks and other methods. After Customs processing the 
passenger proceeds through the AVSEC checkpoint where they are screened for sharp and 
dangerous objects, explosives and liquids aerosols or gasses (LAGS). Finally, the 
passenger enters the waiting area full of cafes and duty free shops around the boarding 
gates. At this point they cannot leave unless they board their flight or there is an 
emergency of some kind.  
 Along the way observant passengers will notice the airline check-in staff, airport 
company staff, Customs officers, roaming airport Police officers and AVSEC officers 
working with radios and ear pieces. Of these people the later three are all the enforcement 
agencies that will be wearing similar uniforms, badges and doubtless tools of their trade 
such as gloves, knives and keys etc in pouches attached to their belts. These three agencies 
can all communicate with members of the other agencies in person but there is no shared 
radio network in operation.  
 The absence of machines that can facilitate direct communication between human 
actors mitigating risk, such as all these agencies have within themselves (radios, computer 
alerts and messages) plays a role, but what of an audio network that does exist but not in a 
way that can communicate in two way mode? The important thing to bear in mind with an 
actor network approach is though it is concerned with the role of the non human actors it’s 
principal concern is the way in which the network is disassembled and assembled as 
described by Farnsworth and Austrin 
We highlight three processes involved: the first is assemblage involving 
the combination of different technologies and social arrangements into 
particular configurations. The second is the problem of how such 
configurations are stabilised or destabilised. … 
The third is the assembly and disassembly of networks. Here, we use the 
term actor networks (2005: 15-16). 
 
The case study below of a one- way audio network and it’s assembly and disassembly will 
illustrate the third step mentioned by Farnsworth and Austrin. As on a constant basis the 
 118 
network centred around the beeper is assembled and reassembled depending on that 
network’s success or failure in cutting networks built up around risk items or persons. 
 The only area where there is a direct line of communication between two agencies 
is in the arrivals hall where the Customs control room and the chief Customs officer on 
duty are linked to the MAF quarantine x-ray via a pager that beeps when an officer at the 
MAF x-ray activates his pager. This is one-way communication and simply notifies 
Customs that one of their officers is needed at the x-ray or MAF search bench. The 
assumption that one could draw from this by using it is that the machine, ergo the pager, is 
narrowing the MAF officers knowledge of Customs risks into a Customs risk. The pager 
through its simple beep or not beep mode will not define the risk in any way, as opposed to 
say a Police radio network with different codes for different incidents. A Customs officer 
could be walking to the x-ray to find the worlds largest drugs concealment or alternately to 
the MAF officer who wants to startle the Customs officer by putting a fake pistol cut-out 
through the x-ray. The latter was observed repeatedly throughout my fieldwork. 
Farnsworth and Austrin talk of audio technologies and the way in which they 
rework the boundaries not only of public or private space, but of the 
actors, technologies and networks that assemble each other (2005: 20). 
 
The pager concedes to a MAF officer that all Customs risks are the same and should be 
treated accordingly, while at the same time assembling a MAF- Customs – passenger – x-
ray network. This new network can contain tensions as seen when Customs and MAF 
officers are involved in incidents where drugs are found. This could be because MAF 
officers do not follow the ‘chain of evidence’ approach that Customs officers are bound to 
in their ‘world’.  
An example of this that occurred during my fieldwork that involved the audio 
network and tensions between Customs and MAF due to the context that the call from the 
pager immediately creates, occurred when a MAF officer called a Customs officer to the 
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MAF search area. The Customs officer ‘Gluver’ was advised by MAF officer ‘Pear’ that 
she had found some pills in a passengers bag in the course of conducting a biosecurity 
search. ‘Gluver’ took a look at the pills and questioned the passenger and satisfied herself 
through this process that the pills were prescribed to the passenger and that they were in a 
reasonable amount for the passengers visit to New Zealand. This is operating under the 
instructions given to Customs by ‘Medsafe New Zealand’. As ‘Gluver’ went to leave 
‘Pear’ asked her ‘oh, so those kind of pills are okay, I won’t call you in future for them?’ 
‘Gluver’ had to educate ‘Pear’ about the fact that Customs would need to be called each 
time as each passenger needed to have their risk assessed in regards to the pills or items 
that MAF had located and that even if the pills were the same the context next time might 
be different. The pager allows Customs officers to be rapidly present within the MAF 
search area and creates a context of risk that MAF acknowledges needs to be addressed. 
Based upon the interactions that occur MAF staff may be lulled into believing that they 
understand the context of risk as being based upon the individual items that are located. If 
for example ‘Pear’ came across some codeine tablets and ‘Gluver’ talked to the passenger 
and checked she had the prescription and said they were okay, would not mean that the 
next time ‘Pear’ discovers codeine tablets and a passenger they would be able to be 
released. 
 The Customs officer makes a decision on the risk posed by the medicines in the 
context of the passenger, the medicines, their prior experience and knowledge and the 
likelihood that the medicines are not going to be used for a legitimate or lawful purpose. 
‘Pear’ believed she had assembled enough knowledge so as to be able to make a decision 
when these elements were present again where in actual fact the Customs officer believes 
in order for the network to function correctly their presence is required. As such the 
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Customs officer in this instance and in similar instances has to impart on the MAF officer 
that they cannot make risk decisions such as this without Customs being present. 
 The following subchapter will conclude this chapter’s discussion of the role played, 
and significance of the non-human actors within the border network that police the border 
in alliance with the human actors. 
 
Conclusions – risk as a product  
 The technologies of the border shape a context in which the workers of the border 
and the technologies of the border do their job in mitigating risk. Risk is also a product of 
these technologies working in alliance with human actors at the border. 
Border enforcement work for the most part goes on the assumption that all passengers 
crossing the border are of risk and lack either common sense or morals or both. Smith 
states that specially trained 
behaviour detection officers at 40 airports in the United States since 2003  
in the SPOT programme (screening passengers by observation 
techniques)… have stopped 43,000 people for questioning resulting in 
278 arrests (2008: 28).  
 
Sadly, Smith seems impressed with these statistics. From 43,000 questioned people for 272 
arrests it appears that even at ‘high risk’ US airports the amount of passengers breaching as 
opposed to obeying the regulations and getting caught is a small fraction. Latour using the 
simple example of a non-functioning doorway groom with a sign saying “please close the 
door” states “people are not circumspect, disciplined and watchful” (1992: 245). So we can 
conclude that people do require policing, in the same way they need to be reminded to 
close the door as they will intentionally or inadvertently breach border regulations. 
However even the discussed ‘highly trained’ ‘behaviour detection officers’ are not that 
good at detecting risk passengers.  
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The first chapter of the thesis looked at border workers’ identities, and how through 
some members of the border workers being part of an occupational community they were 
able to increase their effectiveness at policing the border. Not all border workers were 
members of the occupational community and even within the occupational community 
success much of the time was rather fickle within the border network. In light of this 
failing of humans to ‘effectively’ police the border we turn to the machines and artefacts 
that are also actors at the border. 
 These non-human actors at the border the x-rays, ion scanners, databases, cameras, 
arrival cards, notebooks and hitherto unmentioned dogs also police the border. They create 
contexts that make it easier for the human workers of the border to interact with 
passengers. In alliance with the border workers, the non-human actors also police the 
border and shape the human workers of the borders understanding of their workplace. 
 At this point, it is appropriate to touch on how border agencies management 
monitor the risks to the border. These concluding remarks reinforce the theoretical focus of 
this chapter, actor network theory. In the Risk Management AS/NZS 4360:1999 ‘Seven 
step cycle’ we can see that the previously discussed ‘advanced machines’ and ‘mundane 
artefacts’ are a vital part of the mitigation of risk at the border. It is not only at the final 
stage of ‘treat risks’ that the discussed ‘machines’ and ‘artefacts’ at the border come into 
play. Initial ‘establishment of context and the identification of risks’ at an intelligence and 
operations level is reliant on the Cusmod system. The ‘analysis of risk’ is done through the 
x-rays, itemisers and cameras used to analyse and evaluate risk and the risk is traced 
through tracking technologies such as arrival cards and notebooks. These technologies also 
contribute to the airport being a space of ‘confession’ where due to the various 
technologies such as arrival cards and cameras passengers feel compelled to reveal to 
agents of the border details of their lives that they would not otherwise disclose. 
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 The decision as to whether or not to ‘accept risk’ is often undertaken at this level 
based upon a yes / no answer given by a non-human actor in alliance with a border worker. 
For example a passenger may be a drug risk but if successive swabs of their luggage give 
consistently negative results they will likely be released based as much upon this as any 
human decision. The sidebars of ‘communicate and consult and monitor and review’ are 
also dependant on the impartial language provided through the technologies. Cusmod 
provides a method of communication between those, who work to mitigate risk, such as 
border officers at the airport and those who monitor it, such as intelligence and operations 
analysts. An intelligence officer is more likely to be swayed by the sentence “itemiser 
scans and x-rays negative, no unusual behaviour noted on cameras in arrival hall”, in a 
report an airport officer has submitted, than an opinion-based report on a risk passenger. 
An opinion-based report could say something like: “I felt that passenger BLOGS is of a 
low risk to the border and he said that any information we had about him dealing drugs 
was just lies fabricated by his ex-wife.”  
 Caplan talks of risk and how it also bonds through common values and fears  
Common Values lead to common fears, thus the choice of risks and the 
choice of how to live and be linked and each form of life has its own 
typical risk portfolio (2000: 9-10). 
 
The collective mitigation of risk at the border network through numerous agencies 
primarily endeavouring to mitigate ‘their risk’ is something that happens through the 
shared world view of human actors shaped by nonhuman actors, from advanced machines 
to mundane artefacts. Perhaps to tie together the arguments presented here it is worth 
noting the approach of Joffe in that there is an unprecedented sense of risk in contemporary 
societies (1999: 2). As one of the core areas of research of this topic it is apparent that 
there is an unprecedented sense of risk at the border. Many of my informants have 
described the border as ‘chaotic’ and everyone interviewed has described how they from 
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time to time rely upon the non-human actors of other agencies to mitigate risk at the 
border. Recalling the statistics of 43,000 questioned people for 272 arrests being pitched as 
a success it is no surprise that we look to non human actors to “give us a  sense of 
mastery” (1999: 2) over the unpredictable border network. 
 In order to stabilise the border network that can be seen by its human actors as 
unpredictable and chaotic, workers draw upon both human and non human actors to 
mitigate risk. These workers within the border are employed by agencies who compete for 
funds, status and power. This exertion of power to mitigate risk and the competitions for 
power within the border network are the focus of the following chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
Highlighting Power at the Border 
 
As sites of multiple vectors of authority, 
airports present fascinating illustrations of network power 
(Salter 2008: 54) 
 
Power and working the border 
 Power is able to be analysed at the border in three main ways, which conveniently 
relate to three of the ways Foucault looks at power. The first is ‘disciplinary controlling 
power’ which relates to a states power of knowledge and control and the other type of 
power is relational forms of power between entities. The third way is ‘pastoral power’ and 
this will feature at the end of this chapter. 
Power at the border can be visualised as a kind of fork, the handle of the fork is the 
disciplinary power of the state, this is the obvious line of power at the border. Below are 
the multiple prongs of interactional power, exerted by the states workers on passengers and 
sometimes, other workers. These lines of individual power can be seen in action between 
border workers but also between border workers and passengers when they exert their 
discretionary power to select the targets of the states power. Each agency at the border is a 
different fork of state power with the workers as the prongs of interactional power exerting 
the power of the state. Sometimes like two diners each reaching for the same piece of food 
on a plate the prongs of the forks will clash. Unfortunately for passengers in this metaphor, 
they tend to be the food. Sometimes however the food is harder than the fork and the 
prongs can get bent. This can be seen for example, when passengers complain about their 
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treatment at the border, and their complaint is upheld by a reviewing ombudsman or 
similar. 
One of the first aspects of power that must be considered is that power needs to be 
protected, this is of course referring to the state’s power of legitimacy. Foucault says of 
this in regards to his analysis of “the Prince” that the link between the ability to rule and 
the actual ruler is “fragile and continually under threat” (2006: 133). As a corollary to this: 
“the objective of the exercise of power is to reinforce, strengthen and protect the 
principality” (2006: 133). The border is a good place to see the state attempting to protect 
it’s power through it’s rules and procedures and the implements of its power, the workers 
of the border who interpret and enforce the power and will of the state.  
Another key aspect of power according to Foucault is what he would earlier call the 
‘capillary’ nature of power. We can see this understanding of power in his discussion on 
the practices of government: 
practices of government are, on the one hand, multifarious and concern 
many kinds of people: the head of a family, the superior of a convent, the 
teacher or tutor of a child or pupil; so that there are several forms of 
government among which the prince’s relation to the state is only one 
particular mode; while on the other hand, all these other kinds of 
government are internal to the state or society (2006: 134). 
 
Within the border network the practises of government can be seen as split between 
different government agencies. These agencies in turn delegate power down through their 
own hierarchies. Border workers that I talked to even had a personal webpage within the 
agencies intranet that would tell them which “delegated powers” they held. Where one 
worked and ones place in the hierarchy, would influence the power that a worker had 
delegated to them. 
 A successful government controls “the right disposition of things” (2006: 135). 
This is to say in the words of Foucault that the “object and, in a sense, the target of power 
are things” (2006). The border network has been shown in many examples earlier in this 
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thesis, to arrange the targets of power at the border through the management and creation 
of risk. An example where this was shown was the itemiser which turns a passenger into a 
‘drugs risk’ therefore they become a person of risk which must have power exerted on 
them by the states tool, the border worker. The border workers exercise the states’ power 
through searching and questioning the ‘drugs risk’ passenger. The border network has the 
ability to order people and artefacts, therefore the border network enables the government 
to be successful in one respect to Foucault’s arguments on power. 
 This ordering of people and things within the border network is done through the 
exercise of power. One form of power that was mentioned earlier is that of the disciplinary 
controlling power of the state over the border network which is expressed in chapters two 
and three. These chapters give many examples of the border being worked by the human 
and non-human actors who exert the will of the government over the passengers who cross 
the border and come into the government’s jurisdiction. This will of the government is not 
however a smooth exertion of seamless power. This aligns with Foucault’s views on the of 
the mechanisms of security which was mentioned in the introduction and can be said to 
“not tend to convey the exercise of a will over others in the most homogenous, continuous 
and exhaustive way possible” (2007: 66). 
 Foucault is arguing that the mechanisms of security do not in fact tend to exercise a 
will over others in the most effective way possible. One of the arguments of this chapter in 
relation to the question - how is the border worked, is the argument that many of the 
workers of the border are members of an occupational community who communicate risks 
to one another. Non-human technologies also communicate risk and therefore work the 
border. Power in a Foucauldian sense is exerted on behalf of the state through workers as 
they ‘work’ the border. The way that the workers ‘work’ the border is in fact not the most 
“homogenous, continuous and exhaustive way possible”. The border is worked with the 
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workers as eyes of a twisted panopticon at the same level of the passengers. This is a 
mutilation of the traditional concept of the panopticon as an all seeing eye above the 
subjects of it’s’ power. It is a metaphorical mutilation that Foucault would agree with. This 
chapter will give some examples aligned with the idea of an occupational community and 
the theories of an actor network that will analyse power in an appropriate way. 
 ‘Relational power’ is seen at the border in the ways border workers individually 
compete for personal power as to what they are allowed to do. Workers at the border 
compete for power in this way though it may appear that they are competing for their 
agency. For the most part the most obvious power contestations at this level are between 
the workers of the border using their discretionary power and the passengers crossing the 
border. In these instances the workers of the border are using relational power to disallow 
the actions or objects of each other or of passengers, when using their discretionary power 
or state power. 
 
Disciplinary power of the state 
 The following example illustrates the disciplinary controlling power of the state 
exerted in a kind of twisted panopticon where the many eyes of the border workers can 
observe threats to the border and communicate this risk to one another so as to project the 
power of the state. The example that shows this metaphor of a twisted panopticon in action 
that occurred when drugs were detected by a MAF officer at the x-ray machine, along with 
a large amount of other items of interest to Customs not mentioned in this article and still 
under investigation. When discussing this case with my informants (it was my team that 
led the investigation, but I had been on study leave at the time), the comment was made “It 
wasn’t our find really, we just looked where MAF told us to.” The statement that a senior 
officer had made was greeted with assent from the rest of the team present. The feeling 
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was that the person had got through Customs primary line risk assessment, and later 
assessment via camera surveillance and roving officers and possibly dogs, but had been 
caught by a quarantine-screening tool and an operator both focused on looking for bio-
security risks. The incident was summarised in the court news several months later. 
Prescription drugs found in passenger's luggage 
A Cheviot sickness beneficiary was found with thousands of pills in his 
luggage when he arrived at Christchurch Airport from Thailand. 
… pleaded guilty to the charges of importing prescription medicines 
without a reasonable excuse, when he appeared before Judge Stephen 
Erber in the Christchurch District Court today. 
He had been found with 30 packets of 100 tablets – that’s 3000 tablets – 
of the analgesic Amadol, sometimes known as Tramadol, 
He also had 7500 codeine sulphate tablets. 
The drugs were discovered when he flew in to Christchurch Airport from 
Thailand on August 27 (Christchurch Court News, 2008). 
 
Though a successful result in protecting the border (prescription drug abuse in the USA 
now resulting in more fatalities than illegal drug abuse and motor vehicle accidents), the 
result left Customs officers aware that their network by itself, of human and non human 
actors alike could not be relied upon to stop every risk. Maril in his study of the US – 
Mexico border argues that agents working the border realise they cannot prevent all risks 
crossing the border 
every agent … knew from the very marrow of their bones what no one 
else, every nonagent, cared to admit. Real control of these lands along the 
Rio Grande was a pipe dream, a vicious illusion, and a wicked pretension 
(2004: 117). 
 
Maril is arguing that the policing and control of the border is a pipe dream and that agents 
acknowledge this. Agents he argues are aware that they cannot exercise power over every 
border crossing. Similarly border workers in New Zealand cannot expect their agency to 
achieve complete control over the risks it is tasked with protecting. However they can rely 
upon the workers of other agencies, in alliance with their various technologies such as x-
rays to project their power for them at the border. In this way the disciplinary power of the 
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state is exerted and the workers as implements of this disciplinary power appear to the 
public to be in complete control of the border network.   
 Some officers reveal a remarkable amount of reflexivity about their networks role 
in protecting the border. I have had officers from competing agencies tell me how they felt 
the work of another agency was more important, for example 
“MAF has a lot of responsibility, if they miss a dirty boot that brings mad 
cow disease into NZ our whole economy is wrecked. No one will trade 
with us for the next ten years… even AVSEC, if they miss a guy with a 
knife and he boards a plane and crashes it, heads will roll, politicians will 
be tearing in to them left right and centre. But if Customs misses some 
drugs, who will ever know? They are always coming in.” 
 
 Another situation from my fieldwork illustrates the disciplinary power of the state 
through the twisted panopticon metaphor of the many eyes of the border workers exerting 
state power. Customs officer Glover was called to the MAF x-ray via the MAF beeper. A 
garden gnome went through the MAF x-ray and the MAF operator was concerned that the 
image was not consistent as would be expected. To his mind a possible drugs risk existed 
as a result of the visual image presented by the x-ray machine. The x-ray machine did not 
say yes, there was a drugs risk, or no there was not. The gnome had gone through the MAF 
x-ray and been picked up by a passenger at the end before another MAF officer had asked 
the passenger to put it back down by the x-ray. The MAF officer then put the gnome 
through the x-ray again and it was paused in the machine and further x-ray images were 
taken, but none were saved to the x-ray’s hard drive. At this point the gnome had been 
handled by two different MAF officers and the passenger.  
 On arrival Customs officer Glover looked at the images and decided to bring the 
passenger and the gnome to a Customs search bench for questioning and further 
examination of the gnome. Eventually the gnome was taken back to the x-ray where 
images were taken and were stored to the hard-drive of the x-ray. Throughout the later 
Customs process, the gnome was only handled by Customs officer Glover. Eventually a 
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decision was made to drill into the gnome and some of the internal substance that had 
showed up inconclusively on the x-ray was tested with two Customs machines. The first, a 
ion scanner, gave a negative result for drugs. The second, a NIK chemical test, gave an 
inconclusive result.  
 Customs here had used two technologies, one which gave a negative result the 
other which gave an inconclusive result. The decision was made by Glover’s supervisor to 
detain the gnome and further examine it using a device at the Customs base that is similar 
to a device used to perform keyhole surgery. The passengers were released and subsequent 
examination revealed the gnome not to be filled with any narcotics. 
 The MAF officer had detected a possible drugs risk in the border network that was 
handed to the Customs. The networks lateral communication had allowed for the power of 
the state to be exerted on the passengers. Liaison between the agencies following the 
detention of the Gnome followed and, as a result of this Customs requested that MAF take 
a photograph of the x-ray image in the first instance (in future) for evidential purposes. 
Despite the fact that the initial detection of a possible transgression of the states rules had 
been detected by a MAF officer, Customs the agency with the power to legally police the 
transgression was called and able to exert it’s power over the passenger and detain the 
Gnome. The subsequent liaison between the two agencies within the network about future 
action (saving an image) meant that the future ability of these actors within the network to 
exert the states power over passengers was enhanced. 
 This detection and lateral communication within the border network meant that the 
MAF network had to be reassembled around future possible risk items. This reassembly 
falls under Latour’s Litmus test for actor network in action in that 
You have to ‘follow the actors themselves’ , that is try and catch up with 
their often wild innovations in order to learn from them what the 
collective existence has become in their hands, which methods they have 
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elaborated to make it fit together, which accounts could best define the 
new associations that they have been forced to establish (2005: 12). 
 
To Customs, the technology of the x-ray is a risk mitigating technology that allows for the 
power of the state to be exerted over the travelling public. However in itself the x-ray 
presents new risks to the network. A new risk that the x-ray introduces is the risk of a 
failed prosecution, if images of possible ‘exhibits’ such as Gnomes are not saved when 
first discovered.. The acknowledgement of this risk creation fits with contemporary risk 
theories such as those of Joffe, who states 
Even though the advancement of technology has supposedly added a 
sense of mastery over the natural world it has spawned an unprecedented 
sense of risk (1999: 2). 
 
These two examples have shown state power in action over the passengers who cross the 
border. This disciplinary power relies upon knowledge being transferred between the 
workers of the border. It is argued that to passengers crossing the border the power of the 
state appears to come from an all seeing panopticon. In actual fact the power of the state is 
exerted through the workers of the border communicating laterally. The panopticon in 
effect become ‘the all seeing eyes of many border workers – both human and non human’ 
who communicate their knowledge of risks to each other.  
 The other type of power at the border that we can analyse through the ideas of 
Foucault is relational power contested between the workers of the border and between the 
workers and passengers. This is seen in instances where it is not the power of the state 
being exerted so much as the discretionary power of the border workers between 
themselves and passengers. 
 
Relational power at the border 
 In the border network negotiation between actors over meaning illustrates relational 
power. In the following example two border workers were debating how to treat an object 
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in order to determine risk. In the end it was the MAF officer who was working in alliance 
with a technology (x-ray) that mediates risk that was able to exert relational power over the 
Customs officer so as to modify his behaviour and acceptance of the meaning of an object  
Customs officer “can you x-ray this please.” Customs officer is referring 
to a backpack that he has searched and brought down to a MAF officer at 
an x-ray machine in empty form. 
MAF officer “Sure” The backpack is x-rayed and the MAF officer 
frowns at the Customs officer. “There are still pens and keys and junk in 
this, I can’t get a clear return on what’s in the frame.” 
Customs officer “Oh, I didn’t bother clearing them out, its not a drug 
search, its just to see if he has stuffed the lining with cigarettes as he has 
done in the past. I didn’t ask for drugs mode.” 
MAF officer “That’s not how it works I need it empty to be able to tell 
you if there is anything concealed inside, items left in it obstruct things.” 
Customs officer “Oh, sorry, I’ll do it your way in future.” 
 
The Customs officer said no more to the MAF officer but later confided in me that he was 
unsure how MAF could detect fruit in packed luggage, which is how they normally 
checked it, but could not notice cigarettes. He also said he intended to look for himself at 
the image as he felt he would be able to identify cigarettes in the lining. 
 The drugs mode that the x-ray has, changed the behaviour of the MAF officer, the 
human actor now responds to Customs x-ray requests by putting all empty suitcases 
through on ‘drugs’ mode even if the Customs officer is not looking for drugs. In situations 
like this MAF officers exert relational power over Customs officers so as to ensure the 
inputs to the machines that they work in alliance with, are consistent to their demands 
whatever the context that the Customs officer may be working in. Thus Customs officer 
may be searching in different contexts, such as drugs, alcohol and tobacco or counter 
terrorism but for MAF staff involved in this through x-raying items for Customs the 
context of the search remains the same. To ensure this context remains the same MAF 
officers need to exert relational power over Customs officer. 
 The concept of ‘chain of evidence’ provides a good platform to discuss examples of 
relational power interactions between border workers and passengers. ‘Chain of evidence’ 
 133 
is a law enforcement concept that ensures that exhibits, such as seized or detained 
weapons, are handled by as few officers as possible and are appropriately stored, tracked 
and recorded, so that when the item is produced in court there can be no question of 
tampering or falsification of evidence. At an international airport the actors most exposed 
to this concept are the Police and Customs officers. Actors such as MAF officers, AVSEC  
officers and Immigration officers all seize items but due to them rarely taking the matter to 
court, unlike Police and Customs, they do not have the same need for a chain of evidence. 
International air travellers will have been exposed to the latter groups’ technological 
response to this situation in the form of yellow quarantine amnesty bins and red AVSEC 
amnesty bins.  
Neither the Police nor Customs, due to the nature of what they look for, drugs, 
weapons, objectionable material etc can use amnesty bins. Though the focus of this work is 
on the border networks of workers, a point of interest is seen in the fact that passengers 
who have dealings with Customs are often horrified to find that they cannot just put 
offending articles (a common one being stun guns) into an amnesty bin and must instead 
go through a process of having it legally detained. Often the passengers try to negotiate 
with the Customs officers to be able to bin the item as they have seen the amnesty bin for 
another agency in the area. This item in their network means that the Customs officer and 
passenger must reinvent the border network into one that aligns with the legal definition 
that the Customs officer has to enforce. Often the negotiation involves explaining how the 
non human actor – the amnesty bin, is not an applicable part of the network to the 
passenger. To do this another nonhuman actor in the form of a NZCS334 ‘Notice of 
Detention’ or a copy of the applicable legislation is often used to reassemble the officer – 
passenger border network.  
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Through my fieldwork I have noted that tension between passengers and officers is 
most apparent in instances such as this, as opposed to officers dealing with serious 
offenders having drugs seized. This is because relational power is being exerted by the 
border worker over the passenger. The passenger is being told they cannot have something 
that has been in their possession before they travelled. Worse still they are told that 
importing the item is an offence and they cannot simply just put it in an amnesty bin like 
they want to. Because passengers are used to being able to do so the border worker is 
forced to use relational power over the passenger and argue with them as to the place of the 
item in the border network. 
Interactional or relational power provides examples of the workers of the border 
competing for power amongst themselves. To fall back on the fork metaphor the workers 
of the border are not always able to see the world of risk through the point of view of the 
other workers and can come into relational conflict as they exert the states power. Though 
occupational community is an applicable idea not all border workers are members of the 
occupational community and even if they are they will still due to the nature of the work, 
and human nature, come into conflict with one another. An example of this that came to 
note during my fieldwork was when an AVSEC officer called a Policeman over to his 
work area to advise the Policeman that he had seized cannabis from a passenger. The 
Police officer on discovering that the AVSEC officer had not held the person until his 
arrival, threatened to charge the AVSEC officer with possession of a Class C drug. This 
informal joking on the exercise of power of one individual over another is relational power 
and came about due to the different methodologies, in regards to chain of evidence, that the 
agencies use. 
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Pastoral Power at the border 
 A third kind of power that is mentioned by Foucault and would not warrant a 
mention  in so brief a discussion of power were it not for the borders inherently 
‘movement’ based nature is the concept of pastoral power. Pastoral power is linked to the 
movement of a flock, be it people such as the crew of a ship or a flock of animals. It is also 
readily applied to static populations and is defined as: 
pastoral power is, I think, entirely defined by it’s beneficence; its only raison 
d’etre is doing good, and in order to do good. In fact the essential objective of 
pastoral power is the salvation (salut) of the flock…. 
Pastoral power is a power of care. It looks after the flock, it looks after the 
individuals of the flock, it sees to it that the sheep do not suffer (Foucault 2007: 
126-127). 
 
In the course of my fieldwork I jokingly heard large groups of passengers being 
referred to as sheep when they couldn’t follow the ‘Disney Land queues’ to get to 
the immigration booths and had to be ‘rounded up’ and pointed in the right 
direction by the trouble shooting officer in charge of the queues. Surely within the 
border network this is where any metaphor of state power and beneficence would 
end? Not so.  
 The border network and the artefacts and workers that make it up exert the 
pastoral power of the state over the passengers who travel through the network as 
regularly as they exert the disciplinary power of the state or get involved in 
contests for and around interactional power. It could be argued that from the 
moment that passengers are handed their arrival cards on the plane they are shown 
the pastoral power of the state. The arrival cards give passengers the opportunity to 
declare ‘restricted and prohibited items’ without fear of repercussion. In this way 
passengers surrender hundreds of cans of pepper spray, stun guns, knives assorted 
weapons and even drug paraphernalia on a monthly basis at the border. The cards 
take the time to outline in many languages and in great detail what passengers must 
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declare, not what they must not bring in. In this way the cards can be seen as an 
artefact of pastoral power.  
 Distributed throughout the international departures area and also through 
the internationals arrival area are AVSEC and MAF amnesty bins. These amnesty 
bins again represent the pastoral power of the state. A passenger could walk right 
up to a bin holding an apple that they had not declared or a knife that was in their 
bag and place it in the bin with no fear of repercussion for their oversight. In this 
way the bins cost the border agencies hundreds of dollars in potential fines that 
they could otherwise collect. This fits with Foucault’s definition of pastoral power 
and the shepherd metaphor that he applies to it “he does not even consider his own 
advantage” (2007: 128).  
 An aspect of pastoral power that is not present at the international airport 
studied is the red / green lanes. Instead, and of a similar vein and another example 
of pastoral power at the airport studied, is the signage which advised passengers to 
proceed to certain areas if they have something to declare. Passengers that fail to 
declare items were also sometimes seen during the fieldwork as being subject to 
the pastoral power of the state rather than disciplinary power. An example of this 
during the fieldwork was an elderly British couple who had failed to declare an 
apple to MAF. The apple was detected in a handbag by a MAF beagle and 
theoretically the passengers should have been given a $200 instant fine. The 
passengers were asked: “is this your arrival card? Did you read this card? Did you 
understand this card?” Seeing as the passengers had answered in the affirmative 
(and even if they had not) the MAF officer could have issued a $200 fine. Instead 
the MAF officer let the passengers off with a warning and advice as to the best way 
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to get to their hotel, thereby demonstrating at an individual level the pastoral power 
of the state. 
 These examples of pastoral power represent this larger concept of power on 
a much smaller scale. Foucault’s discussions on power are wide ranging and 
variable and it is not the intention of this thesis to show the full range of his ideas. 
Rather the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the three kinds of power that are 
mentioned by Foucault that are applicable to the border network. All three kinds of 
power are in use within the border network and all can be related to one another 
through asking: who is the subject and object of the power being exerted? 
Interestingly the answer to this question is that the subject and object can vary, 
mostly it is the passengers who are subject to power at the border, but it can also be 
the border workers themselves. 
 
Power and working the border, concluding remarks 
“At an airport, public world order interests converge with the private traveler’s 
interest” (Aaltola 2005: 275) 
 
Power of the state as a potential force is omnipresent at the border. Customs officers as 
part of their work will strip search passengers and charge people for taking photographs, 
airport Police officers carry Glock pistols at all times; ergo, deadly force is always present 
at the border, where it is not amongst Police officers outside the airport. AVSEC officers 
take non-illegal items such as aerosols and nail clippers and MAF officers issue 
thoughtless ageing tourists with $200 fines for breaching bio-security regulations.  
 The major risk, and as such the main justification for the brash projection of state 
power at the border that is in the forefront of border workers minds as well as the travelling 
public’s, came into the public consciousness on September 11. No book or article related to 
 138 
the topics of airports in recent years will fail to mention this event at length. To surmise 
this event in relation to the international airport I argue that the events of September 11 
were pitched as a failure of the airport as described by Gordon who says of the terrorists 
and their attack 
There was no flag waving or fanfare: they were simply exploiting the 
shoddy banality of the system. Minicams at ATM machines and twenty 
four hour surveillance cameras recorded their movements before they 
boarded. x-ray machines scanned their belongings. A barely perceptible 
line was crossed and nineteen hijackers were waved past security 
checkpoints (2008: 260) 
 
The attack had brought into popular consciousness the idea of the “threatened member of 
society”. The airport as a mechanism ensures that passengers feel two things; the first and 
foremost is that they are threatened and need to be protected, the second is that they are 
potential threatners. It is in this dichotomy that the role of the border agencies across the 
spectrum unite, and come to light. Be it an Immigration officer stopping a foreign worker, 
or a Policeman shooting a terrorist, the role of border agents is to determine the threatened 
and threatner. Fierke defines this concept of threatner and threatened 
The core of security, the protection from harm, assumes a field of 
relationships, including a threatner, the threatened, the protector or means 
of protection and the protected (2007: 46). 
 
Discussions of power at the border in regards to state disciplinary power fall back in this 
day and age to the threat of terrorism that we are told we live under. As such modern 
governments in the interests of reinforcing their authority need to project their disciplinary 
power to the border. The workers of the border are their implements in projecting this 
power. The government rather than relying upon these workers and their technologies 
which were critiqued by Gordon above in regards to September 11 is happy to maintain the 
traditional idea of the border being protected by a panopticon like power.  
 The reality of this research is the disciplinary power of the state at the border in fact 
relies upon the many eyes of the border workers and their ability to communicate laterally 
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within the border network. As a side effect to this lateral communication within the border 
network is the relational power that is contested between individuals, be they border 
worker – border worker, or border worker – passenger. 
 Power is an important aspect of the border and this chapter raises some key issues 
around power in relation to the workers of the border. Unfortunately the scope and ethical 
dilemmas posed by a worker of the border such as the author conducting participant 
observation based research into passengers’ perceptions of power at the border are 
untenable. 
 
Too much power at the border? 
 The concern of many who study the border is that it is a network in which power 
can be readily abused, by the state and also by the implements of the state itself, the 
workers. This is a concern of civil libertarians the world over, perhaps rightfully so, as has 
been demonstrated throughout this thesis, the workers of the border and the machines that 
they work in alliance with can be extremely invasive towards the travelling public. This is 
a concern even of border agencies such as customs who commissioned a book on the 
border 
Who can exercise the power? Is it conferred on a particular group or 
levels of officials, or can any border control official or police officer 
exercise it? (Ladley and White 2006: 55) 
 
 It can be argued in mitigation of the idea that too much power is wielded at the 
border, that a consequence of the power relations that come about from their being 
numerous agencies that ‘police’ the border is that no one agency has all the power. As such 
no one group of workers, even the occupational community that was discussed, are all 
knowing and all seeing. The occupational community may have the ability to communicate 
what it sees effectively, but there is not one all seeing panopticon above the border 
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network. The border control apparatuses therefore are not a part of the “cold monster in 
history that has continually grown and developed as a sort of threatening organism above 
civil society” (Foucault 2007:248). This is to refer back to Foucault’s concerns that 
governments and their policing instruments become all encompassing. This is certainly not 
reflected in the conclusions drawn in this chapter. Finally the exercise of pastoral power at 
the border demonstrates that all power is not necessarily negative in nature. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
 
 Over the two years that have passed since this thesis began the border network has 
changed considerably. A new government is in power and the new government will no 
doubt have intentions to change the shape of the network and introduce new technologies 
that will themselves cause the network to be reassembled in ways that neither government, 
nor border workers expect.  
 What has not changed is the central argument and focus of this thesis which is the 
focus on the interconnectedness of human and non human actors within the border 
network. The place where this fieldwork was conducted was an airport but it is 
acknowledged that even at this field site a ‘full’ all encompassing view of the border is not 
achievable or realistic. 
 
The Airport 
The workers of the border, the tools that the workers of the border use and the 
power that is centred at this hub of international travel are all dependant on the existence of 
the airport. Any analysis of the workers of the border is also an analysis of the airport 
itself. A study of the workers of the border becomes a study of the power exerted by the 
modern air travel process. Salter talks of the modern airport as “a system of systems that 
functions as a single node in a complex global network” (2004: 22). This node in the 
global network (to draw from AS/NZS 4360:1999 Risk Management Standard) is able to 
identify, monitor, treat and communicate risk, through the human and nonhuman actors 
working in alliance. 
 It is interesting and relevant to this study of the workers of the border to note the 
way in which the various technologies in air travel have influenced the shape and internal 
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dynamic of the airport as well as its workers. Gordon gives an example of the Boeing 747 
jumbo jet 
The 747 changed the scale of everything on the field and in the 
terminals… The planes could carry four hundred passengers, so departure 
lounges and concourses needed to be twice as big… The stylish 
restaurants and cocktail lounges of the 1960s gave way to self service 
food courts and fast food franchises where herds of rumpled travellers 
waited in line to buy processed snacks (2004: 22).  
 
It can be expected that future changes in aeroplanes will have similar effects.  
 To roughly trace Alistair Gordon’s excellent history of the airport we can see that 
air travel went through a golden phase in the 1920s, which was then followed by buildings 
constantly being behind the demands put on them by ever increasing passenger numbers 
(2008). Gordon refers to a period in the 1960s when “airports would reach an almost 
supernatural level of temporality, leaving little time between conception and demolition” 
(2008: 217). This is still seen throughout the world’s airports, and at the site of the 
fieldwork. Finally and presently came the securitised age which followed the events of 
September 11 which I have addressed in this thesis in the accounts of the management of 
risk at the border. 
 Though this thesis has focused upon one node in this network; the workers in a 
modern airport and the relatively modern technologies that they use to police the border, 
the mutually constitutive nature of borders is not limited to modern air travel. Flynn 
studied the Benin- Nigeria border and identity, exchange and the state and came to some 
interesting conclusions on this border zone that are applicable as much to this third world 
land border as they are to a first world airport border (1997). Flynn looked at the way the 
people living in the border zone used the border to draw boundaries around themselves and 
situate themselves in relation to the border 
Because borderlands are inherently zones of mediation and ambiguities, I 
will throughout this article try to distinguish clearly among Beninois 
border residents, Nigerian border residents, Customs guards, and nonlocal 
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traders. Only by doing so can we understand how these groups draw 
boundaries around themselves and how they situate themselves in relation 
to the border. (1997: 314). 
 
A conclusion of this thesis is that the workers of the border at the international airport 
studied also draw boundaries around themselves. These boundaries separate them from 
those who cross the border as passengers, as well as those who do not work the border in a 
policing capacity, or only do so on a part time basis. Risk crosses these boundaries and 
contributes to the interconnectedness of the actors at the border. 
 Air travel is for the majority of the public something to be endured rather than 
enjoyed as it once perhaps was, Aaltola described the cause and effect of this modern 
airport 
Stemming from the partly conflicting demands of economy and security, 
the airport’s political space is tense, nervous and, occasionally, highly 
dramatic…. The airport exposes people to what the average Westerner 
regards as either a nuisance or a reassurance – drug-sniffing dogs, x-ray 
machines, metal detectors, mandatory searches, restrictions on movement, 
security inspections, and intense screening. Staring Customs officers, 
sharp questioning, bio-identifiers, computerized facial recognition and 
other technological marvels are meant to produce an environment in 
which people’s intentions are ‘revealed’ and suspicious behaviour is 
recognized (2005: 263). 
 
The public travel with the human and non human agents of the border all around them, 
policing their actions and watching them. The public ‘endure’ the border workers and the 
border technologies as they travel, it is therefore an appropriate anthropological question to 
look at what these workers are doing. 
 
‘How is the border worked at an international airport?’ 
 The Introduction to this thesis showed that there are many different border agencies 
at the international airport studied. All of these agencies are looking to mitigate certain 
risks set down for them by the government. Sometimes the agencies look to mitigate the 
same risk, such as endangered species, but in different ways. Risk at the border is 
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ambiguous and the role of border workers is often blurred, as is the public’s perception as 
to the roles of border workers. Risk is also the commonality between border agencies, all 
of them seek to identify risk and mitigate it. 
 As a result of September 11, changes to travel and trade legislation and practises 
mean different projects are underway that look at how the border is operated from a 
facilitation and security perspective. These projects will impact upon the workers of the 
border but the workers of the border will reshape and renegotiate any changes that come to 
their network be they new technologies or new procedures. As such the border network 
cannot be defined in a future state any more than it can be described in its current state. 
This is because the triad of border workers, border technologies and passengers are 
constantly changing and as such the border network is constantly changing. The focus of 
this thesis can therefore be seen as not so much describing the border network as it is, 
rather it seeks to account for and track changes to the network.  
 Chapter two of this thesis looked at the way the workers of the border go about 
their work on a day-to-day basis as members of the occupational community who have 
refined their ability to talk to other workers of the border from different agencies about 
different risks to the border. What the border workers actually did at work did not 
necessarily fit with their formalised position descriptions. This chapter showed that the 
workers of the border outside of the occupational community were also able to police risk 
to the border but were not so effective at policing ‘collective’ risk to the border. Risk was 
the common aspect of border workers identity and the workers of the border all based their 
workplace identity on their ability to effectively mitigate and communicate about risk.  
 Chapter three looked at the way in which these border workers use the various 
technologies at the border to communicate these risks and detect and mitigate the risks in 
alliance with one another. These technologies like the workers of the border themselves are 
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not necessarily what their ‘position description’ would have them to be. A MAF x-ray 
machine being loaded by a worker outside of the occupational community has a 
completely different contextual interaction with a passenger than the member of the 
occupational community operating the x-ray who notices contraband in a passenger’s bag. 
The machine creates the context in which the worker interacts with the passenger and also 
potentially with other border workers depending upon what is in the bag. Chapter three 
also looked at the way in which these technologies impacted upon the border network. The 
technologies and workers in alliance police the border and in doing so exert power over the 
people who cross the border as well as demonstrate discrepancies between the power that 
the workers of the border project and the power they actually have. Farnsworth and Austrin 
talk of the way in which human actors and objects become a hybrid identity 
Human and their objects become in effect, a hybrid entity themselves- an 
entity connected to, and connecting up, other communities and worlds. 
For this reason it makes sense to speak of actor-networks because each 
half of the term engages with, and assembles, the other. Actor networks 
then become a way to track how humans and technologies constantly 
assemble and reassemble chains of actors, technologies and practises into 
fluid networks of interaction (2005: 15). 
 
This was demonstrated in chapter three where the assemblies and reassemblies of networks 
at the border of which objects such as itemiser , x-rays and surveillance cameras were all 
involved in connecting the networks of border workers from different agencies as well as 
connecting passengers to border workers. The artefacts of the border from mundane arrival 
cards and notebooks to sophisticated itemisers and x-ray machines, all appear to the 
travelling public to have a simple ‘job’. In point of fact the roles of these artefacts and what 
they actually do and transform are far from what would be apparent to the causal observer.  
 Chapter four looked at the role of power within the border network, the power the 
border workers competed for, the power of government that they enacted and exercised 
over the travelling public. This power was shown to be collectively used by the border 
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workers in a way that to the passengers crossing through the border network made it 
appear that the border is a kind of all knowing all seeing panopticon. The all seeing 
panopticon is in fact a many eyed panopticon constituted through border workers and 
technologies communicating laterally within the network. 
 Traditionally the idea of a border is one where power is arbitrarily enacted upon the 
travelling public. Interestingly this has been shown to be not the case. The workers of the 
border are also subject to the power of the state and compete for power amongst 
themselves. If the state decided that all passengers from a certain nation are a ‘risk’ then 
the border workers are forced to interact with all passengers from that nation. Both the 
passengers arriving from the ‘risk’ nation, and the border workers themselves are forced by 
the states power to do certain things.  
 Another interesting issue that arouse from the study of power at the border is that 
while some passengers and workers are subject to the disciplinary power of the state or 
relational power interactions with border workers, all are subject to pastoral power. This 
kind of soft power is very visible but often disregarded at the border. The pastoral power is 
not a threatening kind of power that the travelling public need to be concerned about. 
Pastoral power is only really talked about in studies such as this and it is neglected in most 
of the literature studied during the production of this thesis. 
 Anthropology as an academic discipline traditionally went to a ‘far away’ location 
so as to understand the ‘familiar’ human existence better. As a site of study, an 
international airport is a place where far away people and things come into the ‘familiar’ 
domain. I argue that these far away people and things allow us to understand the border 
network effectively and what this tells us is surprising and unfamiliar. Insights into the 
border network of New Zealand give us insights into the workers of the border as well as 
into New Zealand itself. 
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 Essentially this thesis does in a unique way what contemporary anthropology does 
best, it looks at the interconnectedness of actors. In this thesis the interconnectedness of 
human actors, and non human actors was the focus. It is through this interconnectedness 
that the border is worked. Communication and risk are a central tenet of this 
interconnectedness. This thesis makes neither a structuralist argument nor an argument 
which focuses upon agency. The thesis acknowledges that the whole border cannot be 
looked down upon to give an ‘all encompassing account’ this is because networks have no 
boundaries, no small irony in a study of the border.   
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Appendix One – ‘Questionnaire’  
Information, Consent form and Questions 
 
University of Canterbury 
Department of Anthropology 
 
INFORMATION 
 
You are invited to participate as a subject in the research project:  
 
Working the Border: Risk and Inter-Agency  
Communication at an International Airport. 
 
• The aim of this project is to better understand and analyze through 
anthropological methods how risk and inter-agency communication are 
linked at the border. 
• Your involvement in this project will be through a brief questionnaire that will 
take 5-15 minutes. If you so wish at a date following the questionnaires 
completion you have the right to review your answers and the right to 
withdraw from the project at any time, including withdrawal of any 
information provided. 
• The results of the project will be published, but you may be assured of the 
complete confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: the identity of 
participants will not be made public. To ensure anonymity and 
confidentiality:  
1. All interview transcripts/ material will be kept under lock and key.  
2. You will not be identifiable in the text of the thesis – through use of 
non-specific quotations and aliases, where and as necessary. 
 
The project is being carried out as a requirement for Mason Tolerton’s Masters of 
Arts Degree – Anthropology, under the supervision of Associate Professor Martin 
Fuchs, who can be contacted at +64 3 364 2987 and Associate Professors Terry 
Austrin who can be contacted at +64-0-3-364 2188. They will be pleased to 
discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project. 
 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the School of Sociology and 
Anthropology Ethics Committee. 
 
Mason Tolerton. 
BA Honors 1st Class Anthropology 
Masters of Arts Candidate 
Phone: ### #### 
Email: 
#### 
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Consent Form 
 
 
Mason Tolerton 
C/O School of Sociology and Anthropology,  
University of Canterbury, 
Private Bag 4800,  
Christchurch,  
New Zealand,  
 
17 August 2007 
Working the Border: Risk and Inter-Agency  
Communication at an International Airport. 
 
I have read and understood the description of the above-named project. On this 
basis I agree to participate as a subject in the project, and I consent to publication 
of the results of the project with the understanding that anonymity will be 
preserved. 
I understand also that I may at any time withdraw from the project, including 
withdrawal of any information I have provided. 
 
NAME (please print): ……………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Signature: 
 
 
Date: 
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1/ 
The ‘border’: which of the following metaphors best describes the border where you 
work (please circle one): 
A/ Wall / line in the sand 
B/ A Sector 
C/ A Network / web of agencies and laws 
D/ Checkpoint 
E/ Other – (please describe) …………………. 
 
If you wish please describe why you chose you answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
2/ 
Is the border where you work a: 
A/ Calm and ordered environment 
B/ Chaotic environment 
C/ Other – (please describe) …………………. 
 
If you wish please describe why you chose you answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
3/ 
From a professional perspective what is the biggest risk you look for / to mitigate 
through your work: 
A/ People and their actions such breaking laws – smuggling immigration breaches and 
terrorism etc. 
B/ Things (plants, contaminated food stuffs, LAGS, knives, drugs, explosives etc. 
C/ Other – (please describe) …………………. 
 
If you wish please describe why you chose you answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
4/ 
What mistake that you could make while working at the border concerns you most? 
 
For example – for me it is searching a passenger and deeming them to be of a ‘low risk’ 
but in fact that passenger is an extremist who leaves NZ and launches a terrorist attack on 
Australia. 
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5/ 
Do you believe that you: 
A/ Attempt to only mitigate risks to the border as defined by your agency, 
B/ Go to work and attempt to mitigate all risks to the NZ border,  
Eg: I am a Customs officer but I attempt to stop all risks to the NZ border such as 
immigration and biosecurity and air security risks. 
C/ Other – (please describe) …………………. 
 
If your answer is (B) could you please give an example of how you have done so and your 
motivation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6/ 
Do you: 
A/ Only use the tools and colleagues of your agency to mitigate risk to the border? 
B/ On occasion use the tools and people of other agencies to mitigate risk to the border? 
 
If your answer is (B) could you please give an example of how you have done so: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7/ 
Do you believe that risk to the border is: 
A/ Shared 
B/ Individual 
C/ What my immediate manager tells me it is, each shift. 
D/ Other – (please describe) …………………. 
 
If you wish please describe why you chose you answer: 
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8/ 
Can you think of an occasion when you have been un-able to convey to a colleague 
from a border agency other than your own that a person or object is a risk to the 
border – from your perspective?  
      Yes / no 
If yes please describe the occasion in general terms: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9/  
If any issues arise that I feel may be worth further discussion for my research would 
you mind being approached for an interview? 
 
10/  
Finally: 
Please circle your work area: NZCS – MAF – INZ – POLICE - AVSEC 
OTHER ________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you very much for your time and please feel free to add any comments, 
opinions or examples on the reverse of the page about this topic / research area. 
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